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THE ENERGY CRISIS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The energy industry faces a crisis-an energy shortage that may not
be alleviated for a number of years. Unlike the transitory regional
supply shortages of the past, the present crisis is far more pervasive,
threatening the industrial and economic progress of the nation.
Authorities have predicted that this energy gap, spurred on by the
convergence of a variety of circumstances affecting the delicate balance
of supply and demand, will have collateral consequences that stagger the
imagination, including sharp buyer competition for scarce fuel supplies
and spiraling consumer prices for basic fuel services. The very existence
of the crisis raises many grave questions. What factors caused the
shortage? Will the energy industry be able to meet the burgeoning
demand in future years? What action must be taken to avoid further
crises? What can the federal government do under the existing laws and
regulations to meet future energy problems? None of these questions
admit to a categorical answer, but they do suggest the need for a
comprehensive national energy policy that can help insure a constant
fuel supply to meet the nation's expanding energy needs. The purpose of
this Special Project is to analyze the current fuel markets and to
investigate the antitrust and regulatory questions created by a decade of
increasing concentration and interfuel combination. The Project will
seek to identify actual and potential problem areas and suggest possible
solutions within the antitrust and regulatory framework.
Although primary responsibility rests with the industry to solve the
existing crisis, responsible government action must be taken to avert
similar problems in the future. If, for example, lively competition in the
market place will answer future fuel needs, then definite antitrust
measures should be taken immediately. In this regard, the trends in
economic concentration in the fuel industry will be pointed out, together
with the antitrust implications of these trends. Other avenues of
government action also are available, primarily in the form of
government regulation. The Project will examine the possible forms of
regulation that could be employed, including interagency coordination,
consolidation of regulatory authority, and development of new
regulatory agencies.

II.

THE ENERGY CRISIS AND ITS CAUSES

The severe fuel shortages in 1970 poignantly demonstrated the

serious problems that beset our present system of fuel supply.
Unfortunately, the causes of this shortage are more obscure than its
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result. Yet these causes must be explored before any remedial action can
be properly directed toward eliminating further shortages in the supply
of fuel. This portion of the Project is designed to sketch-in the
background of the shortage and briefly detail its causes. The exploration
of these causes serves as the basis for the corrective actions suggested
throughout the Project.
A.

The Nature of the Energy Crisis

Without question, a severe fuel shortage exists in the United States.
The demand for fuel has far outstripped the supply, leaving a
considerable energy "gap." Consumption of energy in the United States
has grown at an annual compound rate of 3.1 percent since World War
II.1 Even this figure obscures the more recent increases in energy
consumption. Between 1965 and 1969, the annual compound rate
jumped to 5.0 percent. 2 The overall increase in the need for energy is
reflected by rising demands for individual fuels, such as residual fuel oil,
whose growth rate, increasing at an annual compound rate of 2.7 percent
from 1960 to 1964, leaped to 7.1 percent from 1966 to 1968.3 Dramatic
increases in demand are pronounced for other fuels as well. Natural gas,
a fuel that has gained popularity because of new pollution standards,
faces a demand that will outstrip available supplies by 50 percent in
1980.4 Even at present consumption, proved natural gas reserves can
meet demands for only thirteen years.5
The coal shortage is similarly acute. In 1970, demand outstripped
supply by ten million tons.' Moreover, demand has exceeded supply in
seven of the last ten years. The impact of this shortage has been
particularly devastating to the nation's steam-electric generating plants,
which consume 54 percent of the annual coal production. 7 During the
1. NATIONAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., COMPETITION IN THE ENERGY
3 (1970) [hereinafter cited as COMPETITION IN THE ENERGY

MARKETS, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
MARKETS].

2. Id. The per capita consumption of energy was 42.5% higher in 1969 than in 1947. Although
the consumption of energy per dollar of the gross national product declined from 1947 to 1966, in
the last 3 years this figure appears to be increasing, indicating that energy consumption is keeping
pace with the growth in the economy. In terms of barrel equivalents, the annual per capita
consumption of oil has increased from 39 barrels in 1950 to 49 in 1965. In 1980, this figure will be
equal to 69 barrels. Wall Street J.,Oct. 5, 1970, at 1, col. 5 (S.W. ed.).
3. COMPETITION IN THE ENERGY MARKETS, supra note 1,at 8. The annual growth rate at the
present time is nearly 12%. Mayer, Why the U.S. is in an "Energy Crisis," FORTUNE, Nov. 1970, at
76.
4. Wall Street J.,
Oct. 5, 1970, at I, col. 5 (S.W. ed.).
5. Id.
6. Id.

7.

NATIONAL COAL ASS'N,

1966

BITUMINOUS COAL FACTS

76-77 [hereinafter cited as 1966
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past three consecutive years, coal consumption, including domestic
demand and coal exports, has exceeded the supply, causing consumers to
draw down their reserve supplies." Nationally, for example, this shortage
meant that the average power company in April 1970 could only
maintain a 54-day coal stockpile, well below the typical 75- to 90-day
reserve considered necessary to provide service during peak loads? Some
electric utilities have experienced even more difficulty maintaining
sufficient coal stockpiles. During the summer of 1970, the Tennessee

Valley Authority (TVA) had only a ten-day reserve of coal at full burn,
with some plants having only a five-day supply.' 0 In addition, receipts of
coal averaged only 80 percent of the amount scheduled for delivery under
long-term contracts." Uranium is the only fuel source that is not
presently in short supply. Even this exemption may be short-lived,
however, since the Atomic Energy Commission has predicted that the
204,000 tons of existing reserves capable of being enriched and supplied

are not sufficient to meet projected needs through 1980.12
The normal response of a competitive market to an increase in
demand is a commensurate increase in supply. In the face of a

phenomenal expansion in the need for energy, however, domestic
production has remained relatively stagnant. In the coal market, for

example, it was estimated that a ten million ton shortage will remain in
1970.13 Likewise, the current supply base of natural gas is barely
sufficient to continue service to existing customers, 4 and the present
BITUMINOUS COAL FACTS]. In 1965, for example, electric utilities consumed 242,729,000 tons of

coal, out of a total noncaptive production of 413,368,000 tons in that same year.
8.
COMPETITION IN THE ENERGY MARKETS, supra note 1, at 10.
9. Bus. WEEK, Apr. 18, 1970, at 27. In only one month, between March and April 1970, the
average stockpile dropped from a 60-day supply to a 54-day supply. Id.
10. Letter from Aubrey J. Wagner, Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, to
Congressman Richard Fulton, Sept. 21, 1970, on file in the Vanderbilt Law Review office. In his
letter, Chairman Wagner pointed out that invitations to bid on coal supply contracts, which would
require the development of new mines, have been virtually ignored. As a result, TVA has been
purchasing nearly all the coal bid to them, on short-term or medium-term contracts.
I1. Id.
12. COMPETITION IN THE ENERGY MARKETS, supra note 1,at 12. It has been estimated that by
1980, 35% of electric energy generated will be produced by nuclear fuel. Consequently, new uranium
enrichment facilities and improvement of existing facilities will be required by 1980, necessitating
capital investment of $600-800 million. JOINT COMM. ON ATOMIC ENERGY, 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS.,
SELECTED MATERIALS CONCERNING FUTURE OWNERSHIP OF THE AEC's GASEOUS DIFFUSION
PLANTS 3 (Comm. Print 1969) [hereinafter cited as SELECTED MATERIALS].
13. Wall Street J., Oct. 5, 1970, at 1, col. 5 (S.W. ed.); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Special Small Business Problems of the House Select Comm. on Small Business, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 44 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Hearings] (statement of Herbert Stein, Council of Economic
Advisors).
14. COMPETITION IN THE ENERGY MARKETS, supra note 1,at 6; Wall Street J., Oct. 5, 1970,
at I, col. 5 (S.W. ed.).
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increase of six percent per year in natural gas demand signals significant
supply shortages in the future.- 5 Domestic production of residual fuel oil
also is insufficient to meet demands; consequently, 94 percent of the oil
consumed on the east coast must be imported. 6
Because of these shortages, intense buyer competition for available
supplies has developed, with resulting increases in the price of fuel.
Nationally, bituminous coal prices rose an average of 56 percent in the

first half of 1970, while oil prices to utilities increased at a 48 percent
annual rate during the same period.17 In terms of price, the shortage
caused an increase from 2.28 to 3.34 dollars per barrel for crude oil
during a five-month period in 1970.18 In addition, spot contract rates in
some areas climbed as high as thirteen dollars a ton for coal. 9 At TVA's
Widows Creek Plant, for example, the per ton price of coal has increased

from slightly in excess of four dollars in 1968 to nearly nine dollars by
mid-year 1970.20 Overall, TVA estimated that 60 million dollars in
increased expenses for 1970 was reflected in the cost of coal.2 The
additional 100 million dollars of revenue needed to meet these increasing
costs has been supplied by the consumers of TVA power, who have had
2
to absorb a 23 percent rate hike. 1

B.

Short-Range Contributorsto the Energy Crisis

Obviously, the increase in fuel prices is the classical result of
demand outstripping supply. In order to assess the performance of the
energy industry, it is necessary, therefore, to determine the reason for the
15. Hearings, supra note 13, at 166 (statement of Hollis M. Dole, Assistant Secretary for
Mineral Resources, Department of the Interior). This increase in demand is twice the amount that
the United States has been able to import from Canada. Mr. Dole predicted that gas consumption
will drop substantially below the annual 6% increase because of the consistent inability of the supply
to meet the demand. Id.
16. Wall Street J., Oct. 5, 1970, at 1, col. 5 (S.W. ed.).
17. Id.
18. NEWSWEEK, Oct. 12, 1970, at 95, col. 3. On the east coast spot market, the cost of
residual fuel oil averages $4.10 per barrel as compared with a cost of $2.20 only a year ago. Mayer,
supra note 3, at 77, col. 1.
19. FoRBEs, Oct. 15, 1970, at 80, col. I. The price rise generally has been less spectacular in
the electric utility market. The cost of coal rose from $6.02 f.o.b. the plants in 1968 to an estimated
$6.50 in 1970. This points out the limiting effect the long-term contract has on prices. Hearings,
supra note 13, at 44 (statement of Herbert Stein, Council of Economic Advisors).
20. Letter from Aubrey J. Wagner, supra note 10.
21. TVA Press Release (July 17, 1970). Duke Power Company's cost per million BTU for
coal has risen from $0.28 in 1968 to $0.30 in 1969, to $0.35 in March 1970, and then to $0.38 a
month later. It was estimated that the cost would reach $0.42 by the end of 1970. Washington Post,
Aug. 24, 1970, at A16, col. 2.
22. Id.
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disparity between supply and demand at current price levels. Authorities
have advanced a multitude of factors to answer the supply question. Of
course, the tremendous increase in the demand for energy underlies the
entire shortage problem, but the real question is why is the energy
industry unable to meet this increased demand, especially in light of the
abundant fuel resources still available in the United States. Because
these untapped fuel reserves, with the possible exception of natural gas,
are still plentiful, the present shortage may properly be called artificial.
As of January 1, 1970, there existed 29,631,862,000 barrels of estimated
proved reserves of crude oil in the United States alone. z3 Furthermore,
proved reserves of natural gas amounted to 275,108,835 million cubic
feet in 1970,24 and reserves for all types of coal, including proved and
unproved reserves with a zero to 6000 foot overburden, were estimated at
3,210,060 million tons.? These resources are believed sufficient to last
800 to 1000 years at present consumption rates. With these vast reserves,
what factors have produced the shortage?
One of the primary reasons advanced for the fuel shortage is the
new pollution standards in effect in most major communities. These
standards typically require the use of low-sulphur fuels, such as natural
gas, residual fuel oil, or low-sulphur coal to reduce the sulphur oxide
emissions of major fuel consumers. 26 The suddenness of the conversion to
these fuels has not given producers adequate time to seek new sources of
supply; furthermore, the shortage of low-sulphur fuels is compounded by
the slow increase in domestic production of these products.2 Residual
fuel oil, for example, is considerably less valuable to petroleum
companies than higher-priced fuels such as gasoline, 28 and, therefore, it is
23.

NATIONAL COAL ASS'N,

1970

BITUMINOUS COAL FACTS

69 [hereinafter cited as 1970

BITUMINOUS COAL FACTS].

24.

Id.

25. Id. at 68. At present, proved recoverable reserves equal 380 billion tons. It is estimated
that the total recoverable reserves amount to 1,605 billion tons. Id. at 9.
26. The increase in demand for residual (heavy) fuel oil is evidenced by the 18% increase in
sales by Humble Oil and Refining Company in 1969. STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW JERSEY,
1969 ANNUAL REPORT 10.
27.

Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practiceand Procedures of the Senate

Comm. on the Judiciary, 9 Ist Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1970) (statement of John N. Nassikas, Chairman
of the Federal Power Commission). Furthermore, the problem is compounded since the largest
reserves of low-sulphur coal are located in the Western States, far from the areas of high coal
consumption in the eastern portion of the United States. Id.
28. In the New England area in 1968, residual prices per barrel f.o.b. plant varied from a high
of S5.04 to a low of S1.74. NATIONAL COAL Ass'N, 1969 STEAM-ELECTRIC PLANT FACTORS 3-5
[hereinafter cited as 1969 STEAM-ELECTRIC PLANT FACTORS]. This price can be contrasted with the
average retail price per gallon of gasoline which ranges from SO.34 to S0.42. Thus a 42-gallon barrel
of gasoline would cost between $16 to $20.
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not normally produced in quantities sufficient to meet demand. 9 This
forces domestic users to seek their supply from foreign markets and
exposes them to the uncertainties inherent in foreign trade. Reliance on
foreign sources whose supply may depend more on international
relations than consumer demand further increases the possibility of
additional fuel shortages in the future.
Oil import quotas also have been attacked as a major contributor to
the fuel shortage. Through these quotas, imports of petroleum products
are limited to encourage domestic production. Critics claim, however,
that this policy deprives domestic users of inexpensive foreign petroleum
supplies, forcing them to bid for scarce and more expensive domestic
production. In residual fuel oil, which is in shortest supply, this problem
has been partially alleviated by a lifting of the quotas for the eastern
seaboard and midwestern portion of the country.30
The coal industry itself is partially responsible for the fuel shortage.
In the mid-1960's, when plans called for 53 percent of all proposed
steam-electric generation facilities to be powered by nuclear fuel, 31 the
coal industry overestimated the popularity and reliability of atomic
energy and discontinued exploitation of new coal reserves. By 1968,
however, 63 percent of proposed generation facilities were to be powered
by conventional fossil fuels because developmental problems had arisen
in the use of nuclear fuels. 32 Not only did the number of generation
facilities requiring fossil fuels increase, but many nuclear facilities failed
to become operational on schedule. The net result of the combination of
these factors has been an unanticipated increase in the need for coal.
Since it generally takes two to three years for a coal mine to achieve
operational status, this increase in the demand for coal has remained
unsatisfied. It also has been claimed that increased exportation of coal to
overseas markets-raising total exports to an estimated 60 million tons
in 1970 33-has contributed to the shortage. Even though the coal
industry produced an additional 30 million tons of coal in 1970, ten
million tons of this additional production were exported., This exported
29. See note 6 supra.
30. Hearings,supra note 13, at 206 (statement of George A. Lincoln, Director of the Office of
Emergency Preparedness).
31. FORBES, Nov. 15, 1968, at 55-58.
32. Id.
33. Mayer, supra note 3, at 77. Exports in 1969 were 56,234,000 tons or approximately 10%
of production. 1970 BITUMINOUS COAL FAcrs, supra note 23, at 54.
34. Hearings, supra note 13, at 44 (statement of Herbert Stein, Council of Economic
Advisors). Additionally, labor difficulties in 1969 resulted in the loss of 20 million tons of coal
production. Mayer, supra note 3, at 160.
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coal, approximately eleven percent of the national production, consists
primarily of high-priced metallurgical coal, which is sold to foreign
customers at prices that greatly exceed those domestic users are willing
to pay. 3 The economic effect of this export policy, however, may extend
beyond the primary consumers of metallurgical coal. Coal producers,
because of higher profit margins, may tend to utilize future capital
outlays to expand production of metallurgical coal rather than the lower
priced coal now consumed by the utilities. Moreover, the new pollution

standards are forcing utilities to compete directly for this low-sulphur
metallurgical coal, which results in further competition for scarce
supplies.
The concomitant of increased exportation has been the lack of
adequate transportation facilities to move existing fuel supplies. This
problem has been especially acute in the coal industry. In transporting
coal to piers for shipment overseas, hopper cars may be idle for up to six

weeks awaiting unloading. As many as 20,000 to 30,000 cars, some
merely awaiting overseas bidders, may be tied up at a pier at any one
time. 3 In addition, the tankers necessary to move oil to the United

States from foreign sources have been in short supply, causing spot

37
tanker rates to double in the last two years.
The primary cause of the shortage of natural gas has been the
failure to exploit known domestic reserves. Producers contend that profit

incentives are not sufficient to stimulate the development of new natural
gas wells because of price ceilings set by the Federal Power
Commission; 3 8 significantly, in 1968, consumption of natural gas

exceeded new gas discoveries for the first time. 39 Some authorities
35. Hearings, supra note 13, at 44 (statement of Herbert Stein, Council of Economic
Advisors).
36. FORTUNE, Nov. 1970, at 77. The Interstate Commerce Commission has taken steps to
alleviate the hopper car shortage by doubling the demurrage charge for all cars standing idle in
loading or unloading zones. Additionally, in a joint statement entitled "The Fuel Situation for the
Winter of 1970-71," released on September 29, 1970, Paul McCracken, Chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisors, and George A. Lincoln, Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness,
indicated that the ICC will require that general service cars be diverted to movement of coal and
that hopper cars be returned within a specified period.
37. Mayer, supra note 3, at 76. The closing of the Suez Canal and the break in the TransArabian pipeline have resulted in the increased use of tankers and in their consequent short supply.
This has increased sixfold the tankerage required. Id.
38. Charles S. Mitchell, chairman and chief executive officer of Cities Service Company, has
stated that the real reason for the natural gas shortage is the "unrealistic regulatory practices" in
natural gas production. He claimed that unrealistically low prices have created the dilemma of
greatly expanding markets while reducing profit incentives for discoveries of more natural gas. Wall
Street J., Oct. 7, 1970, at 16, cols. 2-3 (S.W. ed.).
39. NEWSWEEK, Oct. 12, 1970, at 95, col. 3.
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suggest, however, that natural gas producers have nothing to lose by
delaying natural gas development and forcing a price increase from the
FPC. 41 The effectiveness of this alleged stalling tactic has been partially
borne out in the present compromise being developed by the FPC, which
allows producers to impose a six cent increase over the rate
recommended by a recent FPC investigation. 4'
C.

The Market Structure-A Long-Range Contributorto the Energy
Crisis

In addition to the short-range contributors to the energy crisis,
some critics have charged that economic concentration in the fuel
industry is the primary cause of the crisis.12 This charge is based on the
recent acquisitions of large coal-producing facilities and vast uranium
reserves by major oil companies. In essence, the charge is two pronged:
(1) the "energy companies" are deliberately withholding production of
fuels to drive up prices and improve profit margins; and (2) heavy
concentration eliminates the element of competition as a price regulator

in the market.
The first contention is questionable. The fuel industry has increased

financial outlays in some areas of coal production. Continental Oil, for
example, has nearly tripled capital outlays by Consolidation Coal, its
wholly owned subsidiary, in the three years it has operated the
corporation. 43 The contention has more credence in the area of oil and
natural gas production, since oil companies have considerably reduced
their capital spending plans. Current estimated capital expenditures are
40. See COMPETITION IN THE ENERGY MARKETS, supra note 1, at 6.
41. Bus. WEEK, Nov. I!, 1970, at 24, col. 2. Furthermore indications that the industry's
tactics are effective came from a recent FPC statement issued after the FPC ended its moratorium
on rate increases. The statement said the policy change was prompted by the energy shortage and
the "indications of cost increases which have affected the amounts of funds devoted to the industry's
exploratory effort." Wall Street J., Oct. 28, 1970, at 5, col. I (S.W. ed.).
42. The electric utility industry has been most vocal in this charge. Aubrey J. Wagner,
Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, has charged that coal companies are deliberately
holding back supplies for a higher profit margin and that prices for fuel supplies have greatly
increased in the wake of mergers in the fuel industry. Nashville Tennessean, Oct. 8, 1970, at 1, col. 3;
see Bus. WEEK, Nov. 21, 1970, at 52, col. 2. As a result of these charges, the Federal Trade
Commission has launched an investigation of the antitrust implications of these mergers. Wall
Street J., Oct. 14, 1970, at 12, col. I (S.W. ed.). Furthermore, the Tennessee Electric Cooperative
Association, representing 22 Tennessee cooperatives, voted unanimously to file an antitrust suit
against the oil and coal conglomerates and the United Mine Workers Union. Nashville Tennessean,
Oct. 22, 1970, at 1, cols. 2-3.
43. Wall Street J., Oct. 20, 1970, at 19, cols. 1-2 (S.W. ed.). Howard Hardesty, senior vice
president of Continental Oil, stated that Consolidation Coal has opened 15 new mines in this same
period. He claims that if other producers had done the same, there would be a 150 million ton
annual surplus of coal supplies. Id.
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50 million dollars below spending in 196944 and 390 million dollars
below recent Department of Commerce estimates.4 5 Although these
figures do not conclusively demonstrate a collusive production
slowdown, they do indicate an unusual spending program in light of
present fuel shortages. Furthermore, petroleum companies already have
announced that natural gas exploration and production will lag because
of low profit incentives.4"
The second criticism-that heavy concentration eliminates the
element of competition as a price regulator-presents more complex
considerations. The development of "total energy" companies through
the acquisition of formerly competitive fuels represents a classic
horizontal integration problem. Critics of oil-coal combinations point
out that this integration violates the principles and the spirit of antitrust
policy and eliminates price regulation found in the competitive market,
giving the petroleum companies actual, or at least potential, control over
the nation's fuel resources. The result, they claim, will be an emphasis on
higher priced fuels, with little or no incentive to reduce prices or
manufacture lower cost fuels. These critics also assert that the spectre of
monopoly will grow more ominous due to the virtual absence of
regulation of the fuel industry.
A charge of this nature against an industry that is the virtual
backbone of the American economy merits further investigation.
Considered with the multitude of other factors allegedly contributing to
the present fuel shortage, it appears that the fuel industry has become a
behemoth, incapable of self-regulation and insensitive to the needs of the
domestic market. The mere existence of a shortage indicates that the
industry needs structural and regulatory changes to make it more
responsive to market demand.
1. Effects of Market Concentration in the Fuel
Industry.-Competition, the mainstay of the nation's economic system,
may be viewed as regulation of business activity through the market. The
theory of competition operates on the assumption that firms are driven
by their own self-interest-the desire to earn profits. 41 In the market, this
self-interest is expressed by attracting the customer to the goods and
services that a firm provides. In order to earn dependable profits in a
44. OIL AND GAS J.. Sept. 14, 1970, at 44. This spending estimate is still above the $5.25
billion invested in plants and equipment in 1968.
45. Id.
46. See notes 39-41 supra and accompanying text.
47. The free enterprise system itself depends on personal incentives, rewarding efficiency and
penalizing inefficiency. M. MASSEL, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY 5 (1962).
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competitive market, a particular firm will be compelled to make a more
attractive offer to the customer, either through price or product
differentiation, or through any other factors that may cause the
customer to select the firm's product over its competitor's.48 Thus, the
customer is in a position to exert influence over the market conduct of
competing businesses through his power to select from a number of
competing products. If the competitive system functions properly, the
customer influence will cause the market conduct to be production
oriented as well as profit oriented.
In a purely competitive market, the price of a particular product is
established by the convergence of supply and demand. A single seller,
servicing only a small percentage of the market, is powerless to affect
substantially the price of his product by either increasing or decreasing
his output. This competitive market structure is altered, however, as the
firms producing the product become smaller in number and more
oligopolistic. Since a few firms control a large portion of the market in
an oligopolistic industry, each of them is very sensitive to the impact that
the other firms' actions will have on its business. Thus, if one firm raises
its price for a product and if other firms producing similar products do
not act accordingly, the firm raising its price will receive a reduced
market share. A price decrease that is met by the firm's rivals, on the
other hand, will not increase the leader's market share but will reduce its
profits. 49 To assure his market share and profits, the oligopolist will
instead use such devices as seller's agreements, price leadership, and tacit
collusion. Using these methods the oligopolist can, by subordinating the
public's interest to his desire to maximize profits, establish market price
at a monopoly level without the risk of unilateral price change.50 For
these and other reasons, the antitrust policy of the United States has
long discouraged oligopolistic concentration. In some industries, the
Government has employed the Sherman 5' and Clayton Acts 52 to break
up large blocks of power and re-establish a competitive market
48. Price, for example, will usually be the determinative factor in the choice of homogeneous
agricultural products, since the consumer will have no other basis to select a supplier. The
automobile industry, however, presents a good example of product differentiation competition.
Characterized by price leadership, this industry attracts the customer through offerings of
performance and style.
49. See generallyC. WILCOX, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS 116-36 (3d ed. 1966).
50. W. FELLNER, COMPETITION AMONG THE FEW (1949); G. STOCKING & M. WATKINS,
MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 85-109 (1951). Contra, W. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR,
VALUE AND GROWTH 27-82 (1959).
51. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
52. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27,44 (1964).

1971]

THE ENERGY CRISIS

structure,5 but in others it has imposed comprehensive regulations in an
attempt to eliminate the undesirable side effects of concentration. 4
Economists measure changes in the concentration of a market by
means of a concentration ratio. 55 This ratio compares either the absolute
size or the production of the top four or eight enterprises in a
market-CR-4 or CR-8-to the total output of the market. When the
largest eight or fewer firms account for 33 percent or more of the total
market output, the structure of the market is generally considered
oligopolistic.56 Measured in terms of the national market and relevant
regional markets, 57 there is an overall trend toward concentration in the
fuel industry. As indicated by table A,'5 this trend is manifested in the
coal industry by a movement toward fewer but larger companies.
TABLE A
TREND TOWARDS LARGE FIRMS IN THE COAL INDUSTRY
Percent Produced by Various Tonnage Groups
Tonnage range

1949

1960

1965

1966

1967

1968

1,000,000 & over

50.46

64.87

68.14

68.94

70.22

71.57

100,000 to 999,999
under 100,000

31.69
17.85
438

22.13
13.00
415

22.49
9.37
515

21.93
9.13
534

22.28
7.50
552

21.21
7.22
545

total tons (million)

53. See notes 84-106, 204-09 infra and accompanying text.
54. See note 385 infra and accompanying text.
55. Since the absolute size of a particular firm is irrelevant to market control, other factors
must be introduced to reflect the portion of control a particular firm or firms have over the market.
The concentration ratio is used for this purpose. In essence, concentration deals with "numbers
modified by inequality." Adelman, Monopoly and Concentration: Comparisons in Time and
Space, in THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST: COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY 45-46 (R. Low ed. 1968).
56. The market is said to be a "Type Two" oligopoly if the CR-8 is greater than 33% but less
than 50% and the remainder of the market is unconcentrated. The market is said to be a "Type
One" oligopoly if the largest 8 firms account for at least one-half of the total market sales, and the
top 20 firms account for 75% of these sales. In a "Type One" oligopoly recognition of
interdependence is highly probable. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY-AN ECONOMIC
AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 25-27 (1959).
57. There are many bases from which concentration ratios can be computed, including total
assets, sales, number of employees, and total production. Although sales most accurately reflect
market power, total production in an extractive industry is an equally valid measure. This is true
since among the larger firms there will be little difference between amounts realized from a given
quantity of production. See R. MOYER, COMPETITION IN THE MIDWESTERN COAL INDUSTRY 65
(1964). Concentration ratios based solely on the national market are somewhat misleading because
they do not take into account the limited market area of a particular producer. The regional ratio
provides a more reliable figure since it shows the percentage of control held by a producer in the area
where he effectively competes.
58. This table is based on computations from data provided by MINING INFORMATIONAL

1970 KEYSTONE COAL INDUSTRY MANUAL
KEYSTONE COAL INDUSTRY MANUAL].
SERVICES,

645-47, 470-640 [hereinafter cited as 1970
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During the period from 1949 to 1968, there was a 42.4 percent decrease
in the number of companies producing more than one million tons of
coal. Concentration in the coal industry also is reflected by the high

national and regional concentration ratios. In 1969, the four largest coal
companies accounted for 31.13 percent of the total national production
and 36.25 percent of national noncaptive production. 9 In addition, as
table B indicates,"0 the regional ratio of the largest four coal producers to
total regional production ranges from 31.5 percent to 100 percent.
TABLE B
REGIONAL CONCENTRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY
Region

Total Bituminous Production
(1969)

Concentration Ratio
(CR-4)

Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific

78,375,000
134,681,000
10,134,000
173,921,000
127,650,000
2,045,000
20,000,000
70,000

37.62%
54.55%
71.83%
32.29%
31.50%
79.75%
43.08%
CR-2 = 100%

National

550,000,000

31.13%

Concentration in the petroleum industry also is apparent from
national and regional concentration ratios. In 1959, Kaysen and Turner
concluded that the eight largest petroleum producers dominated 52 to 56

percent of the nationwide market. When regional concentration data was
computed, the market share of the eight largest firms varied from 48 to

99 percent." The Federal Trade Commission also has acknowledged this
trend. A report prepared by the Commission's Bureau on Economics
documents the increasing degree of concentration within the industry
and concludes that this aggregation of power will profoundly affect the
62
country's entire energy industry in the future.

59. Id. at 470-640.
60. Id. The Middle Atlantic region includes Maryland, New York, and Pennsylvania; the
East North Central region includes Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin; the West
North Central region includes Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and
South Dakota; the South Atlantic region includes Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia; the East South Central
region includes Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Tennessee; the West South Central region
includes Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas; the Mountain region includes Arizona,
Colorado, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming; and the Pacific region includes
California, Oregon, and Washington.
61. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 56, at 283-84.
62. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, ECONOMIC PAPERS 1966-69, at 190 (1969).
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2. Methods to Mitigate the Effect of Market Concentration.-An
oligopolistic fuel producer could be prevented from charging nearmonopoly prices by the entry of new producers into the market or by the
existence within the market of substitute fuels. Yet when fuels do not
compete-when they are not interchangeable-the entry of substitute
products into the oligopolist's market is virtually eliminated, leaving
only the threat of potential new entrants as a price limiting factor. In
addition, if barriers to entry are high, the oligopolistic producers are free
to charge all the market will bear, maintaining their market dominance
63
while forcing the consumer to pay monopoly prices.
(a) Interfuel competition.-When fuels are competitive, the
potential for substitution of fuels acts as an important deterrent to profit
maximization by giving the consumer an element of price control
through product selection. Thus, although price competition between
producers of a particular fuel may be lessened and although barriers to
entry may remain high, competition between producers of alternative
fuels will continue. A producer of oil, for example, must remain close to
the prevailing market price in order to keep substitute fuels such as coal
and gas from making inroads in his share of the market where the fuels
compete.
Even this restraint upon the oligopolist may be eliminated, however,
if the few firms that control an industry obtain control over substitute
products as well. Once competition between substitutes is destroyed, the
consumer can no longer influence prices through product selection. In
the extreme, if all competing fuels were owned by one firm, the consumer
would have no choice but to deal with that firm. As indicated in table
C,11 this accumulation of economic strength is occurring in the overall
fuel market through the acquisition by large petroleum companies of
leading coal producers and coal reserves.
63. When barriers are high, the existing producer can maintain his market share by setting his
prices just below the level at which entry would be attractive to a potential producer. This result
occurs since a lower profit margin is required to stay in business than to enter a new business.
64. 1970 KEYSTONE COAL INDUSTRY MANUAL, supra note 58, at 647. The significance of
these figures is demonstrated in the following table, based upon pages 470-636 of the Keystone
manual, which reveals on a regional basis the percentage of noncaptive coal production controlled
by petroleum interests.
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TABLE C
PETROLEUM ACQUISITIONS IN THE COAL INDUSTRY
Parent
Continental Oil
Occidental Petroleum
Standard (Ohio)
Gulf Oil

Producer
Consolidation Coal
Island Creek Coal
Old Ben Coal Company
Pittsburg & Midway

Total Tonnage

1969 Tonnage
60,904,000
30,348,797
11,997,405
7,615,597

1969 Rank
1
3
9
13

110,865,799

Hence, not only do a few petroleum companies presently dominate that

industry, but they are fast gaining control of other fuel industries as
well-industries that once acted as price regulators by providing the
consumer with a choice of fuels. Today, the impact of this power
pyramid is directly felt in those areas where it is possible for coal and oil
to compete. In the future, its effects surely will be nationwide, not only in
terms of prices, but bigness itself. This "bigness" creates the power in a
few firms to exclude competition or control price; whether exercised or

not, this power can create stagnation and inefficiency within the market.
The evils of interfuel mergers often are not readily apparent because
fuels clearly do not compete in certain well-known uses.6 5 The
PERCENTAGE OF NONCAPTIVE COAL PRODUCTION CONTROLLED
Region

BY PETROLEUM INTERESTS ON A REGIONAL BASIS
Noncaptive Production
Petroleum-Controlled

Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific
National (approximately)

41,214,075
130,431,051
8,615,685
152,476,215
112,013,540
2,045,000
13,650,685
70,000
460,516,251

Production
7,252,695
31,195,308
2,514,858
38,654,316
21,760,361
6,000
1,112,566
0
102,496,104

Percent
17.60%
23.92%
29.19%
25.35%
19.43%
0.29%
8.15%
0.00%
22.25%

Petroleum companies control 23.44% of the nation's coal production while the regional control
factor varies from 0.0% in the Pacific region to 29.19% in the West North Central region. The
combination of these oligopolistic industries confers on the total energy company the power to
dominate regional fuel markets, especially in the submarkets where oil and coal are substitute fuels.
65. Statistical evidence indicates, in fact, that petroleum products are beginning to dominate
the nation's energy markets. Coal's share of the nation's total energy requirements fell from 67% to
20% from 1920 to 1969. During this same period, crude petroleum's share rose from 15% to 34%
and natural gas's from 4% to 32%. In uses where coal was competitive with other fuels, coal's share
of the market declined from 59.7% in 1939 to 29.9% in 1969 on a BTU basis. In this same market,
the share for natural gas increased from 8.9% to 41.4%. 1970 BITUMINOUS COAL FACTS, supra note
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transportation field, for example, is dominated by petroleum products.
Similarly, fuel demand is captive in the home heating market, in which
the consumer can only use the fuel for which his home is adapted." In
other uses, however, fuels are virtually interchangeable. In the electric
utility industry, 7 for example, many steam-electric plants are now able
to burn any of the three major fuels with a minimum of time and expense
wasted in conversion."'
23, at 53, 55. In fact, one of the only markets coal has been able to dominate is the metallurgical
coke market. R. MOYER, supra note 57, at 48.
66. Naturally, in those uses that are captively controlled by a fuel, cost is a relatively
unimportant factor. Cost, however, as it affects the long-range growth of sales, may still be
determinative.
67. In the electric utility industry, demand is elastic in the long run since price will be crucial
both in initial fuel choice and in conversion of existing equipment to take advantage of lower price
fuels. This is especially true since fuel costs amount to almost 60% of kilowatt-hour charge for
electricity. R. MOYER, supra note 57, at 57.
68. The extent of these convertible plants was shown in a study of 7 states in the West North
Central region of the United States-an area where coal occupies 52% of the market while gas
serves 47%. In the following table, based on computations from 1969 STEAM-ELECTRIC PLANT
FACTORS, supra note 28, at 17-26, it was found that plants that burn only coal account for 20% of
the total generating capacity, while those generators with the capacity to burn 2 or 3 fuels comprise
approximately 67% of generating capacity.
PLANTS HAVING COAL AND MULTIPLE FUEL BURNING CAPACITIES
Coal Only
State
Iowa
Kan.
Minn.
Mo.
Neb.
N.D.
S.D.

Cap.*
444.4
0.0
1,198.9
1,145.8
0.0
585.0
40.0

Coal and Other Fuels
Gen.**
Cap.*
Gen.**
f,528.4
2,284.9
9,668.0
0.0
1,202.2
4,527.1
5,186.9
2,043.6
9,373.8
5,772.1
3,055.0
12,457.6
0.0
1,217.2
4,233.6
2,640.1
100.0
510.7
107.5
108.4
353.8
* Capacity-Thousands of kilowatt-hours

** Generation -Millions

Total All Plants
Ca.*
2,729.3
3,019.4
3,275.5
4,320.8
1,530.7
687.0
163.9

Gen.**
11,196.4
12,461.4
14,607.1
18,285.1
5,212.3
3,150.8
462.0

of net kilowatt-hours

Although 86% of the net generation of electricity in this region for 1968 was produced by plants that
could burn coal, only 57% of this generating capacity in kilowatt-hours was actually produced by
coal. When it is taken into account that 24% of this 57% consumption is represented by plants that
could only burn coal, the effects of competition in those plants capable of burning more than one
fuel is even more pronounced. In the same time period, for example, natural gas accounted for 42%
of generation, only 2% of which is represented by gas-captive plants. The average cost per BTU
during this period in this region, as burned, was $0.276. The comparative figure for gas was $0.254.
By way of contrast, in the East North Central region, where 98% of the net generation in 1968 was
produced by plants with the capacity of burning coal, this fuel accounted for 90% of total net
generation. Although 80% of this generation represents captive coal users, the portion of the
remaining generation produced by coal in multifuel plants is higher in this region than in the West
North Central.
On a regional basis alone, the study revealed that in New England, 35 of 54 plants were
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The electric utility industry also provides a workable basis from
which the effects of various fuel policies may be evaluated. The industry
serves as a link between the consumer and the fuel industry by passing
fuel costs, which are the largest factor in operating expense, 9 directly to
the consumers. If generating facilities are located in geographic regions
where the delivered cost of the various fuels is substantially the same to
the utility, competition between these fuels results in the benefits being
passed directly to the consumer of the electricity. 70 In Kansas, for
example, the comparative average cost, per million BTU, of fuel burned
in plants with a dual capacity was 23.7 cents for gas and 25.1 cents for
coal. 71 Consequently, during the period that these prices existed, 75
percent of the consumption by BTU was generated by gas and only 24
72
percent was produced by coal.
(b) Potential entrants into the market.-When interfuel mergers
occur in the already concentrated coal and oil markets, the competitive
element of product substitution is destroyed, and the potential entry of
new producers becomes the only factor limiting oligopolistic control.
This factor, however, can be eliminated by high barriers to entry. 73 The
entrance of a firm into a market requires either the creation of new
convertible; in the Mid-Atlantic region, 41 of 89 plants were convertible, including 29 coal burning
plants located in Pennsylvania, which is a primary coal producing state; in the East North Central
region, 36 of 185 plants were convertible; in the West North Central region, 135 of 191 plants were
convertible; in the South Atlantic region, 55 of 117 plants were convertible; in the East South
Central region, 14 of 46 plants were convertible; in the West South Central region, 64 of 122 plants
were convertible; in the Mountain region, 51 of 77 plants were convertible; and in the Pacific region,
38 of 43 plants were convertible. These figures are taken from 1969 STEAM-ELECTRIC PLANT
FACTORS, supra note 28, at 3-46, 99.
69. In C. PHILLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 131 (1965), the author presents R= O +
(V - D) r as a standard rate formula: R= total revenue required; 0 = operating costs; V = gross
value of all property; D = accrued depreciation on all property; and r = the rate of return.
Operating costs comprise the largest variable, and fuel costs are the largest single factor in operating
expenses.
70. This is the concept of the geographically limited market wherein the producer of a
particular fuel can remain price-competitive with both the producers of the same fuel and producers
of substitute fuels that are in the same "'product" market. The limits of the geographic market are
usually defined in terms of transportation costs. A producer whose transportation costs are high, for
example, must offset this cost with lower production costs if his geographic market is to be
contiguous with the geographic market for a producer with lower transportation costs. If he cannot
lower his production costs, then his high transportation costs will constrict his market to those
geographical limits where he can remain price-competitive.
71. 1969 STEAM-ELECTRIC PLANT FACTORS, supra note 28, at 19-20.
72. In Connecticut, oil burned in dual capacity plants cost an average of $0.26 per million
BTU and accounted for 72% of the total energy by BTU, while coal costing $0.33 produced 27% of
the total energy generated by these plants. The high percentage figure for oil probably can be
accounted for by the relatively easy access to foreign residual oil through nearby ports. 1969 STEAMELECTRIC PLANT FACTORS, supra note 28, at 3-4..
73. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
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facilities for production or the adaptation of existing facilities to a new
use. In the case of fuel industries, the acquisition of sufficient reserves,
the initial development costs, and the heavy mechanization necessary to
take advantage of scale economies require the investment of substantial
amounts of money. Additionally, the firm that can overcome the capital
requirements will be handicapped because it lacks market outlets, a sales
force, and established good will. Furthermore, initial transportation
problems may be difficult, if not impossible, to overcome-especially in
the petroleum industry. 74 Even coal producers, if faced with developing
the coal pipeline and the unit train, may encounter substantial

transportation barriers.7 5 Long-term contracts, usually made with
electric utilities and ranging from ten to thirty years, also may impede
entry into the fuel industry. To be awarded a long-term contract, a
producer must have sufficient production to provide for all the needs of

the consumer. Thus, a producer seeking to enter this market must make
substantial capital outlays in order to attain sufficient production
capacity to acquire the security of a long-term contract. 7 Furthermore,

since most major consumers are already obligated under long-term
contracts, these agreements clearly restrict potential entrance into the
fuel market. Two examples of the importance of these contracts to a
producer are Consolidation Coal, the nation's largest coal company,

which has 75 percent of its production tied up in long-term contracts,
and Peabody Coal, the second largest producer, which has 80 percent of

its coal committed to these contracts. 77 With such high cost barriers to
entering the fuel industry, the profit margin must be substantial in order
74. Although it costs only $0.50, or about 15% of wellhead cost, to move a $3.30 barrel of
crude oil from Louisiana to New York, the high costs of constructing pipelines are often prohibitive
to the potential entrant. Since this method of transportation allows unit costs of operation to
decrease inversely with utilization of the line, the established firm has significant cost advantages
merely by utilizing an existing pipeline. See Hearings, supra note 13, at 43 (statement of Herbert
Stein, Council of Economic Advisors); M. DE CHAZEAU & A. KAHN, INTEGRATION AND
COMPETITION IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 69 (1959).
75. Transportation costs for coal comprise a large portion of delivered cost and perhaps
account for the fact that coal markets have been limited to those areas with the greatest access to
prime coal mines, such as the eastern portion of the country. Although this market may expand in
the future because of new methods of transportation, such as the unit train and the coal slurry
pipeline, both of these methods require a large initial capital outlay. The Southern Pacific
Company, for example, is currently engaged in constructing a coal pipeline from Kayenta, Arizona,
to Davis Dam, Nevada, a distance of 273 miles. The total cost is estimated at $35 million. N.Y.
Times, July 5, 1969, at 24, col. 3. See also FEDERAL POWER COMM'N, NATIONAL POWER SURVEY 61
(1964) [hereinafter cited as POWER SURVEY]; 1970 BITUMINOUS COAL FACTS, supra note 23, at 63;
H. PERLOFF, E. DUNN, E. LAMPARD, & R. MUTH, REGIONS, RESOURCES, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
323 (1960).
76. R. MOYER, supra note 57, at 131.
77. FORBES, Oct. 15, 1970, at.80.
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to attract new producers. Although an existing firm can raise prices to a
level that may produce considerable extra profit, the price still may not
be sufficiently high to attract new entrants.
Market forces, therefore, cannot be relied upon to alleviate the
concentration problem and its actual and potential suppression of
competition in the American fuel industries. Giant petroleum and coal
firms are already powerful enough within their own industries to prevent
competitors from effectual interference with their market control.
Fortunately, some regional interfuel competition still exists due to the
substitutability of the various fuels. The imminent synthesis of
petroleum products from coal will further alleviate the noncompetitive
pressures within each of these industries. The advent of efficient coal
transportation, moreover, will enable producers to break out of
circumscribed markets and extend the benefits of interfuel competition
to even more consumers. The present trend toward merger between the
producers of substitute products, however, will create a concentration of
power that is not limited to a single industry or region, but one that will
encompass the national fuel market and eliminate even product
substitution as a price regulator. These "total energy" combines
apparently are anticipating technological advances that will engender
greater competition in the fuel market and are using them to solidify
their control through concentration on a nationwide level.
America's traditional solution to concentration and suppression of
competition has been through antitrust legislation. Possible application
of the laws to the fuel industry raises several questions. Are the present
laws adequate? Are they desirable? What alternatives to these laws are
available? And finally, what should be this country's national fuel policy
and how should it be enforced?
III.

USE

OF ANTITRUST

LAWS

To

RESTORE COMPETITION

IN THE

ENERGY MARKET

American antitrust laws reflect a strong commitment to economic
freedom by recognizing that optimum use and efficient allocation of
8
resources can best be obtained under competitive conditions." These
statutes seek to promote competition by preserving a large number and
variety of decision-making units in the economy to insure innovation,
experimentation, growth at a stable rate, and equitable distribution of
income. Perpetuation of this competitive structure makes possible the
78.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON ANTITRUST POLICY

I-1 (1969) [hereinafter cited as WHITE HOUSE REPORT].

at
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maximum choice of products at lower cost and permits the movement of
resources into fields of greatest economic return. 79
Any trend toward greater economic concentration is inimical to this
antitrust policy. A highly concentrated industry confers upon its
constituent members market power that may be used to set prices and
outputs in order to maximize the profits of the industry and short-circuit
the role of competition. 0 Section 2 of the Sherman Act81 and section 7 of
the Clayton Act 8 2 are the principal antitrust statutes used to combat an
anticompetitive market structure. As corrective devices for economic
concentration, these statutes should have the advantage of encouraging
self-regulation without continuous government intervention and control.
Antitrust statutes, of course, are not a complete panacea for market
concentration problems. Lengthy and expensive litigation, evidentiary
problems, and inadequate remedies are just a few of the imperfections
that limit the effectiveness of present antitrust laws. This section of the
Special Project will investigate the efficacy of employing current
antitrust statutes against economic concentration in the fuel industries.
The first portion of this section, dealing with the Sherman Act, is
concerned primarily with the Act's applicability to present and future
intrafuel concentration. The second segment focuses for the most part
on the Clayton Act implications of the recent interfuel combinations.
A.

Application of the Sherman Act to the Energy Market

Prior to passage of the Sherman Act in 1890, the public admired
large industrial enterprises, naively believing that any increase in size
meant corresponding increase in efficiency8 With this public support,
rapid expansion was easily accomplished through mergers, which
79. Id.
80. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 56, at 104-05.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964) provides: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with the foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor ... "
82. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964) provides: "No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire,
directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of
the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any
section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or
to tend to create a monopoly."
83. H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 71, 111 (1955). Between 1859 and 1889,
with the development of industrialism, the number of wage earners in manufacturing increased
300% and the economic return increased almost 500%. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1945, at 179, 234 (1949).
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increased the economic power of a few large manufacturing
combinations.8 The public's admiration soon waned, however, due to
the predatory practices and cutthroat methods of competition typified

by the activities of enterprises like the Standard Oil Company., As
public reaction against "trusts" and "monopolies"

heightened, it

became clear that congressional action was necessary to deal with the
tendency of monopolistic enterprises to "crush out" competition. 8 The
answer was the Sherman Antitrust Act, which contains two fundamental
provisions: Section 1 prohibits contracts, combinations, and
conspiracies in restraint of trade; 7 section 2 .makes it illegal to

monopolize or attempt to monopolize any part of interstate commerce.88
Big business immediately labelled the Act vague, impractical,
innocuous, and unenforceable." 9 Indeed, actions of the Department of
Justice and the courts during the first ten years following passage of the
Act seemed to confirm the optimism of the trust and business leaders. 0
Lack of funds, absence of administrative leadership in the antitrust field,
and the general ill-preparedness of the Department of Justice to assume
the complicated administration of the Act were responsible for decisions
limiting the effectiveness of the new law. In the Sugar Trust case,9 for
84.

H.

THORELLI,

supra note 83, at 72-85. See also R. CAVES, AMERICAN INDUSTRY:

STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, PERFORMANCE

57 (2d ed. 1967).

85. The Standard Oil enterprise obtained preferential treatment from railroads, engaged in
several "unfair practices" against competing pipelines, participated in local price cutting to
suppress competition, set up bogus independents, and was guilty of industrial espionage. Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
86. E. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 12 (1967).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal ....
88. See note 81 supra.
89. This attitude probably accounts for the fact that the statute was passed, with only one
dissenting vote, by a Congress elected 'on the Republican high-tariff platform. I S. WHITNEY,
ANTITRUST POLICIES 5 (1958). In legal circles, the statute was greeted by a variety of responses. An
article in the Harvard Law Review shortly after the Sherman Act became law contained the
following passage: "It is impossible now to say what the effect of the Act, as interpreted by the
courts, will finally be. . . . IT]here are grave doubts whether, indeed, there can be any construction
of it such as to render it constitutional. . . .But one conclusion, upon the whole, can be reached.
The Act is necessarily vague . . . and like words, therefore, have been used to express it." Dana,
"Monopoly" Under the NationalAntitrust Act, 7 HARV. L. REV. 338, 355 (1894).
90. Between 1890 and 1903, only 23 public cases were instituted under the Sherman Act, and
the vast majority of these were handled in a haphazard, half hearted manner by the Justice
Department. Five of the 23 cases were in the coal production and distribution industry. H.
THORELLI, supra note 83, at 589-90.
91. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (through stock purchases in a
number of sugar companies, American Sugar Refining Company had gained control of the vast
majority of the sugar refineries in the United States).
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example, the Supreme Court, by establishing the artful distinction
between manufacture and commerce,9 2 so limited the Act that
manufacturing monopolies went uncontrolled and unpunished .3 Thus,
despite the new legislation, the nation experienced a "consolidation
craze," during which the number of new combinations nearly tripled,
and total authorized capital stock quadrupled.94
A stock market panic in 1903, prompted by a series of spectacular
trust failures, again signaled the public's withdrawal of confidence in the
efficacy of large-scale combinations.9 5 Armed with public opinion,
special congressional funds for antitrust enforcement,9 6 and the new
power to grant immunity to persons testifying or producing evidence in
antitrust cases,9 7 the Justice Department launched a vigorous attack on
the Northern Securities Company" which culminated in the first major
case under the Sherman Act. In Northern Securities Co. v. United
States,99 the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the company and
its directors for violating section 2. By its decision, the Court overruled
the idea that constitutional provisions relating to freedom of contract
and rights of property could be invoked in support of attempts to
monopolize.'" Although the Northern Securities decision spelled the end
of section 2's impotency, it failed to establish any guidelines for the
92. Id. at 13; see H. THORELL, supra note 83, at 598-99.
93. The Government presented its case in a manner that precluded any attempt by the Court
to reach a more incisive conclusion. H. THORELLI. supra note 83, at 598-99.
94. Id. at 294-304. "Between 1890 and 1897 there were 84 new combinations with total
authorized stock capital of $l billion; but between 1898 and 1902 there were 189 new combinations,
with capital of $4 billion." Id. at 294.
95. H. THORELLI. supra note 83, at 560.
96. H.R. Res. 372, 57th Cong., 2d Sess., 36 CONG. REc. 411-12 (1903). "For the purpose of
enforcing the antitrust laws of the United States, and to enable the Attorney General to prosecute
suits . . . . the sum of $500,000 . . . ; to be expended under the Attorney General.
...
Id.
Although this appropriation may seem small by present standards, it was twice as large as the
annual appropriation for the entire administration of the Justice Department at that time. See H.
THORBLLI, supra note 83, at 561.
97. "[N]o person shall be prosecuted or be subject to any penalty or forfeiture for or on
account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he may testify or produce evidence,
documentary or otherwise, in any proceeding, suit, or prosecution under said acts.
...
H.R. Res.
372, 57th Cong., 2d Sess., 36 CONG. REc. 412 (1903).
98. This era of "trust busting" was initiated by a press release from the Attorney General
indicating the intention of the Government to begin proceeding against the Northern Securities
Company. N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1902, at 1,col. 3.
99. 193 U.S. 197 (1904). In this case, the Government proceeded against not only the largest
holding company yet established, but also 3 individual defendants who personified the popular idea
of "big business" and "high finance": J. Pierpont Morgan, Edward H. Harriman, and James J.
Hill.
100. Id. at 332; see Langdell, The Northern Securities Case Undera New Aspect, 17 HARV.
L. REV. 41 (1904) (discussion of the circuit court opinion).
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Act's future application. In subsequent years, courts still have not
developed standards based on the impact of monopolistic activity on the
market structure, but instead have adopted a case-by-case approach to
section 2, conditioning the violation upon the individual anticompetitive
behavior of the firms involved.' 0' Section 2 has been described, much like
the due process clause of the Constitution, 10 2 as an open mandate to the
courts rather than specific legislation designed to deal with a specific
problem. Thus, section 2 has never gained the definitional accuracy
necessary for consistent application. Furthermore, although the section
may be an open mandate to the courts, it has not been efficiently
exercised on a market-wide basis in the absence of instigation by the
Justice Department.'
It cannot be said that the reasoning and result of one court's
application of section 2 to an industry in a given situation would
necessarily apply to another industry in a similar situation. Instead, the
trier of fact must make ad hoc judgments on economic issues guided by
the section's general standards and broad policy goals and colored by
political considerations. 14 Many times these issues exceed the trier's
capacity to evaluate because they involve subjective determinations of
motive and intent-which are elusive and only marginally relevant to the
central issue of market structure-and indirect measurement of
competitive behavior through an evaluation of performance.' This ad
hoc approach has expanded the scope and complexity of Sherman
antitrust suits and has made decisions less like precedents and more like
pieces of a jigsaw puzzle that cannot be fitted correctly into a single
pattern.' 0 The structure of the fuel industries, therefore, must be
measured by each relevant principle before the potential effectiveness of
the Act's regulatory power in this area of intrafuel concentration can be
evaluated.
1. The Standard Oil Principle.-In 1911 the Supreme Court in
United States v. Standard Oil Co.,'0 7 ushered in a new era of antitrust
101.

See Austern, Problems and Prospects in Antitrust Policy-l, in PERSPECTIVES ON
(A. Phillips ed. 1965).
102. See R. CAVES, supra note 84, at 58.
103. See generally id. at 65-68.
104. WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 78, at 1-6. See also Sections I and 2 of the Sherman
Act Generally: Developments at Large and Portents of Things to Come, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 657,
661-62 (1967-68) (panel discussion-statement by Victor H. Kramer).
105. WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 78, at 1-6.
106. Judge Wyzanski used this apt metaphor in describing the problems of precedent he faced
in applying the Sherman Act to the United Shoe Monopoly. See United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'dper curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
107. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
ANTITRUST POLICY 10
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enforcement by establishing the "rule of reason" in an attempt to give
some uniformity to the application of the Sherman Act. The
Government decided to prosecute Standard Oil under both sections of
the Sherman Act, believing that its predatory activities clearly violated
section 1I l and that if any industry had achieved the dimensions
necessary to violate section 2, it was Standard Oil."09 The Government's
beliefs were well founded. Standard of Ohio had managed to dominate
the entire petroleum industry by pressuring competitors either to join the
enterprise or be driven out of business by losing preferential rates and
rebates from the railroads controlled by Standard."' By the turn of the
century, when Standard of New Jersey was established as a holding
company to replace the Standard of Ohio trust, the organization began
to control other forms of oil transport, such as pipelines, until it
effectively dominated 90 percent of the petroleum industry.' Because of
these factors, the trial court awarded a verdict to the Government,
emphasizing monopoly and the intent to monopolize rather than the
alleged unfair practices."' On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the
judgment and announced the celebrated "rule of reason" as the standard
against which the literal sanctions of the Sherman Act were to be
weighed. Much simplified, this rule read into the Sherman Act the word
"unreasonable" as modifying "restraint of trade" in section 1,113
making only "unreasonable" restraints of trade reachable under the
Act. Although the rule of reason may have given some uniformity to the
application of section 1, it also may have had a negative effect on the
potential application of the Act, and section 2 in particular, to the kind
of concentration found in the fuel industry today. By conditioning the
Act's application upon a finding of unreasonableness, the Court
emphasized examination of business behavior rather than the structure
of the industry as a test of monopoly under section 2. Since the statutory
language of section 1, and not section 2, deals directly with the
reasonableness of business behavior, the Court, in essence, was hinging a
violation of section 2 upon the finding of a section 1 violation.", Thus,
108. See notes 85 & 86 supra and accompanying text.
109. 221 U.S. at 71-77 n.1.
110. 1. STELZER, SELECTED ANTITRUST CASES: LANDMARK DECISIONS 3 (3d ed. 1966).
Ill. Id. at 4.
112. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 173 F. 177, 191 (E.D. Mo. 1909).
113. Justice White argued that words in a statute must be presumed to have their common
law meaning in the absence of contrary evidence. In the case of the Sherman Act, common law
precedents gave validity to the theory that only unreasonable restraints of trade were to be
prohibited. 221 U.S. at 51. Justice Harlan dissented, emphasizing the trouble the courts would have
deciding which restraints were reasonable. Id. at 187-91.
114. This concept was actually enunciated in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S.
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under the Standard Oil rationale, an industry probably will not be in
violation of section 2, despite its control of the market, unless the court
finds that it engaged in unreasonable anticompetitive behavior leading to
the acquisition or maintenance of its monopoly power."' Since the
Supreme Court has designated certain behavior illegal "per se" under
section 1,"1 the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department generally
has been unwilling to expend its limited funds and manpower on cases
not involving per se violations because it is much harder to obtain
convictions in those areas. 1 7 The "reasonableness" test, therefore, has
limited utility in dealing with monopolistic conditions in most modern
industries because many corporations of monopolistic or oligopolistic
proportions can either avoid or conceal this per se behavior and escape
the Sherman Act's sanctions altogether."' These problems can be
demonstrated readily in the fuel industry. It would be difficult, for
example, to find evidence substantiating the many rumors and
indications that coal producers deliberately conspire to break delivery
contracts and withhold coal from the market to force higher prices."' It
is just as unlikely that the major oil companies could be convicted of
''price fixing" even though their crude oil prices fluctuate with
surprising uniformity. 12 These kinds of activity are inevitable results of
495, 525 n.24 (1948), and United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 106 (1948). See also Arant,
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 643, 644-45 (1967-68).
115. Unfortunately, the StandardOil opinion seems to have relegated § 2 to a supplemental
role. "And a consideration of the test of the second section serves to establish that it was intended to
supplement the first and to make sure that by no possible guise could the public policy embodied in
the first section be frustrated or evaded." 221 U.S. at 60. This theory has been confirmed by the
Justice Department's reliance on § 1. See notes 116 & 118 infra and accompanying text.
116. E.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (holding any
scheme of market division illegal per se); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392
(1947) (establishing the per se illegality of certain tying arrangements); United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (applying the term "per se" to a flat rule of illegality for price
fixing); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (convicting the defendant of
price fixing without regard to the reasonableness of the price, the good intentions of the parties, or
the actual raising or lowering of the prices).
117. For a detailed discussion of this area and its recent developments see Flinn, Parsons,
Poul, Snell, & Weber, The PerSe Rule, 38 ANTITRUST L.J. 731 (1968-69).
118. "Corporations are extremely aware of the implications of their actions if they have any
sizeable share of the market and are well advised by council. . . . [I]t is very difficult. . . to find
evidence of the sort that frequently was found in the earlier Section 2 cases." Hearings on H.R. 13
Before Subcomm. No. 6 of the House Comm. on Small Business, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1965).
The Chief Public Counsel of Legislation Section, Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice,
testified before a House Committee that the reason the Government had not brought more cases
under § 2 from 1955 to 1965 was that "it is getting more and more difficult to prove violations
of § 2."Id.
119. Hearings, supra note 13, at 143-44 (statement of Aubrey J. Wagner, Chairman of the
Tennessee Valley Authority).
120. Wall Street J., Nov. 12, 1970, at 3, col. I (S.W. ed.).
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the monopoly power that exists within the two industries.12' Neither these
devices nor the anticompetitive conditions in which they thrive, however,
can be eliminated by a principle that conditions the application of
section 2 on the behavior of a few firms rather than on the market
structure that has triggered this behavior. Fortunately, later cases have
122
indicated that section 2 was not entirely undermined by Standard Oil.
2. The Alcoa Principle.-In United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America,"2 the Second Circuit established a legal principle governing

single firm monopolies that is in sharp contrast with the section 2
requirements developed by StandardOil 35 years earlier.

24

Alcoa clearly

25

held a dominant position in the aluminum market,' but it was a
position resulting from internal growth rather than from any predatory
activity, apparent wrongdoings, or elimination of competitors. It did not
exert its power to extract more than a fair profit from the consumer, nor
did it have a specific intent to exclude potential competitors. 26 Despite
these facts, the court found that Alcoa's continued occupation of the
market could have resulted only from a persistent determination to

maintain control. 127 Reasoning that the intended objective of the
Sherman Act is to preserve an industrial organization of small
competitive units,' s the court concluded that the maintenance of a single
firm monopoly was sufficient to bring the company within section 2
29
despite Alcoa's good faith.'

The majority's diminished concern with predatory practices and its
emphasis upon concentration and potential to control suggests a
121.

See generally Comment, Making the Oil Industry Competitive-Problems and

Solutions: 1, 5 HOUSTON L. REv. 315 (1967-68).
122. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 347 U.S. 521 (1954); see notes 123, 125-30,
13846 infra and accompanying text; United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945):
123. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). In this case, the circuit court was the court of last resort
since the Supreme Court did not have a quorum of 6 justices qualified to hear the case.
124. See notes 107-15 supra and accompanying text.
125. Alcoa was found to control 90% of the aluminum market. 148 F.2d at 424.
126. Id. at 427. See generally Note, Monopolizing Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 30
U. PiTT. L. REv. 715, 717 (1968-69).

127. Although the court was willing to admit that Alcoa might originally have been the
"passive beneficiary" of a monopoly because of the involuntary elimination of competition by
operative economic forces, Alcoa's "continued and undisturbed control did not fall undesigned into
its lap; obviously it could not have done so." 148 F.2d at 431.
128. Id. at 427. The court emphasized that the purpose of maintaining a system of small
firms dependent on their own skill for success was not only for economic reasons, but also for its
"indirect social and moral effect."
129. "'Alcoa' meant to keep, and did keep, that complete and exclusive hold upon the ingot
market with which it started. That was to 'monopolize' that market, however innocently it
otherwise proceeded." Id. at 432.
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standard that could bring oil and coal industries within the scope of
section 2 if applied on a multifirm basis. The majority opinion showed
this heightened interest in market structure by intimating that a market
share of 65 percent would be sufficient to satisfy the "monopoly power"
requirement of section 2.130 This statement can be supported by basic
economic theories. 31 Many economists feel that if the eight largest firms
in a given industry control 33 percent or more of the market, the
structure of the market is oligopolistic and generates the same problems,2
such as price inflexibility, as those created by a single firm monopoly.
In 1969 the eight largest coal producers accounted for more than 50
percent of the nation's coal production and for up to 100 percent in some
regional markets.'3 In addition, the eight largest oil companies supplied
about 54 percent of the nationwide oil market, while their regional
market concentration varied from 48 to 99 percent. 3 It would appear
that "monopoly power" as defined by the Alcoa rationale, exists in both
of these industries-if not on the national level, then clearly in certain
regional markets. 35 This "monopoly power" is no less damaging
because it is vested in several firms rather than in a single firm such as
Alcoa.
Unfortunately, the impact of the Alcoa theory has been sharply
curtailed by the reluctance of most courts to accept the Second Circuit's
broad prohibition of individual monopoly. 35 Furthermore, no court has
been willing to extend the single firm monopoly concept to multifirm
"monopoly power" without a clear showing of conspiracy.3 7 As a
result, it is unlikely that the potential of the Alcoa principle will be fully
realized as a basis for attacking the continued concentration in the oil
and coal industries.
130. Id. at 424.
131. See C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 56, at 107.
132. See note 56 supra.
133. These figures were compiled from 1970 KEYSTONE COAL INDUSTRY MANUAL, supra
note 58, at 365, 647.
134. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
135. One should note that under present Sherman Act application the market need not be
nationwide. A product or service can be effectively monopolized although provided by different
firms in different areas of the country, if buyers in one area are prevented by transportation or other
barriers from shopping among the firms. See Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21
STAN. L. Rav. 548 n.l (1969).
136. E.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (allowing
defendants to escape liability under § 2 because there had been no showing of the required intent);
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1947) (recognizing that percentage of market is
not the decisive question in determining whether a monopoly exists); see Cox, Competition and
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 27 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 72,80 (1965).
137. Cox, supra note 136, at 81.
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3. The United Shoe Case: A Compromise.-In United States v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp., 138 a federal district court modified
Alcoa's broad approach by providing that a violation of section 2 will
not occur unless a firm or firms with monopoly power have engaged in
practices that, though regarded as legal, have restricted the opportunities
of actual and potential competitors.13 The case arose because United
Shoe, which controlled 80 percent of the shoe machinery market, would
offer its products only on long-term leases that included free repair
service and more favorable terms if eventual replacement were by a
United machine. These leases forced United Shoe's potential
competitors to establish prohibitively expensive repair services, seriously
deterred consumers from disposing of a United machine and acquiring
one from a competitor, and prevented the creation of a second-hand
market, which would have acted as an unwanted check on United Shoe's
leasing price.' The court found that these practices created unnatural
barriers that excluded potential competitors from the market and
furthered the dominance of a particular firm.'
Relying considerably on the reasoning in Alcoa, the court in United
Shoe established a two-step approach. To follow this approach, a court
must initially examine the level of market concentration to determine
whether monopoly power exists. The court then must determine if the
dominant firm or firms are engaging in any activity that perpetuates this
power.4 2 Many courts prefer this approach since it is less expansive than
the Alcoa principle, but is still sufficiently inclusive to reach companies
43
sharing monopoly power.
(a) The petroleum industry-state prorationing.-Although the
individual firm monopoly presented in the United Shoe case does not
exist in the oil industry, the court's rationale still can be applied. Taken
as a group, the largest oil producing firms have a tight oligopolistic
structure that has created a highly concentrated market on a regional
138. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), affd percuriam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
139. Id. at 343.
140. See generally, C. KAYSEN, UNITED STATES V. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CORPORATION
(1956).
141. "They are contracts, arrangements, and policies which, instead of encouraging
competition based on pure merit, further dominance of a particular firm. In this sense, they are
unnatural barriers ..
" 110 F. Supp. at 344-45.
142. See Cox, supra note 136, at 82 n.33. See also 110 F. Supp. at 343 n.l.
143. Under this approach, a company that controls a very high market percentage would face
a presumption of monopolization under § 2, but a company possessing a somewhat lower
percentage of the market would at least have to have the power of price control to exclude
competitors. 110 F. Supp. at 343 n.l.
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and, to some degree, a national basis. 44 The market control power vested
in these major oil companies is itself probably sufficient to satisfy the
liberal Alcoa test. The industry's culpability is increased by the kind of
activities the industry uses to maintain market control' 45-activities that
cannot be reached through section 146 and therefore do not fall within
however, may be sufficient
the confines of Standard Oil. These activities,
47
to satisfy the United Shoe rationale.
A clear example of the industry's practices can be observed in the 29
oil-producing states that have established commissions to regulate the
amount of crude oil that can be produced within the state in a given
period of time. 4 8 These state commissions, originating under the
auspices of the oil companies, are staffed largely by past executives in the
oil industry."' A typical example is the Texas Railroad Commission,
which has been described as "the most powerful state administrative
agency in the United States;"15 this agency alone controls or regulates
motor carriers, railroads, pipe lines, gas utilities, and close to one-half of
the nation's oil.'-' These agencies set production "allowables" according
to "nominations" from the major crude oil producers and purchasers.
Thus, in effect, the oil companies tell the agencies how much crude oil
they require in any 30-day period, and production is balanced
accordingly. 5 2 Ostensibly designed as a conservation measure, the
purpose of this prorationing system in reality has been to regulate the
supply of oil available to the market, controlling, within limits, the price
paid for oil. The Bureau of Mines obligingly facilitates the control of the
regional and national markets by furnishing detailed data regarding
monthly estimates of "the amount of oil of each state which it is
anticipated the total market will require during the forthcoming
period." 3 Although this prorationing practice would appear to be open
144. See notes 56 &61 supra and accompanying text.
145. See notes 152 & 163 infra and accompanying text.
146. See note 155 infra and accompanying text. Section 1, however, has been used to attack
restraints of trade at the retail gasoline end of the industry in the form of tying arrangements, price
fixing, and market allocation.
147. 110 F. Supp. at 342.
148. See generally Note, Administrative Regulation of Petroleum Production, 59 HARV. L.
REV. 1142 (1946).
149. Lobel, Red, White, Blue & Gold: The Oil Import Quotas, WASHINGTON MONTHLY,
Aug. 1970, at 11.
150. Walden, Antitrust in the Positive State, 41 TEXAS L. Rev. 741,778 (1963).
151. See Davis & Wilbern, Administrative Control of Oil Production in Texas, 22 TEXAS L.
REV. 149 (1944).
152. See Bus. WEEK, Nov. 7, 1970, at 54, col. 1.
153. Walden, supra note 150, at 780.
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to a section I attack on several grounds, 5 4 the federal government has
tacitly exempted the activity through the 1933 Connally Hot Oil Act,15
which makes it illegal to transport oil produced in excess of state
allowables across state lines. The Senate Small Business Committee
appropriately summed up the prorationing activities in the following
manner: "No single item is in itself controlling; taken together they form
a perfect pattern of monopolistic control over oil production, the
distribution thereof among refiners and distributors, and ultimately the
price paid by the public."' 5 In essence, state agencies, under the purview
of the oil industry leaders, are creating results that, if privately arranged,
would violate the Sherman Act.
Although prorationing probably is not subject to direct Sherman
Act attack,5 7 it has the effect of maintaining the power to monopolize
required by the United Shoe court for a violation of section 2. In
practice, prorationing enables the major companies to maintain
monopoly power and exclude competition by setting prices at a level that
may be high enough to produce substantial profits, but not sufficiently
high to attract new entries. It is not necessary for a practice that
"maintains" the power to monopolize to be illegal, so long as it fosters
the illegal result. This standard was demonstrated in both the Alcoa 5 '
and the United Shoe'5 9 cases when perfectly normal, prudent,
nonpredatory business practices were censured as activities that helped
maintain a monopolistic structure within a given industry.
Consequently, the two requirements held, in United Shoe,' to be
necessary for a section 2 violation are present in the oil industry: the
power to monopolize and the presence of practices that maintain this
power.
(b) The coal industry-long-term contracts.-Although the coal
industry has not enjoyed the governmental favors granted the oil
154. On its face, this activity falls within either the § I "price-fixing" concept or one of
the § I "division of market" or merger violations. See Keane, Section I of the Sherman Act, 37
ANTITRUST L.J. 632, 634 (1968).
155. 15 U.S.C. §§ 715-715m (1964).
156. S.REP. No. 25,81st Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1949).
157. The principal cases in this area seem to indicate that the state agencies are not subject to
federal antitrust laws. A judicially created exemption can be presumed from Eastern R.R.
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), which justified the
antitrust exemption on the basis of need for uninhibited communication to state agency officials,
and Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), which created an antitrust exemption in order to
preserve noninterference with state regulation.
158. See note 123 supra and accompanying text.
159. 110 F. Supp. at 343-45.
160. Id.at 342-45.
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industry,' the leading coal firms also have developed practices that
effectively maintain market control and create barriers for new entries
into the industry. 62 The use of long-term contracts, for example, is a well
established exclusionary device in the industry.' These contracts,
ranging from 10 to 30 years, have a dual exclusionary effect. First, a new
producer seeking entry into the coal market must make substantial
capital outlays to attain immediately a production capacity sufficient to
fulfill these long-range requirement contracts." 4 Secondly, a potential
new entrant into the market is faced with a highly restricted group of
customers since most coal consumers are already obligated under these
165
contracts.
There is an interesting parallel between long-term coal contracts
and the ten-year leases on which the court focused its attention in
convicting the United Shoe Company. The court pointed out that United
Shoe's leases were normal and natural because they were "honestly
industrial."'6 6 Although this kind of activity was a long-standing
tradition in the industry, it "represented something more than . . . the
employment of those techniques . . . which a competitive society must
foster."' 167 Like the prorationing activities in the oil industry, the longterm contracts in the coal industry represent the kind of unnatural
barrier prohibited by the section 2 principle established in United Shoe.
4. The Theory of Shared Monopoly.-The exclusionary practices
used by the fuel industry will violate section 2 only if the shared
monopoly power prevalent in this industry fits within the individual
monopoly standard enunciated in United Shoe. 8 It is submitted that the
same considerations and economic reasons that prompted section 2's
161. See Walden, supra note 150, at 780. The protection devices that have aided the oil
industry include: (1) tax incentives that have sustained the industry since 1926; (2) the prorationing
system that has kept surplus crude oil off the market since 1933; and (3) the import quotas that have
insulated domestic producers from foreign pressures for the past decade. Bus. WEEK, May 17, 1969,
at 99.
162. An obvious result of these high barriers to entry is the failure of the nationwide
production of coal to keep pace with expanding consumption. Hearings.supra note 13, at 145-46.
(statement of Aubrey J. Wagner, Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority).
163. Id.; see R. MOYER, supra note 57, at 130-37 (1964); FORBES, Oct. 15, 1970, at 80. See
also Nashville Tennessean, Oct. 8, 1970, at 1, col. 3.
164. R. MOYER, supra note 57, at 131-32.
165. Id. at 132.
166. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 344 (D. Mass. 1953); cf.
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945). For an interesting
comment on this phraseology see Cox, supra note 136, at 72, 79 (1965).
167. 110 F. Supp. at 344.
168. The principles previously discussed were developed in the context of an application
of § 2 to a single firm monopoly.

1971]

THE ENERGY CRISIS

application to individual monopoly power in United Shoe exist in a
shared monopoly situation. In both instances, price competition tends to
lessen, price-cost margins increase, inefficiency and misallocation of
economic resources often occur, and technological progress is
considerably slowed." 9 The only real difference lies in how the power is
exercised. In an individual monopoly, one firm can unilaterally use its
market control without interference from other producers. Firms
sharing monopoly power, on the other hand, must operate with express
or tacit collusion to exercise the same power effectively. Although there
is always the danger that one firm may refuse to help exercise this power,
the probability that it will be exercised is sufficient to merit sanctioning
the aggregation of shared monopoly power. Thus when each of the
companies effectively sharing monopoly power has engaged in conduct
that unnecessarily excludes competitors or otherwise maintains
monopolistic conditions, it is logical and appropriate to charge each
with having individually "monopolized" in violation of section 2.
"Each has obtained and maintained monopoly power-real, though
shared-to which factors other than skill, foresight, industry, and the
70
like have contributed."'1
71
The Supreme Court in American Tobacco Co. v. United States,
had an opportunity to decide whether individual and shared monopoly
power warrant similar antitrust treatment. The case involved the
activities of three totally separate companies that together controlled
nearly 68 percent of the national cigarette market. 7 There was no
evidence of any actual conspiracy or other section 1 violation that would
1 73
have brought the companies within the Standard Oil principle.
Although the Court recognized that the evils inherent in an individual
monopoly also exist when the power to control is in a few, 7 1 it refused to
apply a rationale similar to United Shoe to the shared monopoly,
adopting instead an "implied conspiracy" theory. 175 Instead of looking
at market concentration, 76 to find a section 2 violation, the Court
determined that the three defendants had acted in a closely parallel
169. See Turner, The Scope ofAntitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies,82 HARV.
L. REV. 1207, 1225-31 (1969).
170. Id. at 1231.
171. 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
172. The 3 major defendants in this action were American Tobacco Company, Liggett &
Myers Tobacco Company, and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company.
173. R. CAVES, supra note 84, at 63.
174. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 787-89 (1946).
175. Cox, supra note 136, at 73.
176. See notes 132-35 supra and accompanying text.
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fashion "as if they were taking full account of their influence on one
another and on the market."' 7 7 By taking this approach, the Court was
attacking the kind of behavior that results from effectively shared
monopoly power rather than attacking the power itself.
After the Court had assessed fines in American Tobacco,7 the
three defendants retained the same high market concentrations" 7 and
presumably the same conscious parallelism. The Justice Department,
however, has never attempted to prevent these further "violations" in
the cigarette industry because they essentially consisted of a few firms
taking one another's presence into account. This conduct could hardly
be avoided as long as the industry retained the same concentrated
structure. The ineffectiveness of the Court's approach is indicated by the
small number of courts that have used the "implied conspiracy" theory
to attack the shared monopoly problem in other concentrated
industries. 0
Today, "consciously parallel" noncompetitive activity,
particularly pricing, continues unchallenged in most tightly structured
oligopolies.181 This anticompetitive behavior is manifested in the fuel
industries by the uniformity in crude oil price changes8 2 and by the
steadily rising costs and consistent contract breaches in the coal
companies' dealings with the electric utility industry. I8 The majority's
refusal in the American Tobacco case to prohibit the exercise of shared
monopoly power without using a conspiracy concept as a crutch is
typical of the kind of approach that has allowed the continued
development of market concentration in a number of industries. There is
no apparent reason, however, for not applying the exclusionary conduct
rule of United Shoe to shared monopoly power when this conduct is
sufficient to cause a single firm monopoly to violate section 2.'1 Until
American courts bring the law on shared monopoly in line with the law
on individual monopoly, the Sherman Act will be of little use in
combatting the concentration that has developed in fuel industries.
5. Potential Effect of Applying Sherman Act Remedies to the
Fuel Market.-While the American Tobacco case indicates a failure to
177.
178.
179.

R. CAVES, supra note 84, at 63.
A total of$ 15,000 in fines was assessed for § 2 violations in American Tobacco.
R. CAVES, supra note 84, at 63.

180.

Id.

181.
182.
183.
Tennessee
184.

The automobile and soap industries are typical examples of this.
Wall Street J., Nov. 12, 1970, at 3, col. 1-2 (S.W. ed.).
Hearings,supra note 13, at 144-45 (statement of Aubrey J. Wagner, Chairman of the
Valley Authority); Nashville Tennessean, Oct. 8, 1970, at 1, col. 3.
Turner, supra note 169, at 1230-31.
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deal effectively with shared monopolies, it also suggests more complex
problems that could arise if section 2 were used to correct market
structure in a shared monopoly.'85 Today, most action taken under the
Sherman Act is directed toward the general regulation of conduct or
behavior, and little effort is made to reorganize market structure. This
results from the fear that divestiture or dissolution of large industrial
enterprises might do more harm to the economy than a settled, albeit
concentrated, industry. In the fuel industries this fear is particularly
applicable because any effective use of the Sherman Act against intrafuel competition might disable the industry to the point where the
existing energy crisis would be preferable to the chaos that would
accompany large divestitures by the major oil and coal companies. 86
The debilitating effect that Sherman Act restructuring might have on the
fuel industries is graphically illustrated by the effect that a series of
Sherman Act decisions had on the anthracite coal industry. From 1907
until 1955, a group of eight so-called "line companies" controlled the
anthracite market. 87 Like the controlling firms in the present
bituminous coal industry, these companies shared 80 percent of the
anthracite industry before a series of adverse decisions in 1920.188
Although these cases clearly had stopped attempts to monopolize, it is
questionable whether they reduced the existing concentration by any
measurable amount because five years after these Sherman Act
decisions,189 the defendants' market share had only decreased to 72
percent. On the other hand, the anthracite industry's contribution to the
country's energy supply dropped from 12.3 percent in 1917, to 5.8
percent in 1939, and then to only 2.1 percent by 1954.190 Interestingly
enough, the line companies' share of this market dropped sharply after
the time when the impact of the antitrust decisions should have been felt,
from 72 percent in 1925 to 46 percent in 1955.111 Although many factors
caused this decline, the most obvious was the encroachment of
competing fuels into the anthracite market. Most authorities concluded
that the real reasons for this increased penetration were the high coal
Id. at 1231 n.45.
See McDermott, The Shift in Antitrust Objectives and its Impact on the Oil and Gas
Industry, in 19th S.W. LEGAL FDN. OIL & GAS INST. 117 (1968).
187. They were called "line companies" because they were all railroad-connected. 2 S.
WHITNEY, ANTITRUST POLICIES 57 (1958).
188. The Department of Justice attempted to sever the railroad-coal connections in United
States v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 254 U.S. 255 (1920), and United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26
(1920).
189. See 2 S. WITrNY, supra note 187, at 66.
190. Id. at 69.
191. Id. at 66.
185.
186.
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prices caused by the continued monopolistic structure of the industry
and the unaggressive attitude of the line companies in dealing with this
outside competition."12 If the apparently noncompetitive pricing of
anthracite was a major factor in the industry's decline, it may indicate
that the Sherman Act was the ultimate cause of the decline. By stopping
the continued growth and control of the industry's leaders, the Court
may well have taken away their incentive to improve the quality of their
product. The line companies may have been satisfied to squeeze what
they could out of a dying industry by holding their monopoly prices
3
while reinvesting their returns in other areas.1
Would today's bituminous coal industry respond similarly to
antitrust restrictions? Two parallel factors exist between the two
situations: (1) control of the industry by a few large companies;," and (2)
a struggle to maintain the industry's share of the fuel market against
increasing encroachment by substitute fuels. "5 If the growth of major
companies within the bituminous industry is blunted by Sherman Act
enforcement, these companies might not be willing to continue to invest
the funds and resources necessary for aggressive competition in the
national fuel market. Furthermore, since a large number of controlling
coal companies have been taken over by firms in the competing oil
industry, 9 ' it is likely that future capital outlays in the coal industry will
be redirected toward development of synthetic petroleum products, "7
leaving immediate coal consumers in a short supply, high price crisis."'
In a different sense, the oil and gas industries present the same
sensitivity to antitrust discipline. It is clear that extraordinary pressures
exist in the fuel industry to enlarge market control. 9 ' As a result, the
large oil companies have expanded by acquisition, merger, and
consolidation within the existing fuel market structure, and the number
of competitors has rapidly diminished.2 11 Since the fuel industries until
recently have been able to satisfy the gross demand at reasonable
prices,2 1' there has been understandable reluctance to restructure fuel
192.

C.

193.

See note 118 supra and accompanying text. The condition became so hopeless that when

FRASER &

G.

DORIOT, ANALYZING OUR INDUSTRIES

399, 407-09 (1932).

27 firms, practically the whole industry, were indicted on price-fixing charges to which they pleaded

nolo contendere, the judge set fines of around $750 because of the "desperate and deplorable" state
of the industry. 2 S. WHITNEY, supra note 187, at 73.
194. See text accompanying note 133 supra.
195.

See note 65 supra.

196. See note 64 supra and accompanying text, and note 316 infra. See also,
1970, at 80, cols. 1-3.
197.

See note 242 infra.

198. Id.
199. McDermott, supra note 186, at 142.
200. Id. at 141.
201.

Id. at 139.

FORBES, Oct.

15,
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markets. Problems resulting from the growing fuel oligopolies have been
quickly camouflaged beneath antitrust exemptions and tax
advantages.21 2 Thus, the oil and coal industries have been allowed to feed
upon themselves-at first consuming the weak or failing units and then
the healthy, economically stable companies of smaller size 0 3 until it has
reached a point where section 2 relief is unfeasible. This is particularly
true in the oil industry in which any attempt at this time to force
divestiture of a smaller, merged oil corporation would merely weaken the

controlling oil corporation without producing an alternative to take up
the slack in market supply, since the divested company probably would
have become too dependent on the finances and resources of its
"divorced" parent to continue existing as a separate market force.
It appears, therefore, that although a strong legal argument can be
made for the application of section 2 of the Sherman Act to the fuel
industries, no practical relief could be gained by this effort. Section 2 has
become a rusty and dull regulatory tool in the area of oligopolistic
industry. Its application now is more likely to bludgeon the fuel
industries to death than cut out the malaise that afflicts them.
B.

Application of the Clayton A ct to the Energy Market

As originally enacted, the antimerger provision of the Clayton Act
was ineffective because it was interpreted to proscribe only stock

acquisitions, not asset acquisitions, and was limited to horizontal

mergers. 2 4 In 1950, Congress, viewing with alarm the rising level of

economic concentration that resulted from corporate acquisitions and
mergers, 0 5 broadened the Clayton Act to include asset acquisitions and

202. See W. LOVEJOY & P. HOMAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF OIL CONSERVATION
REGULATION 276-78 (1967); Lobel, supra note 149, at 10; Mead, The System of Government
Subsidies to the Oil Industry, 10 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 113 (1970); Walden, supra note 150, at
774, 779-81; BUs. WEEK, May 17, 1969, at 99, col. 2.
203. See Comment, supra note 121, at 325. See generally E. ROSTOw, A NATIONAL POLICY
FOR THE OIL INDUSTRY 12, 67-69; BUS. WEEK, May 17, 1969, at 99.
204. Clayton Act § 7, Ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731-32 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1964) provides: "That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation engaged also in
commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition between
the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to
restrain such commerce in any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce." This section was interpreted to apply only to stock, not asset acquisitions, thus
emasculating the statute. Thatcher Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 272 U.S. 554 (1926); see I. Stelzer, supra note
110, at 56.
205. S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950); Note, Determining the "Line of
Commerce" UnderSection Seven of the Clayton Act, 18 VAND. L. REV. 1506, 1508-09 (1965); see
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962).
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brought vertical and conglomerate as well as horizontal acquisitions
within the scope of the statute.2 °1 In amending section 7 of the Clayton
Act, Congress intended to halt, in their incipiency, mergers and
acquisitions that might substantially lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly in any line of commerce. Congress wanted to protect small
business as an important competitive factor in the market by preventing
the anticompetitive effects of corporate mergers before they achieved the
monopolistic proportions necessary to violate the Sherman Act.20 7 In
order to reach section 7 violations in their initial stages, Congress
conferred enforcement jurisdiction on the Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission.2 1 In addition, the FTC was granted broad
investigatory and rule making authority in order to discover violations
29
of the antimerger provision. 1
The purpose of the following section is to analyze mergers and
acquisitions within the basic energy or fuel market with reference to the
policies and principles of section 7 of the Clayton Act. The mergers are
analyzed in terms of their horizontal and conglomerate characteristics,
206. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), formerly ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731-32
(1914) provides: "No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of
the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another
corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country,
the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly."
207. "The purpose . . . is to limit future increases in the level of economic concentration
resulting from corporate mergers and acquisitions. . . .The enactment of the bill will limit further
growth of monopoly and thereby aid in preserving small business as an important competitive
factor in the American economy." S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1950). The intent
here, as in other parts of the Clayton Act, is to cope with monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency
and well before they have attained the effects that would justify a Sherman Act proceeding. See
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
208. Clayton Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1964) provides: "[A]nd it shall be the duty of the
several United States attorneys, in their respective districts, under the direction of the Attorney
General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations." Federal Trade
Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1964) provides: "The Commission is empowered and
directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of
competition in commerce. ....
"
209. Federal Trade Commission Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 46 (1964) provides in part:
"The commission shall also have power(a) Investigation of corporations.
To gather and compile information concerning, and to investigate from time to time
the organization, business, conduct, practices and management of any corporation engaged in
commerce ..
(g) Classification of corporations; regulation.
From time to time to classify corporations and to make rules and regulations for the
purpose of carrying out the provisions of Sections 41-46 and 47-58 of this title."
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and an assessment of the anticompetitive effects in each category is
attempted. Following this assessment, the public devices for staying
further concentration in the energy market are examined, and
suggestions for possible private actions seeking treble damages are
outlined.
I. HorizontalAspects of the Petroleum Industry's Acquisition of
Coal and Atomic Energy Resources.-The application of section 7 of
the Clayton Act, as amended, is limited to mergers or acquisitions that
may substantially lessen competition in any line of commerce in any
section of the country. 2 0 Since the horizontal merger is the most obvious
threat to competition, it is the kind of acquisition most often challenged
under section 7. 21 A horizontal merger or acquisition occurs when a
21 2
corporation acquires all or part of the stock or assets of a competitor.
The anticompetitive effects of this merger are apparent. As the
enterprises in direct competition are merged, the number of competitors
in the market is reduced, the size of the remaining firms in the market is
increased, and the disadvantages inherent in the oligopolistic market
21 3
begin to emerge.
Since a horizontal merger is not a per se violation of section 7, the
particular facts of each acquisition must be examined. 21 In statutory
terms the proposed merger must exhibit potential anticompetitive effects
in a line of commerce in any section of the country before it will violate
section 7. The initial determination, therefore, is whether the acquiring
and acquired enterprises compete in the same product and geographic
210. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 321-22 (1962).
211. See, e.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966) (horizontal merger of
2 competing breweries held violation of § 7); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270
(1966) (horizontal merger of food store chains violated the Clayton Act); United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (horizontal merger of competing banks was
enjoined). Before reaching the substantive issues, § 7 of the Clayton Act requires compliance with
the following jurisdictional prerequisites. Both the acquiring and acquired enterprises must be
corporations; all the participating corporations must be engaged in interstate or foreign commerce;
the transaction must be an acquisition as defined by the Clayton Act; the transaction must involve
the acquisition of corporate assets or stock; and if the transaction is an asset acquisition, the
acquiring corporation must be subject to the jurisdiction of the FTC. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964); see J.
VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 11.07[l] (16A Business

Organizations 1969).
212. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 334 (1962); B. BOCK, MERGERS
AND MARKETS 49 (5th ed. 1966).
213. McDermott, supra note 186, at 139-40.
214. "[W]hile providing no definite quantitative or qualitative tests by which enforcement
agencies could gauge the effects of a given merger to determine whether it may 'substantially' lessen
competition or tend toward monopoly, Congress indicated plainly that a merger had to be
functionally viewed, in the context of its particular industry." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 321-22 (1962).
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markets. It is only within this context that the nature of the competition
between the enterprises and the probable anticompetitive effect of the
21
merger can be ascertained.
(a) The product market.-On initial observation, coal, residual
fuel oil, and uranium appear to be highly dissimilar products that are

"not in the same line of commerce.1216 Indeed, early decisions in federal

district courts indicated that the product market would be narrowly
defined, and if two products could be distinguished on any reasonable
basis, they would be classified into separate lines of commerce. 2 7 The net
effect of these decisions on horizontal mergers was to limit the scope of
section 7 to corporations producing substantially identical products. In
1962, however, the Supreme Court, in Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States,218 expanded the definition of a product market to include all
products that are reasonably interchangeable or are close substitutes for
one another. In addition, the Court cited several potentially significant
factors that may define relevant submarkets2t 9 within a product market.
These factors include: (1) public recognition of the submarket as a
separate economic entity; (2) peculiar uses and characteristics of the

product; (3) unique production facilities; (4) distinct customers and
prices; (5) susceptibility to price fluctuations; and (6) specialized
sellers.320 Applying these factors in Brown Shoe, the Court rejected the
215. "Because Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits any merger which may substantially
lessen competition 'in any line of commerce,' . . . it is necessary to examine the effects of a merger
in each such economically significant submarket.
... Id. at 325; see Bernhard, Divergent
Conceptsof Competition in Antitrust Cases, 15 ANTITRUST BULL. 43 (1970).
216. Although the balance of this section attempts to define this phrase, in short, suppliers are
said to be in the same line of commerce if their products compete to fill the needs of the same
customers.
217. See, e.g., United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1963),
rev'd, 378 U.S. 441 (1964) (holding metal containers and glass containers were produced in separate
lines of commerce).
218. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
219. Although the concept of reasonable interchangeability of use allows the functional
product market to be broadened, the concept of submarket is used to contract the market in which 2
suppliers compete. If 2 competitors compete in only a portion of what is generally thought to be a
larger product market, then market share, concentration, and other relevant factors will be distorted
if the larger market figures are used. When the plaintiff in an antitrust action contends that a
horizontal merger by producers of substitute products is anticompetitive, he, therefore, is faced with
the dilemma of having to allege a broad product market for the purpose of including the products in
the same line of commerce while attempting to narrow the submarket so that the market share and
concentration data will reflect the true state of competition in the submarket.
220. 370 U.S. at 325. At one time corporations could minimize the anticompetitive effects of
a merger by including within the relevant product market as many substitute products as possible.
This practice was curtailed by Brown Shoe, which set forth criteria to define relevant submarkets,
thus narrowing the scope of inquiry. Robinson, Antitrust-Horizontal and Vertical Mergers Under
the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 36 U.M.K.C.L. REV. 75 (1968).
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contention that the relevant product markets of the acquiring and
acquired companies were medium priced and lower priced shoes
respectively and held that the appropriate submarkets were those of
men's, women's, and children's shoes. By defining the relevant
submarket in terms of age and sex, the Court pointed out that the two
companies were direct competitors since the shoes produced by them
were in the same product submarkets. If, as Brown Shoe had contended,
the submarkets had been defined in terms of medium priced shoes in one
submarket and lower priced shoes in another, the companies apparently
would not have been substantial competitors within the meaning of
section 7.
The criteria enunciated in Brown Shoe are relevant for determining
in which lines of commerce two companies within the same industry
compete. A slightly more complex problem is raised, however, by the
interindustry consolidations involving petroleum, coal, and uranium
interests. The Supreme Court first defined an interindustry product
market in United States v. Continental Can Co. 2 2' In 1956, Continental
Can Company acquired Hazel-Atlas Glass Company, uniting the
nation's second largest producer of metal containers with the third
largest producer of glass containers. The district court applied the
factors enunciated in Brown Shoe and determined that metal containers
and glass containers were not in the same line of commerce. 222 The court
recognized that there was overall interindustry or intercommodity
competition, but did not find the reasonable cross-elasticity of demand 223
it considered crucial for a violation of section 7. Rejecting this decision,
the Supreme Court held that the concepts of reasonable
interchangeability of use or cross-elasticity of demand were not intended
to limit the application of section 7 solely to competition between
identical products. 224 Although the Court acknowledged that glass and
metal containers have different characteristics that may make one more
desirable or suitable for a particular use than the other despite a price
differential, it refused to allow these factors to obscure the nature of the
interindustry competition and found Brown Shoe inapplicable to
interindustry acquisitions. The Court ultimately defined the product
market in terms of the "end use" of metal and glass containers, seeking
221. 378 U.S. 441 (1964), rev'g217 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
222. 217 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
223. Cross-elasticity of demand attempts to measure the degree to which dissimilar products
are substitutes for one another. The demand for products A and B, for example, is said to be highly
cross-elastic if a rise in the price of product A will cause customers to begin purchasing substitute

product B.
224.

378 U.S. at 453; see Note, supra note 205.
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to bring the product market concept as close as possible to functional
competitive reality. Recognizing that glass and metal are not
competitive for all end uses, the Court held that complete interindustry
competitive overlap is not necessary. The Court then faced the dilemma
that in defining the product market broadly in terms of end uses, many
other products, such as plastic and aluminum containers, would be
competitors, thus reducing both the market share of the merged
corporation and the anticompetitive impact of the merger under section
7. It found, however, that the broad product market definition did not
negate the existence of a submarket in which only glass and metal
containers are competitors. In reaching the conclusion that the merger
would substantially lessen competition and thus violate section 7, the
Court stated: "[T]hough the interchangeability of use may not be so
complete and the cross-elasticity of demand not so immediate as in the
case of most intraindustry mergers, there is over the long run the kind of
customer response to innovation and other competitive stimuli that
brings the competition between these two industries within section 7's
competition-preserving proscriptions. ' '2 5
To judge the antitrust significance of petroleum corporations'
interest in coal and uranium, the product markets in which coal, oil, and
uranium compete must first be delineated according to the principles
established in Brown Shoe and Continental Can.22 1 It should be
remembered that as a result of recent petroleum company expansion into
the coal industry, three major petroleum companies-Continental Oil
Company, Occidental Petroleum Corporation, and Standard Oil
Company of Ohio-now produce twenty percent of the nation's coal
supply. 227 In addition, twelve American petroleum companies account
for fourteen percent of uranium.production and control an estimated 45
2
to 80 percent of the known nuclear fuel reserves.1 1
(i) Present product substitutability.-The most important
product market in which petroleum companies 229 compete with
producers of coal and uranium consists of supplying residual fuel oil for
225. 378 U.S. at 455.
226. See notes 217-25 supra and accompanying text.
227. Mayer, supra note 3, at 75. In addition, the author indicates that oil companies,
including Humble Oil and Refining Company, are acquiring huge reserves of coal in the West. Id. at
159. For further discussion of the coal-oil mergers see note 64 supra and accompanying text.
228. Mayer, supra note 3, at 159 (estimated 45%); Bus. WEEK, Nov. 7, 1970, at 54 (estimated

80%).
229. Residual oil is an oil refinery by-product of the processes that extract valuable oils and
remove the solids. It is the only fuel oil used in substantial quantities in the United States. POWER
SURVEY, supra note 75, at 57.
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steam-electric generating plants, which produce most of the power
generated in the United States.2 30 Not only is there immediate
competition when a particular electric utility selects the primary fuel to
be consumed in a new generating unit, but this competition, at least
between oil, coal, and natural gas, may continue throughout the life of
the facility.?' This on going competition is possible since many steam
generating plants now have the capability of converting their boilers to
burn natural gas, coal, or residual fuel oil.?2 If supplies of all three fuels
are available in a geographic area,2 therefore, a generating unit with
multiple fuel burning capacity can retain the ability to bargain
effectively with competing suppliers by utilizing short-term supply
contracts. 4 Since fuel costs comprise a large portion of the cost of
generating electricity, the relative delivered price of fuel per BTU is a
major factor in the selection of a fossil fuel for use in these plants. In
many locations, the suppliers of these fuels are close competitors and a
price reduction for any one fuel may spur competitive reductions in other
fuel prices?235 This competition has been so fierce that the National Coal
Association has charged that petroleum companies "dump" residual
fuel oil onto the steam-electric generation plant market in order to
undercut coal and simultaneously charge higher prices in other oil
markets.? Competition with nuclear fuels, on the other hand, is in the
long-range planning stages only, since generation plants designed to
consume nuclear fuels usually cannot be converted to burn natural gas,
coal, or oil. 237 The Federal Power Commission has concluded that
interfuel competition will intensify in the future, particularly in the
higher fuel cost areas, where improvements in fuel transportation and
reductions in nuclear power costs should lower fuel prices. Nuclear
technology also is expected to set a continually lowering cost target that
38
the fossil fuels will be forced to meet.2
230.

Miller, Competitionand the Public Interestin the Interstate Gas and Electric Industries,
570, 578 (1970); see COMPETITION IN THE ENERGY MARKETS, supra note I, at 16.
231. Note 68 supra.
232. POWER SURVEY, supra note 75, at 53; see H. PERLOFF, E. DUNN, E. LAMPARD, & R.
MUTH, supra note 75, at 323.
233. See notes 252-58 infra and accompanying text.
234. Miller, supra note 230, at 578.
235. Prices at which fuels become competitive are relative. The competitive price of coal is
usually less than the competitive price of natural gas or residual oil because of the greater initial
investment required for a coal burning facility. In 1964, the average price per million BTU was $.35
for residual oil, but only $.15 for coal. POWER SURVEY, supra note 75, at 54, 58.
236. 1966 BITUMINOUS COAL FACTS, supra note 7, at 22.
237. See Address by Wilfred E. Johnson, Fifth Intersociety Energy Conversion Engineering
Conference, Sept. 22, 1970, reprintedin 38 VITAL SPEECHES 29, 31 (1970).
238. POWER SURVEY, supra note 75, at 54.

55

IOWA L. REV.
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Because residual fuel oil and coal are close substitutes in the market
that supplies steam-electric power generating plants, at least one FTC
decision has concluded that demand for the products is cross-elastic.?'
Although the interindustry competition in the fuel market is not as
sharply defined as the intra-industry competition that exists between two
producers of the same fuel, the nature of the competition among coal,
residual fuel oil, natural gas, and uranium producers in supplying
electric utilities seems sufficient to constitute a single product market
within the meaning of Continental Can.240
(ii) Potentialproduct competition.-In addition to the present
competition among coal, oil, natural gas, and uranium at the steamelectric generation level, further competition between coal and oil may
be feasible within the coming decade. 24' This competition will be the
result of a new process that converts coal into petroleum products.
Although oil produced from coal was sold as an illuminant as early as
the 1850's, the expense of the conversion process rendered coal oil
commercially impractical. Recently, however, Consolidation Coal
Company, now a subsidiary of Continental Oil, and Hydrocarbon
Research, Inc., with support from the Department of the Interior, have
undertaken substantial research and development projects investigating
the commercial feasibility of producing synthetic petroleum products
from coal.2 2 Pilot studies indicate that the production of synthetic fuels,
including gasoline, from coal may be commercially reasonable by 1975
and may be a substantial factor in the nation's fuel market by 1980.243
The nation's coal industry thus has the potential capability of producing
synthetic petroleum products that could compete effectively with natural
petroleum products, even in captive petroleum markets. Furthermore,
the proximity of the nation's major coal reserves to areas of high fuel
consumption can only enhance the competitive potential of synthetic
petroleum. 24 It is likely, therefore, that oil and coal will become direct
239. In re Kennecott Copper Corp., BNA A.T.R.R. a-5 (FTC Mar. 8, 1970) (report of
hearing examiner).
240. See notes 224-25 supra and accompanying text.
241. Netschert, Book Review, 14 ANTITRUST BULL. 629 (1969).
242. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, UNITED STATES PETROLEUM THROUGH 1980, at 71-78
(1968) [hereinafter cited as PETROLEUM THROUGH 1980]. The Consolidation Coal Company
method dissolves coal in a liquid that itself is produced from coal through a prior process. Ash and
the less reactive parts of the coal are filtered out and the remaining extract is hydrogenated to
produce a high quality synthetic crude feedstock. The Hydrocarbon Research, Inc., process includes
suspension of coal in recycle oil that is fed directly to a high-pressure hydrogenation vessel. An
additional hydrogen treatment produces gasoline. Id. at 72.
243. Id. at 74.
244. Id.
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competitors in all aspects of the petroleum market within this decade. In
assessing the degree of competition within a product market, this
potential competition is a vital factor. 24 5
(b) The geographic market.-The second statutory prerequisite in
determining the anticompetitive effects of a merger is the delineation of a
geographic market or section of the country where the enterprises
compete. 4 ' Even though two corporations produce products that are
identical or close substitutes for one another, they are not competitors if
they do not offer their goods within the same geographic region to the
same customers. This geographic market may be defined broadly in
terms of a nationwide market or narrowly in terms of a city or other
small geographic area. 2 7 To ascertain the anticompetitive effects of a
merger, the Supreme Court, in Brown Shoe, established a flexible test
for defining the geographic market. The Court held that the statutory
phrase "in any section of the country, ' 248 requires that a geographic
market must correspond to the commercial realities of the industry and
must be economically significant. In other words, the proposed merger
must be one that will substantially lessen competition within the
geographic area of actual effective competition.24 9 In United States v.
Pabst Brewing Co.,250 the Supreme Court further clarified the meaning
of the term "geographic market." Pabst Brewing Company, the
nation's tenth largest brewery, had merged with Blatz, the country's
eighteenth largest brewer, to form an enterprise that was the fifth largest
producer of beer. The merged companies produced only 4.49 percent of
the industry's total nationwide sales, but in the three-state region of
Wisconsin, Illinois, and Michigan, the combined enterprises accounted
for 32 percent of beer sales. As a result, the anticompetitive effects of the
245. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964) (merger with a potential
competitor held anticompetitive); Adler, FrontierIssues in Merger Doctrine, 39 ABA ANTITRUST
L.J. 118, 120 (1969).
246. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-37 (1962); Note, United States v.
Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966). and United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546
(1966)-Competition and the Geographic Market Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 62 Nw.
U.L. REv. 58 (1967). The 1950 amendment substituted the present language "inany section of the
country" for the phrase "inany section or community." Clayton Act § 7, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat.
731 (1914). as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). Apparently, the purpose of this change was to
make it clear that Congress was not concerned with mergers between small enterprises in the same
community. See S. REP. No. 1775, 8 1st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950).
247. Compare United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (a single city), with
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964) (nationwide).
248. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
249. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); see E. SINGER, ANTITRUST
ECONOmICS 252 (1968).
250. 384 U.S. 546 (1966), rev'g 233 F. Supp. 475 (E.D. Wis. 1964).
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merger could be demonstrated easily in the limited geographical area
where the companies were substantial competitors prior to the merger,
even though the anticompetitive effects in the nationwide market were
not as apparent. Reversing the district court's determination that the
three-state area was not the relevant geographic market, the Supreme
Court held that the merger may have a substantial anticompetitive effect
25 1
somewhere in the United States.
(i) Present geographic market overlap.-The high costs incurred
in transporting natural gas, coal, and residual fuel oil limit the
geographic markets or regions where these fuels can compete as
suppliers to steam-electric generating plants. 2 The market for nuclear
fuels, on the other hand, is not regionalized since the small quantity of
uranium needed in a single plant renders its transportation costs
negligible. Although the general trend is for coal to dominate the fuel
market east of the Mississippi River and for natural gas and residual oil
to control the market west of the Mississippi, 20 there are recognizable
regions in which coal, oil, and natural gas do compete. In general, the
regional areas that presently enjoy fuel competition are the Northeastern
states, New England, the Midwest, and the Mountain regions. In New
York, for example, 53 percent of the steam-electric generating plants
utilize coal and 47 percent use oil or natural gas, and in Iowa 51 percent
utilize coal and 49 percent natural gas or oil.21
(ii) Potential expansion of geographic market overlap.-The
long-range trend indicates that transportation costs for natural gas,
coal, and residual oil will decline, enlarging the regions where the fuels
2 56
are competitive. z5 Furthermore, when the coal pipeline and unit train
achieve widespread use, coal should be able to invade regions presently
dominated by oil and natural gas . 7 In addition, when the process for
251. Id. at 549.
252. See H. PERLOFF, E.

E. LAMPARD, & R. MUTH, supra note 75, at 323-25. See also
supra note 1, at 8.
253. POWER SURVEY, supra note 75, at 53-54.
254. 1969 STEAM-ELECTRIC PLANT FACTORS, supra note 28, at 7-8, 19-20. The percentages of
coal as opposed to oil and natural gas consumed by steam-electric generation plants in the
Northeast and New England include: Connecticut, coal 46%, oil & gas 54%; Massachusetts, coal
32%, oil &gas 68%; New Jersey, coal 46%, oil & gas 54%; Pennsylvania, coal 91%, oil &gas 9%; and
Rhode Island, coal 15%, oil & gas 85%. Comparable percentages in the Midwest and Mountain
states include: Colorado, coal 62%, oil & gas 38%; Minnesota, coal 61%, oil & gas 39%; Missouri,
coal 79%, oil & gas 21%; South Dakota, coal 57%; oil & gas 43%; and Utah, coal 43%, oil &gas 57%,
Id. at 3-4, 5-6, 9-10, 3940, 21-22, 23-24, 25-26, 4142.
255. POWER SURVEY, supra note 75, at 54.
256. See text accompanying note 75 supra.
257. Coal pipelines are now commercially (easible. At least one pipeline, which will transport
coal 273 miles from northeastern Arizona to a power plant in southern Nevada, was scheduled for
DUNN,
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converting coal into oil becomes operational, petroleum corporations
and coal companies will be direct competitors in the nationwide
2
distribution of petroleum products. 1
(c) Anticompetitive effects of horizontal mergers within the
energy market.-In 1963, Gulf Oil Corporation initiated the trend
toward petroleum and coal mergers with its acquisition of a relatively
small coal producer, Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Company. This
merger would have gone unnoticed if it had not been emphasized by
three later acquisitions of large coal companies by petroleum interests.? 9
In 1966, Continental Oil bought Consolidation Coal Company, now the
largest coal company, which produces eleven percent of the total United
States coal production. Subsequently, Occidental Petroleum acquired
Island Creek Coal Company and Standard Oil Company of Ohio
purchased Old Ben Coal Corporation. 2 0 Several of the major oil
companies also have been acquiring a large percentage of domestic coal
reserves, 26 ' primarily in the Midwest and Western regions.2 2 Similarly,
petroleum interests have acquired an estimated 45 to 80 percent of the
known uranium reserves.2 3 Although the acquisition of coal and
uranium reserves and the longstanding natural gas holdings probably do
not have direct section 7 significance,2 they do emphasize both the
degree of and trend toward concentration in the overall energy market.
Having defined the relevant product and geographic markets in
which the fuels compete, the task remains to determine the anticompetitive effects of horizontal mergers in the energy market. This
determination will be made largely from an analysis of the various facts
about the acquiring and acquired corporations and the competitive
structure of the market, using guidelines suggested by the Supreme
Court, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Trade Commission.
completion in 1970. The coal pipeline will affect interfuel competition because it provides a means of
lowering the transportation cost for coal and provides the possibility of utilizing coal in areas that
were previously inaccessible. COMPETITION IN THE ENERGY MARKET, supra note 1, at 76; see note
254 supra and accompanying text.
258. See note 242 supra and accompanying text.
259. See note 64 supra and accompanying text and note 316 infra.
260. Bus. WEEK, Nov. 7, 1970, at 54-55.
261. CONCENTRATION IN THE ENERGY MARKET, supra note 1, at 27; see Hearings on
Antitrust Problems in the Energy Field Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970).
262. Bus. WEEK, Nov. 7, 1970, at 54-55.
263. See Mayer, supra note 3; Bus. WEEK, Nov. 7, 1970, at 54-55.
264. Both the acquiring and acquired enterprises must be corporations to invoke § 7. If the
reserves are being acquired through acquisitions of stock or assets of other corporations, the
jurisdictional prerequisites are satisfied. If the reserves are acquired from individuals or
partnerships, however, § 7 is ineffective. Presently, it is not clear how the reserves are being
acquired.
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(i) Judicialguidelines.-In a suit to enjoin or dissolve a merger or
acquisition, it is not necessary to prove that the merger will substantially
lessen competition, but only that the merger's effect may be
substantially to lessen competition. The Supreme Court has defined the
statutory phrase "may be substantially to lessen competition ' 2 5 to
mean a probable, not a certain, deterioration of competition. 2" The
phrase "may be" also reflects congressional intent to reach
anticompetitive mergers in their incipiency, before any substantial
damage is done to the market. 2 7 In assessing the effects of a merger, the
courts look no.t only to the quantitative factors of the merging
enterprises-sales, market share, and ranking of the acquired and

acquiring corporations-but also to qualitative factors that characterize
the market. In general, these qualitative factors include the present level

of concentration in the industry, the trend toward this concentration or
oligopoly, 'the ease of entry of new firms into the market, the ability of

the smaller firms in the market to compete with the larger ones, and the
degree to which potential competition is being eliminated by the
28
merger.
(I) Market share test.-The Supreme Court first applied these
principles to a horizontal merger in United States v. Philadelphia
National Bank. 269 The Court considered the share of the market

controlled by the merged enterprise as the most important factor in
judging the validity of the merger. Specifically, it found that the merger
would result in one bank controlling 30 percent of all commercial
banking in a four-county geographical area. Since commercial banking
265. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
to indicate
"Congress used the words 'may be substantially to lessen competition' .
266
that its concern was with probabilities, not certainties." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 323 (1962).
267. "The intent here, as in other parts of the Clayton Act, is to cope with monopolistic
tendencies in their incipiency and well before they have attained such effects as would justify a
Sherman Act proceeding." S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1950).
268. J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 211, § 19.01; see, e.g.. United States v. Penn-Olin
Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964) (an essential factor in weighing the anticompetitive effect of the
transaction is the degree of potential competition between the enterprises); United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (the degree of concentration in the industry is an
important factor in weighing the effects of the merger); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294 (1962) (usually the most important consideration is the share of the market that would be
controlled by the merged enterprise).
269. 374 U.S. 321 (1963). The Supreme Court had enunciated the factors to be used in
judging the effects of a merger in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). This case,
however, involved significant vertical as well as horizontal factors. The analysis of the horizontal
factors, therefore, was weakened.
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already was becoming more concentrated as an industry, the Court held
that the merger violated section 7, and further said:
Specifically, we think that a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue
percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the
concentration of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition
substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that
the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects. 21

On similar facts, the Court invalidated the merger of two banks in
United States v. First National Bank & Trust Co.27n In support of this
holding, the Court found that the combined banks would control 50
percent of the market, substantially lessening competition among
existing banks. It also recognized that this large market share probably
would remain stable due to the difficulty of entry into the market by new
banks.
The market share test also has been used to judge the validity of
interindustry mergers. In United States v. Continental Can Co.,272 for
example, the Court found that the merger between Continental Can,
which accounted for one-third of all cans produced in the United States,
and Hazel-Atlas, which manufactured 9.6 percent of all glass containers,
was anticompetitive since the merger raised Continental's market share
in the combined glass-tin market from 21.9 percent to 25 percent in an
already concentrated industry. The Court rejected Continental Can's
contention that the kinds of containers produced by the two companies
were not, for the most part, in actual competition. Since there was
interindustry competition between some of the companies' products, the
Court held that the merger did foreclose actual competition.
(II) Industry concentration test.-In addition to the market share
test, increasing emphasis has been placed on the degree of market
concentration as a test of the anticompetitive effects of a merger. One of
the basic reasons cited by Congress for the 1950 amendment of section 7
was a desire to protect the small businessman by stemming the growing
tide of economic concentration. 273 The highly concentrated or
oligopolistic industry is characterized by a few large enterprises
producing the bulk of the industry's products. These corporations often
act noncompetitively for their mutual benefit, curtailing price
270. 374 U.S. at 363; see Robinson, supra note 220.
271. 376 U.S. 665 (1964). Although this case was decided under the Sherman Act §§ 1,2, 15
U.S.C. §§ I, 2 (1964), analysis of the anticompetitive effects also seems relevant to the § 7
question.
272. 378 U.S. 441 (1964). For a discussion of the factual context of the case and definition of
the relevant product market see notes 221-25 supra and accompanying text.
273. S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950).
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competition to the detriment of the competitive system.274 Since a
horizontal merger inevitably results, to some degree, in greater industrial
concentration, any merger within a concentrated industry is suspect. In
United States v. Von's Grocery Co.,275 for example, the Supreme Court
invalidated a merger between two grocery chains even though the new
firm had only a 7.5 percent share of the Los Angeles retail grocery
market. The decision that the merger was anticompetitive rested upon
the Court's analysis of a long and continuous trend in the market toward
fewer individually owned competitors. To support its analysis that the
market was becoming more concentrated, the Court relied not on
increases in the concentration ratio, 276 but on the overall decline in the
7
number of small competitors.2
The Court relied in part on a similar market analysis in United
8 to invalidate the Pabst Brewing-Blatz
States v. Pabst Brewing Co.,27
Brewing Company merger. Although the combined market share of the
two corporations in a nationwide market would have been only 4.49
percent, the decline of competitors in the market-from 714 in 1934 to
229 in 1961-indicated increasing market concentration. Pabst had
conceded the trend toward concentration, but contended that it was
irrelevant since it had not resulted from previous mergers. The Court
held, however, that the degree of concentration, whatever its cause, is a
vital factor in judging the anticompetitive effect of a merger.
In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,27 the Court relied on the
traditional concentration ratio to assess the degree of concentration in
the American shoe market. When Brown Shoe, producing 4.0 percent of
the nation's shoes, acquired Kinney's, producing 0.5 percent, the
combined market share of the consolidated firm was less than 5.0
percent of the total market. Nevertheless, the Court determined that the
merger would probably lessen competition substantially. The Court
considered the shoe market concentrated since the four largest firms
produced approximately 23 percent of the nation's shoes in an industry
274. See C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 56, at 44-45; Mayer, supra note 3.
275. 384 U.S. 270 (1966), noted in 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 653 (1967).
276. The concentration ratio is typically the ratio of the goods produced by the largest 4 or 8
firms compared with total production in the industry. See notes 56-58 supra and accompanying
text.
277. Between 1950 and 1961, for example, the number of single store owners declined from
5,365 to 3,818. By 1963, 3 years after the merger, the total had dropped to 3,590. The Court also
noted that the number of chain stores in Los Angeles had risen during the same period from 96 to
150 and that the market had a history of mergers and acquisitions.
278. 384 U.S. 546 (1966). See generally Greenhut, An Economic Theoryfor Use in Antitrust
Cases, 7 HOUSTON L. REV. 318 (1970).
279. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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that had a history of growth through mergers and acquisitions. The
Court recognized that control of five percent of a market resulting from
merger might not be anticompetitive but added, "If a merger achieving
5% control were now approved, we might be required to approve future
merger efforts by Brown's competitors seeking similar market shares.
The oligopoly Congress sought to avoid would then be

furthered ...."20
(ii) Administrative guidelines. - In addition to the guidelines
established by the judiciary, the Department of Justice, which initiates
the majority of suits under section 7, has recently established criteria for
judging the anticompetitive effects of a horizontal merger. The
Department has indicated that it will challenge any merger in a highly
concentrated market z8 in which the acquiring and acquired companies
each account for four percent of the market. As the market share of the
acquiring firm increases, the respective market share of the acquired
corporation necessary to show the anticompetitive effect decreases. If the
acquiring corporation dominates fifteen or even ten percent of a highly
concentrated market, for example, the acquired firm need only control
one percent or two percent respectively, to provoke a Department of
Justice challenge. When the market is less highly concentrated, the
respective shares of the acquiring and the acquired company must be
somewhat greater than the figures mentioned above.2 8 2 A stricter test is
applied when there is a definite trend toward greater concentration in the
industry."'
In addition to the market share criteria, two situations are likely to
280. Id. at 343-44; see Phillips, Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Antimerger
Decisions, 21 Sw. L.J. 429 (1967).
281. The Department considers a market highly concentrated for this purpose if the largest 4

firms account for 75% or more of the market share. J. VON KALINOWSKI,
TRADE REGULATION, App. IC, at 113 (16B Business Organizations 1970).

ANTITRUST LAWS AND

282. In a market in which the shares of the 4 largest firms amount to less than 75%, the
Department will ordinarily challenge mergers between firms accounting for, approximately, the
following percentages of the market:

Acquiring Firm
5%
10%
15%
20%
25% or more

Acquired Firm
5% or more
4% or more
3% or more
2% or more
I%or more

Id. at 114.
283. A trend toward concentration is considered to be present when the aggregate market
share of any grouping of the largest firms in the market has increased by approximately 7% or more
over a period of time extending from any base year 5- 10 years prior to the merger up to the time of
the merger. Id.
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be challenged by the Department regardless of the market share
involved: (1) the acquisition of a competitor if the acquisition is
particularly disruptive to the industry or eliminates an unusually
competitive factor in the market, and (2) the merger of a substantial
enterprise with a firm that possesses an unusual competitive potential,
such as a new patent or production process. These guidelines reflect the
increasing concern of the Department of Justice with the adverse
competitive effects produced by excessive market concentration. This
concern is also mirrored by FTC merger guidelines established for the
textile and food distribution industries. 211 Unfortunately, however, the
Commission has not established similar guidelines for mergers within
the energy market.
(iii) Application of guidelines to energy market. - In assessing the
anticompetitive effects of oil and coal mergers, several complex
problems arise that are not fully explored in the case law or Department
of Justice guidelines. While the problem of defining the relevant product
and geographic markets has been treated earlier 28 5 the task remains to
analyze the ability of section 7 to cope with growing energy market
concentration. The first major problem is the lack of adequate statistical
information delineating the market shares of merging oil and coal
corporations. This lack of information results principally from the
treatment of oil and coal as statistically separate industries rather than
as members of an integral energy market. The following examples
compiled from available sources merely indicate suppression of
competition in sample states. In 1969, Continental Oil supplied 1.2
percent of the total petroleum needs in Illinois,?" while Consolidation
Coal accounted for 9.4 percent of the coal mined in Illinois during the
same year. 287 The effects of the Consolidation Coal-Continental Oil
merger can be demonstrated through scrutiny of the market that
supplies energy to steam-electric generating facilities in Illinois. Since
ten of the state's 42 generation facilities are equipped to burn either coal
or residual fuel oil,2 the merger was anticompetitive to the extent that
the ten multifuel facilities lost an independent alternative fuel supplier as
a result of the combination. The same inferences can be drawn from the
Pittsburg & Midway Coal-Gulf Oil merger in the geographic market of
Kansas. Pittsburg & Midway produces approximately 78 percent of the
284.
285.
286.

J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 281, App. IC, at 3.
See notes 216-51 supra and accompanying text.

287.
288.

1970 KEYSTONE COAL INDUSTRY MANUAL 476-78.
1969 STEAM-ELECTRIC PLANT FACTORS, supra note 28, at 9-11.

NATIONAL PETROLEUM NEWS-MID-MAY FACTBOOK ISSUE 143 (1970).
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state's coal, 28 9 and Gulf maintains 135 retail outlets in Kansas. 2 0
Although only four of the 34 steam-electric generation facilities burn
coal and oil alternatively, 2 9' an oil-coal merger tends to foreclose
competition in this market. Although these figures do not reveal the
combined share of the merged corporations' electric utility market, they
are indicative of the problem.
The second significant factor in determining the anticompetitive
effect of a horizontal merger, the degree of concentration in the market,
is more easily verifiable in the energy market. Concentration can be
measured either as a ratio of the output of the largest several suppliers to
total production in the market or as a showing of a significant decline in
the number of independent enterprises in a line of commerce. 22 The oil
industry can presently be characterized as oligopolistic, with regional
concentration ratios of the largest eight enterprises ranging from 48 to
99 percent. 23 Furthermore, the total number of independent oil jobbers
is declining. 29 4 Similarly, the coal industry is tending toward
concentration. On a nationwide basis, the four leading coal companies in
1969 produced 31.13 percent of the nation's coal, while regional
concentration ratios ranged from 31.5 percent to 100 percent. 29 5 In
addition, petroleum companies' acquisition of coal and uranium reserves
will result in greater centralization of control of the nation's energy
resources.
In analyzing the market effect of a horizontal acquisition, the
Department of Justice has stressed that it will scrutinize any merger in
which the acquired firm is the owner of a new process or patent.
Continental Oil's acquisition of Consolidation Coal seems to fit
squarely within this proscription since Consolidation Coal is conducting
extensive research in the synthetic petroleum field and has the potential
of becoming a major producer of synthetic petroleum within the decade.
2. Conglomerate Aspects of Petroleum Corporations'A cquisitions
of Coal and Atomic Energy Sources. -Even if the horizontal aspects
are disregarded, oil and coal mergers still may have sufficient
anticompetitive consequences to be challenged under section 7 as
conglomerate mergers. The pure conglomerate acquisition occurs when
289. 1970 KEYSTONE COAL INDUSTRY MANUAL 493.
290. NATIONAL PETROLEUM NEWS-MID-MAY FACTBOOK ISSUE 64 (1970).
291. 1969 STEAM-ELECTRIC PLANT FACTORS, supra note 28, at 19.
292. Compare Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), with United States v.
Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
293. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 56, at 284.
294. Bus. WEEK, Nov. 7, 1970, at 54.
295. See Tables A-C, supra. See also Wall Street J., May 14, 197 1, at 8, col. 2 (S.W. ed.).
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two corporations that have no discernible economic relationship
merge. 29 6 There are two variants of the pure conglomerate
combination-the product extension merger and the geographic market
extension merger. The Supreme Court has defined a product extension
acquisition as one in which the products of the acquired company are
complementary to those of the acquiring company and may be produced
with similar facilities, marketed through the same channels in the same
manner, and advertised by the same media. 297 Similarly, a geographic
extension merger occurs when the acquired and acquiring firms produce
the same or substantially similar products but market the products in
different geographic areas. 298 In essence, all variants of conglomerate
mergers generate the same kinds of potential anticompetitive effects.
Those proscribed effects include: (1) Elimination of potential
competition; (2) generation of reciprocal dealings;2 9 9 and (3)
entrenchment of one enterprise in a market previously characterized by
many competitors. 3 10 The first and third factors are the most relevant to
acquisitions within the energy market.
(a) Elimination of potential competition. - Like the horizontal
merger, the anticompetitive effects of a conglomerate merger must be
assessed within a defined geographic and product market.30 ' If a
corporation is permitted to eliminate a potential competitor by a merger
or acquisition, competition in a given line of commerce may be lessened
296. B. BOCK, supra note 212, at 140-41; Turner, Conglomerate Mergersand Section 7 ofthe
Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1313, 1315 (1965).
297. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) (invalidating merger between
Procter & Gamble, manufacturer of detergents, and Clorox, leading manufacturer of bleach).
298. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964) (ordering El Paso
Natural Gas to divest itself of the stock of Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp.).
299. Reciprocal dealings have been defined as "the favoring of one's customers in purchasing
commodities sold by them. Suppose, for example, that Industry A sells product A to Industry B.
which sells product B to Industry C. If a firm in Industry C acquires a firm in Industry A, it is
possible that the firms in B will now patronize the A-C conglomerate in buying product A, either
because of the overt pressure by A-C or simply in order to curry A-C's favor." Turner, supra note
296, at 1386-87. The Supreme Court has recognized that "[a] threatened withdrawal of orders if
products of an affiliate cease being bought, as well as a conditioning of future purchases on the
receipt of orders for products of that affiliate, is an anticompetitive practice." FTC v. Consolidated
Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 594 (1965).
300. These effects have been cast into 5 categories: (1) the acquired firm may be operated at
low cost as part of the conglomerate, forcing competitors in the acquired firm's market out of
business; (2) a diversified firm may charge an abnormally low price in its new line of commerce,
forcing out competitors; (3) a conglomerate merger may raise barriers to entry and cause small
companies to reduce the vigor of competition because of the intimidating size of the conglomerate(4) the merger may eliminate potential competition; and (5) conglomerate mergers may lead to
reciprocity. Turner, supra note 296, at 1322-23.
301. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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within a geographic region. This anticompetitive effect was
recognized by the Supreme Court in United States v. El Paso Natural
Gas Co.302 At the time El Paso acquired Pacific Northwest Pipeline
Corporation, El Paso was the only distributor of out-of-state natural gas
in California, the relevant geographic market. Since Pacific Northwest
was one of two major pipelines serving the trans-Rocky Mountain
states, the Court concluded that the past efforts of Pacific Northwest to
enter the California market, although unsuccessful, remained a powerful
influence on El Paso's business practices. 313 The lessening of potential
competition also was a factor in invalidating the merger between Procter
& Gamble and Clorox. 3 4 Since Procter & Gamble was the most likely
entrant into the bleach market and would have remained on the
periphery, preventing Clorox from utilizing its market power, the merger
reduced present competition in the liquid bleach market. The
Department of Justice guidelines dealing with the validity of
conglomerate mergers also recognize the importance of potential
30 5
competition as a factor in judging the effect of a merger.
Anticipated technological advances in the coal industry will result
in potential, if not actual, competition between petroleum and coal
corporations in at least two lines of commerce. First, development of the
coal pipeline will enable coal producers to compete in geographic
markets now dominated by petroleum and natural gas. This geographic
expansion can occur in the markets of fuel supply to steam-electric
generating plants. 316 Secondly, all coal companies will be potential
entrants into all petroleum markets, at least in those areas where coal is
accessible, 30 7 when the coal-to-oil conversion process becomes
commercially practical. The recognition of this second area of potential
competition is of particular significance when analyzing the merger of
Continental Oil Company and Consolidation Coal Company. Since
302. 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
303. Id. at 659.
304. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
305. The Department of Justice has indicated that it will normally challenge any merger
between a likely entrant into the market and any of the following: (1) a firm with 25% of the market;
(2) either of the 2 largest firms in a market when the largest 2 firms dominate 50% of the market; (3)
any of the 4 largest firms when the top 8 control 75% or more of the market, providing the merging
firm controls 10% of the market; and (4) any of the 8 largest if the 8 largest control 75% and either
the merging firms' share is not insubstantial and there are no more than one or 2 likely entrants, or
the merging firm is a rapidly growing firm. J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 281, App. IC, at 12122.
306. See notes 229-38 supra and accompanying text.
307. Since the coal conversion process is predicted, at least initially, to be expensive, synthetic
petroleum products would be most competitive in areas in which coal is readily available.
PETROLEUM THROUGH 1980, supra note 242, at 71-78.
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Consolidation is the leading corporation in the research and
development project aimed at converting coal into synthetic petroleum
products, 3 8 its absorption into the Continental Oil complex eliminated
whatever competition might have existed between Continental Oil
petroleum products and Consolidation Coal's synthetic petroleum. In
the future, Continental Oil and other petroleum companies involved in
the production of coal will not have to face competition from synthetic
petroleum when setting policy for research and development, investment,
and pricing. Consequently, competition in the energy market will
3 9
inevitably be suppressed. 1
(b) Entrenchment of a dominant industry.-The second applicable
anticompetitive factor induced by conglomerate petroleum and coal
combinations is the entrenchment of a dominant industry in a market
filled with relatively small competitors. In FTC v. Procter & Gamble
Co. ,310 the Supreme Court, relying in part on the entrenchment or "deep
pocket" theory, determined that Procter & Gamble's merger with
Clorox would reduce overall competition in the liquid bleach market.
The Court reasoned that adding the financial resources of Procter &
Gamble to the strong position of Clorox in the bleach market would
raise the barriers to entry and discourage active competition among the
firms in the bleach industry due to fear of retaliatory measures by
Procter.3 11 As this case indicates, the rationale behind the "deep pocket"
theory is that an acquiring corporation with large assets gives a superior
competitive advantage to the acquired company when competitors of the
acquired company do not have similar financial resources.312 The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Reynolds Metals Co. v.
FTC,3 3 invoked the "deep pocket" theory to invalidate a merger
between Reynolds Metals and Arrow Brands, Inc., a distributor of floral
aluminum. The court concluded that Arrow's absorption into Reynolds
308. Id. at 72.
309. See Netschert, supra note 241, at 648.
310. 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
311. The Court noted that both the liquid bleach and detergent markets were highly
concentrated. For example, in the bleach market the largest 4 firms control 80% of the market, with
Clorox, the leading firm, controlling 48.8%. In addition, Procter & Gamble would add assets of
$500 million to those of Clorox in a bleach market, which, although oligopolistic, was still filled
with many small competitors.
312. For a detailed discussion of the "deep pocket" theory see Davidow, Conglomerate
Concentrationand Section Seven: The Limitations of the Anti-Merger Act, 68 COLUM. L. REV.
1231 (1968); Turner, supra note 296; Note, Conglomerate Mergers: The Attack on Diversification,
25 U. Pi-r. L. REV. 683 (1964); Note, ConglomerateMergers UnderSection 7 of the Clayton Act,
72 YALE L.J. 1265 (1963).
313. 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (vertical merger).
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gave Arrow an immediate competitive advantage over smaller rivals.3 14
The existence of the "deep pocket" created the possibility that Arrow
could sell at prices equal to or lower than cost and thus undercut smaller
competitors. It has been observed that Reynolds Metals comes close to
standing for the proposition that any acquisition by a large corporation
of a business in a competitive market made up of small enterprises
violates section 7, because it is presumed that the merger will lead to
predatory pricing and to improvement of the acquired firm's facilities

beyond the reach of the small competitors.3 15

The "deep pocket" theory can be readily applied to mergers
between petroleum and coal companies. 31 As a general rule, petroleum

corporations are among the nation's largest enterprises 3 17 competing in
a highly concentrated market.3 18 The coal industry, on the other hand, is

largely made up of many small, independent producers.3 19 For example,
when Occidental Petroleum, the nation's forty-fourth largest

32
manufacturing enterprise, with assets exceeding 2,200,000,000 dollars 1
acquired Island Creek Coal Company, presently the third largest coal
producer with only 112,660,000 dollars of premerger assets, 32 1 the latter
gained a potential competitive advantage over its smaller rivals in the
coal market.322 Other coal companies also have found "deep pockets" in
the petroleum industry. 32 Consolidation Coal in 1965 had assets of only
314. The court determined that the relevant line of commerce was floral aluminum with a
market nationwide in scope. There were only 8 firms in the market with Arrow controlling 33%. Id.
at 225.
315. Zimmerman, The Federal Trade Commission and Mergers, 64 COLUM. L. Rv. 500,
514(1964).
316. These mergers include Gulf's acquisition of Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co.,
Continental's purchase of Consolidation Coal Co., Occidental's merger with Island Creek Coal
Co., and Standard Oil of Ohio's acquisition of Old Ben Coal Corp. Bus. WEEK, Nov. 7, 1970, at
54-55.
317. According to Fortune's directory of the nation's 500 largest corporations, Continental
Oil is the thirty-fifth largest corporation when ranked by assets, Gulf ranks tenth, Occidental ranks
forty-fourth, and Standard Oil of Ohio ninety-seventh. FORTUNE, May 1970, at 182.
318. Kaysen and Turner have concluded that the petroleum industry nationwide is
oligopolistic. The largest 8 petroleum firms dominate between 52-56% of the nationwide market.
When the concentration data for various regions of the country are broken down, the market share
of the largest 8 firms varies regionally from 48-99%. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 56, at
283-84.
319. H. RISSER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE COAL INDUSTRY 9 (1958).
320. 1970 MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL INDEX 2230.

321.

1966-67

MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL INDEX

1233.

322. Occidental Petroleum Corp., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
18,797
(FTC 1969).
323. In addition to the examples cited in the text, Gulf Oil's acquisition added $8,104,824,000
to the assets of Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. See NATIONAL PETROLEUM NEWS-MIDMAY FACTBOOK ISSUE 31 (1970). Similarly, Standard Oil of Ohio added $1,553,591,000 to Old Ben
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446,136,728 dollars324 as compared with Continental Oil's premerger
assets of more than 1,679,473,000 dollars. 3 2 This disparity in size is
further accentuated when it is realized that Consolidation is the nation's
leading producer of coal in a market that, although currently
decentralized, is tending toward concentration, as evidenced by the
decline in total number of independent producers.32 6 As a result,
Continental Oil and Consolidation Coal, with combined assets
exceeding 2.9 billion dollars, compete in a market with a few other oilcoal combinations and a large number of independent producers.
In addition, there is at least a suggestion that Consolidation Coal,
through its "deep pocket" Continental Oil, is indulging in predatory
practices. In South-East Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of
A merica,327 plaintiff, a small coal producer, proved a conspiracy between
Consolidation Coal, UMW, and others to skew labor prices to force
small independent coal producers out of business. Although the point
was not raised in the case, Consolidation's merger with Continental Oil
was anticompetitive to the extent it provided the incentive or the
financial resources to carry out the conspiracy. Even though there is
nothing to suggest that other coal companies with "rich parents" in the
oil industry are engaging in similar activities, these companies still have
acquired increased potential to act anticompetitively.
The Department of Justice has specifically indicated that it will
investigate and possibly challenge the acquisition of any leading firm in a
concentrated or rapidly concentrating market where the effect may be to
further entrench or increase the market power of the acquired firm. The
Department is particularly concerned with a merger that creates a large
disparity between the size of the acquired firm and the remaining firms
in the same line of commerce.32 8 This concern apparently applies to the
situation created by the oil and coal mergers. Furthermore, the Attorney
General of the United States has indicated that the Justice Department is
likely to challenge any merger of one of the 200 leading manufacturing
firms with any leading producer in any concentrated industry.329 Since all
Coal Corp. with premerger assets of only $34,147,646. Id.; see 1966-67
INDEX

MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL

1238.

324.

1966

325.

FORTUNE,

FoRTuNE,

MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL INDEX 1288.

July 1966, at 232. Continental's present total assets exceed $2,896,616,000.

May 1970, at 184.

326. For a discussion of the decline of independent competitors in the market as an index of
concentration see note 277 supra and accompanying text.
327. 434 F.2d 767 (6th Cir. 1970).
328. J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 281, App. IC, at 124.
329. Address by Attorney General Mitchell, Georgia Bar Association, June 6, 1969,
reprinted in 35 VITAL SPEECHES 592 (1969).
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the oil-coal mergers have involved petroleum companies that are among
the leading 200 manufacturers and since coal is a concentrating industry,
the energy market mergers seem to fall squarely within the Attorney
General's standards. These facts have led one economist to conclude that
the inaction of the Justice Department is "inexplicable . . . as interfuel
mergers and acquisitions proliferate." ' "
3. Public and Private Remedies. - As the foregoing discussion
indicates, the acquisition of coal companies by petroleum interests raises
substantial questions of antitrust policy. The problems of antitrust
enforcement, however, remain to be investigated. The following sections
will survey'public and private antitrust remedies and discuss the
appropriateness of their application to the energy market.
(a) Public remedies. -Congress has vested enforcement of section 7
of the Clayton Act concurrently in the Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission.3' The Justice Department has the power to
investigate the legality of a given merger and the authority to seek a
decree in federal district court enjoining a merger or an order requiring
the divestiture of the acquired corporation. 3 2 The FTC has similar
investigatory power and may, after a hearing, compel divestiture.
Moreover, the FTC may have the power to issue a restraining order to
prevent a merger.m
To isolate mergers with possible anticompetitive consequences, the
Commission in 1969 first promulgated rules that require premerger
notification. If the merger involves corporations with combined assets in
excess of 250,000,000 dollars," detailed financial reports must be filed
with the Commission. This innovation should provide the Commission
with a greater ability to detect illegal combinations.
The ability of the agencies to utilize post-acquisition evidence in
demonstrating the anticompetitive effect of a merger is the final weapon
in the public remedies arsenal. Under the "backward sweep" doctrine, it
is not necessary to judge the legality of the merger on facts existing on
the date of the merger. Instead, it may be determined by the status of the
market when the suit is brought.35 Since the Clayton Act statute of
330.
33 .
332.

Netschert, supra note 241, at 651.
See note 208 supra and accompanying text.
Clayton Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1964) provides: "[A]nd it shall be the duty of the

several United States attorneys, in their respective districts, under the direction of the Attorney
General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations."
333. FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 497 (1966), noted in 66 MIcH. L. REv. 142 (1967).
334. See O'Brien, The Federal Trade Commission's Pre-MergerNotification Requirements,
14 ANTITRUST BULL. 557 (1969).
335. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957) (successfully
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limitations does not run against the Government, a merger may be
challenged at any time if subsequent events indicate that it was
anticompetitive. It is evident, therefore, that to the extent oil-coal
mergers are in restraint of trade or tend to create a monopoly, they may
be challenged by the Department of Justice or FTC. In view of the broad
statutory definition of an illegal merger and the judiciary's history in
upholding Department of Justice or FTC determinations that a merger
may lessen competition, 33 1 section 7, if vigorously enforced, could
provide a partial solution to energy market concentration.
(b) Privateremedies-the treble damage action.-Section 4 of the

Clayton Act3 7 provides that any person who has been injured in his
business or property by anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may

maintain an action for treble damages in federal district court. The
private treble damage action has two principal goals: (1) To insure

vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws; and (2)to provide redress for
private injury.3 The recognition of the private right of action for the
violation of section 7 is important because the merger, while causing

injury, might not involve violation of the Sherman Act.3 9 To maintain
an action for treble damages under the Clayton Act, the plaintiff must
prove that: (1) The antitrust laws have been violated; (2) plaintiff has

suffered an injury to his business or property that can be described in
terms of money damages; and (3) a causal nexus exists between the
defendant's wrongdoing and the plaintiffs loss.341
(i) Recognition of the private cause of action.-Since

section 1 of

challenging in 1957 the 1917 acquisition of General Motors stock by du Pont). See also Bork,
Anticompetitive Enforcement Doctrines Under Section 7 ofthe Clayton Act, 39 TEXAS L. REv. 832,
840-42 (1961); Note, Postacquisition Evidence and Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Study in
Judicial Legislation, 36 U. CIN. L. REv. 434 (1967).
336. Justice Harlan has characterized the Supreme Court's approach to § 7 cases as res ipsa
loquitur. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 581 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
337. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) provides: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court
of the United States. . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
338. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311 (1965)
(affirming determination that action by FTC tolls the statute of limitations, tacitly assuming the
existence of a private cause of action under § 7); Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co.,
214 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1955) (dismissed for failure to allege
sufficient facts).
339. To prove violation of § I or § 2 of the Sherman Act, plaintiff must prove a
combination, contract, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or attempt to monopolize. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1, 2 (1964); see Stein, Section 7 of the Clayton Act as a Basisfor the Treble-Damage Action:
When May the Private Litigant Bring his Suit?, 56 CALIF. L. Rav. 968, 979-80 (1968).
340. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 289 F.2d 86,90 (9th Cir. 1961);
Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 245 F. Supp. 510, 512 (E.D. Mo. 1965).
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the Clayton Act 34 I defines section 7 as part of the antitrust laws of the
United States, it logically follows that section 4 provides a private treble
damage action against one who has violated section 7. Many courts,
however, have refused to recognize the right of the private litigant to
maintain this cause of action. These courts have reasoned that any
award of damages under section 7 would be purely speculative3 2 since it
would be concerned with probable or future restraints of trade or
tendencies to monopolize by merging corporations rather than with

actual restraints or injuries to trade. Additionally, it has been argued
that the mere violation of section 7 could not be the proximate cause of

injury to an individual's business or property. 343 Since the 1969 decision
in Gottesman v. General Motors Corp.,3 4 however, several courts have

recognized a private right of action arising solely from the violation of
section 7. In Gottesman, the Second Circuit, reversing a district court
decision that a threatened restraint is not compensable, reasoned that if
the threatened loss ripens into reality, a cause of action exists. Finding
that a merger may directly injure a private party or set in motion events
that will later do so, the court concluded that the private litigant should

have a chance to prove an injury by reason of the violation.us The
Second Circuit, the Fifth Circuit, 346 and a series of district court

decisions1 7 now acknowledge this right. The Eighth Circuit, however,
has been hesitant to enforce a private cause of action under section 7.348
341. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1964).
342. E.g., Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 245 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Mo.
1965); Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705 (D. Hawaii 1964);
Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 221 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd, 414 F.2d 956 (2d
Cir. 1969). See also Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656 (9th
Cir. 1963).
343. Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 245 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Mo. 1965).
Contra, Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding employee
discharged following merger could maintain right of action based on § 7); Julius M. Ames Co. v.
Bostitch, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (holding right of action for violation of § 7 exists,
but only if plaintiff's injury was incurred substantially contemporaneously with the merger).
344. 414 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'g 221 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
345. Plaintiffs filed a stockholder's derivative action against General Motors Corp. and E.I.
duPont de Nemours & Co., relying on a Supreme Court decision that du Pont's acquisition of
General Motors stock was a vertical integration that violated § 7.
346. See Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967).
347. E.g., Dole Valve Co. v. Perfection Bar Equip., Inc., 311 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. I11.1970);
McKeon Const. v. McClatchy Newspapers, 1970 Trade Cas. 88,810 (N.D. Cal. 1969);
Metropolitan Liquor Co. v. Heublein, Inc., 1970 Trade Cas. 88,878 (E.D. Wis. 1969); Kirihara v.
Bendix Corp., 306 F. Supp. 72 (D. Hawaii 1969); Western Geophysical Co. of America v. Bolt
Associates, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 1251 (D. Conn. 1969); Sam S. Goldstein Indus., Inc. v. Botany
Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
348. See Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1964).
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(ii) Standing of the private litigant. -Since an action for treble
damages for the violation of section 7 has been recognized in some
jurisdictions, it becomes important to ascertain what classes of private
litigants have standing to maintain the action.3 9 The court first must
determine if the injury is proximately related to the merger because the
chain of events causally related to the merger may extend indefinitely.O
In Kirihara v. Bendix Corp.,31 plaintiff, the exclusive distributor of
Fram oil filters, was stripped of his exclusive franchise after Bendix
acquired Fram Corporation. He alleged that the merger proximately
caused a large business loss. Recognizing that there was a right of action
for the violation of section 7, the federal district court ruled that
plaintiff, in addition to proving the causal nexus between the merger and
the injury, had to show that he was within the "target area" of the
alleged violation. To be within the target area, the plaintiff "must be one
of the components of the competitive infra-structure of the relevant
market involved in complaint . . . and the effect of such injury upon
that component must validate the reasonable probability that a
substantial anti-competitive effect upon the viability of competition in
that market will flow from the condemned acquisition. ' 352 This apparent
requirement that the plaintiff be a competitor of either the acquired or
the acquiring corporation to have standing to maintain a treble damage
action for the violation of section 7 has found support in other cases. 30 A
recent case, however, indicates that this view is not unanimous. In
Metropolitan Liquor Co. v. Heublein, Inc.,354 plaintiff alleged that
defendant Heublein's merger with Vintage Wine, Inc. had deprived it of
the exclusive right to sell a particular brand of Vintage's wine because
defendant had granted similar franchises to several other liquor dealers
in its market area after the merger. Despite the similarity in facts with
the Kiriharacase, the district court refused to grant defendant's motion
to dismiss, holding that the plaintiff should be permitted to prove any
damages it may have suffered even though it was not a direct competitor
of the new combination. In the court's opinion, the plaintiff must prove
349. Standing is the device by which a court can determine whether the injury alleged is one
that is compensable under the law.
350. Pollock, Standing to Sue, Remoteness of Injury, and the Passing-On Doctrine, 32
A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 5 (1966).
351. 306 F. Supp. 72 (D. Hawaii 1969).
352. Id. at 90.
353. E.g., McKeon Const. v. McClatchy Newspapers, 1970 Trade Cas. 88,810 (N.D. Cal.
1969); see Dole Valve Co. v. Perfection Bar Equip., Inc., 311 F. Supp. 459, 462 (N.D. Il1. 1970);
Rayco Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 234 F. Supp. 593, 597 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
354. 1970 Trade Cas. 87,878 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
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only that its injuries were proximately caused by the merger,3 5 thus
broadly defining the target area.
The requirement that the plaintiff show that he is within the "target
area" protected by the antitrust laws is an appropriate device for
screening out meritless claims before the defendant is compelled to
gather unusually expensive and voluminous economic evidence to rebut
the plaintiff's claim. As demonstrated by the Metropolitan Liquor case,
however, the Kirihara requirement that that plaintiff be a competitor
ignores some classes of compensable injury. It is submitted that the
target area test as applied under the Sherman Act would be a more
adequate device for screening out the improbable plaintiff. This test,
similar to traditional tort law formulations of proximate cause, allows
the plaintiff to maintain a cause of action if the defendant should have
been able to reasonably foresee the injury to the plaintiff resulting from
the illegal act."' The adoption of this test in section 7 cases would require
the court to look at some important additional factors, including the
intent of the merging parties and the degree to which the plaintiff's injury
is directly related to the merger. As a result, wholly frivolous claims
would be screened out without adopting the rigid requirement that the
plaintiff be a competitor of the acquired or acquiring corporation.
Moreover, since Clayton section 7 actions and claims arising under the
Sherman Act are frequently joined, this test would simplify the
definition of "target area."
(iii) Statute of limitationsand effect ofprior decrees in favor of the
Government.-In addition to the standing requirement, the plaintiff
faces both the four-year statute of limitations 357 and the probability of
being deprived of his section 5 right to have prior antimerger judgments
for the government given prima facie weight in the private action. There
is controversy over the question of when a right of action accrues under
section 4. The four years may begin to run on the date of the illegal act;3 8
one decision suggests that the cause of action accrues only when the
355.

Id. at 87,880; see In re Multidistrict Private Civil Treble Damage Antitrust Litigation

Involving Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equip., 1970 Trade Cas. 89,254, 89,256 (C.D. Cal.
1970), noted in 24 VAND. L. REV. 126 (1970) (concluding in a Sherman Act action that in
interpreting the phrase "'injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws'. . . plaintiffs may fail in their proof, but until then, they should be given the benefit
of employing 'any available remedy to make good the wrong done.' ").
356. See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 220 (9th Cir. 1964).

See also Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955).
357.

Clayton Act § 4b, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).

358. Stein, supra note 339, at 982.
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plaintiff first suffers injury, 359 and one court has determined that the
cause accrues daily and the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for
360
injury for the period of four years next preceding the filing of the suit.
Since the injury resulting from an illegal merger is a continuing one, it is
suggested that the latter rule is proper.
Section 5 of the Clayton Act 31 provides that an antitrust judgment
in favor of the Government is prima facie evidence of the antitrust
violation in a private action. Since section 7 is violated on the showing of
a mere probability that there has been a restraint of trade, the court in
Gottesman v. GeneralMotors Corp.,362 reasoned that although the prior
judgment for the Government is not prima facie proof of the injury to the
private plaintiff, it should be given substantial evidentiary value.
(iv) Injuries from interfuel mergers.-It is evident from the
foregoing discussion that there are several classes of persons who may
suffer compensable injury under section 7 from a coal-petroleum
merger. Independent coal producers and independent oil companies are
directly within the target area as defined by Kirihara since they are
components of the competitive infra-structure. Within the circle of
foreseeability but outside the Kirihara target area are steam-electric
generation plants that may pay higher fuel prices because of lessening
competition within the energy market. In addition, there is the consumer
who must suffer the consequences by paying higher fuel prices that are
passed on by the utility company. All of these classes of plaintiffs may
utilize the class action and all but the consumer would seem to have
sustained compensable injuries. Unfortunately, statements in several
cases that require the private plaintiff to sustain injury different from
that sustained by the public in general would seem to bar an action by
the individual consumer of electricity. 36 Thus, under present case law the
consumer may fall outside any definition of target area.
359. See Sam S. Goldstein Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 728 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
360. Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327 F.2d 725, 732 (8th Cir. 1964).
361. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1964) provides in part:
"A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any civil or criminal
proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws to the effect
that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant in
any action or proceeding brought by any other party against such defendant under said laws or
by the United States under section 15a of this title, as to all matters respecting which said
judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between parties thereto ....
362. 414 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1969).
363. E.g., Sam S. Goldstein Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 728, 734
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); Clune v. Publishers' Ass'n, 214 F. Supp. 520, affd, 314 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1963)
(Sherman Act); see Blaski v. Inland Steel Co., 271 F.2d 853, 854 (7th Cir. 1959); Dole Valve Co. v.
Perfection Bar Equip., Inc., 311 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. I11.1970).
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Analysis of the Application of Antitrust Laws to the Fuel
Market.

C.

Optimum operation of the American free enterprise system should
produce socially desirable results including efficient utilization of
available natural resources, overall economic progress and stability, and
equitable distribution of income. 3 4 To achieve these ends, the free
enterprise system depends upon open and vigorous market competition.
Antithetical to this competitive system, however, is the growing trend
toward concentration or oligopoly evidenced by the tendency of a few
large enterprises to dominate an entire industry, an event made possible
in part by the modern merger movement. The oligopolistic market
confers on its constituent members the power, whether utilized or not, to
set prices and outputs, thus maximizing profits and subverting the role of
competition in market regulation. 35 Although the theory of oligopoly
is controversial and here somewhat oversimplified, its thrust is that
oligopolies tend to blunt price competition. Compared to
nonoligopolistic industries, oligopoly prices tend to be higher, more
rigid, and less responsive to economic change. The competition that is
diverted from prices is allowed to turn to sales effort and elaboration of
service with wasteful and often unstable results. 36 With competition
suppressed, the nation's economic goals become more difficult to attain,
and the interests of the corporate giant are placed above the interests of
the public. It can be argued that high market concentration is justified
because of the greater economies of scale enjoyed by oligopolistic
industries. Two authorities, however, maintain that all the technical
367
economies of scale are achieved at the plant, not at the firm level.
Consequently, it would be the size of the plant and not the size of the
total enterprise that determines whether all economies of scale are
achieved. Moreover, the Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy has
observed that a significant degree of efficiency in production is not
dependent on existing high levels of concentration. This conclusion is
illustrated by the many small enterprises that are able to remain
competitive with dominant firms that do not exercise their oligopolistic
power.3 68 It has been determined, for example, that some manufacturing
enterprises need only five percent of the market to attain maximum
364.
365.
366.

C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 56, at 11.
See notes 47-50 supra and accompanying text.
Edwards, Large Enterprises and Antitrust Policy, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD

COMPETITION

367.
368.

12 (National Industrial Conference Rd. monograph 1962).

C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 56, at 6.
WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 78, at 11-10.
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efficient production. 3 1 Similarly, there is no evidence that the
concentrated industries are more active in research and development
than the more competitive industries.
Since an oligopoly tends to frustrate desirable economic objectives
and does not benefit society sufficiently to justify its existence, many
oligopolistic market structures have been attacked through antitrust
laws or government regulation. Surprisingly, however, the intra- and
interfuel oligopolies that presently exist have been virtually immune
from either of these governmental regulatory devices.3 7 Whether this de
facto invulnerability is a result of governmental inertia, political
influence, or other debilitating factors is a difficult question and perhaps
unanswerable. The important point is that this nation must recognize
that it is confronted with the possibility that the bulk of its most vital
resources may be controlled by a few corporate giants-a fact more real
than imaginary.
1. Disadvantages of Antitrust Remedies.-Assuming that
governmental impotency can be surmounted, what methods are
appropriate to interdict the growing fuel merger movement?
Traditionally, antitrust remedies have been used to abate market
concentration. These statutes, however, are fraught with numerous
disadvantages that may render them inappropriate for use in the energy
market. The inadequacy of available remedies under the Sherman and
Clayton Acts is the most obvious drawback of present antitrust
legislation. If these acts were vigorously enforced, the judiciary could
enjoin all future intra- and interfuel mergers, compel divestiture of the
acquisitions that have already occurred, and resolve the fuel
conglomerates into smaller units. Although competition is usually
fostered by numerous small competitive units in the market, the energy
industry does not necessarily fit into the typical pattern. In fact,
stringent application of antitrust statutes to dismantle intrafuel
concentration might destroy rather than preserve the energy industry.
Since the extraction, processing, and refining of mineral resources often
require large capital expenditures, small diversified units may be
inefficient. Similarly, American firms, if broken into smaller units,
would be at a competitive disadvantage in dealing with international fuel
producers. If Standard Oil of New Jersey, for example, were divided
judicially into ten or fifteen smaller units, it is not certain that
competition would be fostered. The disruption caused by divestiture
actually might worsen the present fuel crisis. Compounding these
369. G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 223 (3d ed. 1966).
370. Walden, supra note 150, at 780.
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disadvantages, antitrust divestment and dissolution orders would be an
ad hoc, fragmented approach to solving the nation's fuel problems,
which at best could only result in chaos.
Another serious disadvantage in enforcing the antitrust laws is the
overwhelming expense required to mount a multipronged attack on
existing concentration and illegal combinations. In 1965, at the height of
the merger movement, the Justice Department and the FTC could
muster only a total of 27 antimerger complaints.3 71 Antitrust litigation is
expensive, not only for the Government, but also for those fuel
companies forced to defend protracted antitrust suits. In addition to the
expense, antitrust cases are notorious for consuming vast amounts of
judicial time between initial complaint and final resolution. The average
litigated civil antitrust action brought by the Department of Justice, for
example, consumes 59 months, and if the case is considered by the
Supreme Court, it averages 70 months.7 Similarly, the average litigated
restraint of trade action filed by the FTC consumes 61 months if the case
is judicially reviewed.3 73 When a small, closely knit group of
corporations controls resources as indispensable to the nation as the
basic fuels, the prospect of judicial relief in 60 to 70 months is not
comforting.
It also has been suggested that the agencies charged with
enforcement of the antitrust laws tend to move hesitantly against the
economically and politically powerful petroleum industry.3 74 This
observation receives some support from the present status of antitrust
investigations in the fuel industry. Although a year has elapsed since the
fuel crisis first gained national attention,3 75 the FTC has confessed that
its investigation of the energy market has not progressed beyond the
blueprint stage.3 7 Moreover, the Department of Justice has stated that
recent price increases have not led to an increase in antitrust
investigation of energy industries.3 77 It is also interesting to note that
Attorney General John Mitchell has recognized the need for an
371,
(1969).

BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, ECONOMIC PAPERS

1966-69, at 35

372. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J. LAW & EcON. 365, 377
(1970).
373. Id. at 379.
374. See R. ENGLER, THE POLITICS OF OIL 397 (1961).
375. See Hearings on Antitrust Problems in the Energy Field Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust andMonopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
376. Nashville Tennessean, Mar. 3, 197 1, at 41, col. 1.
377. CCH TRADE REG. REP. No. 500, Jan. 11, 1971, at 7 (statement by Richard W.
McLaren, chief of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice).
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appropriate energy policy and has promised that if problems arise from
anticompetitive activities in any fuel market, suitable antitrust action
will be taken.3 8 In contrast to Mitchell's broad statement, Richard W.
McLaren, chief of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, has
stated that it is not the policy of the Nixon Administration to use the
threat of antitrust investigation to combat price increases. Mr. McLaren
conceded, however, that anticompetitive agreements between enterprises
in the energy market generally would be subject to the same antitrust
standards applicable to firms in other fields.3 79 The situation is effectively
summarized by noting that antitrust laws have little real nexus with the
major source of market power, "[a]nd there would be a measure of
agreement that present enforcement attacks the symbols of market
power and leaves the substance."3
2. Proposed Use of Antitrust Remedies.-Although antitrust
remedies have numerous disadvantages, their use would be appropriate
in certain circumstances to promote competition in the energy market.
First, the Sherman and Clayton Acts should be used to prohibit future
concentration within the petroleum, coal, and natural gas industry, but
they should not be used to reduce present levels of concentration within a
particular fuel industry.38' This approach has the advantage of allowing
existing American fuel enterprises to utilize economies of scale and to
compete effectively with foreign fuel companies while prohibiting any
further concentration within the fuel market. Secondly, since the
potential anticompetitive effects generated by the petroleum-coal
mergers do not seem to be counterbalanced by any public policy
considerations or substantial economic advantages, the Justice
Department and Federal Trade Commission should immediately initiate
litigation pursuant to section 7 of the Clayton Act to compel Continental
Oil, Gulf, Standard Oil of Ohio, and Occidental Petroleum to divest
their coal producing subsidiaries, and any future interfuel mergers
should be enjoined.
The enforcement of the Sherman and Clayton Acts could bring
378. CCH TRADE REG. REP. No. 499, Jan. 5, 1971, at 3 (statement of Attorney General
Mitchell).
379. CCH TRADE REG. REP. No. 500, Jan. 11, 1971, at 7.
380. SeeJ.K. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 188 (1967).
381. Should the recommendations of the White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy be
enacted into law, the Sherman Act's application to the fuel industry would be eased. The relevant
portion of the recommendations, embodied in the proposed Concentrated Industries Act, would
make the relevant markets and market shares of the concentrated industry the sole question for
determination under the Act. In this manner, the FTC and the Justice Department could avoid
having to prove anticompetitive behavior in order to show a violation of the Sherman Act by the
shared monopoly. WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 78, at A-I to -15.
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about substantial long-run benefits. If, for example, Continental Oil
were required to divest itself of Consolidation Coal, the coal industry
could independently push forward the development of synthetic
petroleum and thus, within the decade, become an effective competitor
with the petroleum industry.3 8 2 Similarly, if petroleum interests are
prevented from gaining substantial control of the nuclear fuels market,
nuclear energy could maintain long-term competition with petroleum
and coal, at least in the fuel market for electric generating facilities.
Moreover, if the increase in energy market concentration could be
halted, minimum regulatory techniques could be employed to preserve
3
the requisite competition. 8
IV.

FEDERAL REGULATION AFFECTING THE SUPPLY OF ENERGY

Although the Sherman and Clayton Acts should assure that the
nation's energy policy is not distorted by the market impact of giant
interfuel combines, these statutes must be supported by additional
regulation to insure competition. The following section will analyze the
current state of regulation in the fuel industry and examine the
effectiveness of present regulatory techniques to insure competition and
curb concentration in the energy market. It is beyond the scope of this
Project to detail the morass of state and federal regulation affecting the
flow of energy. The following discussion, however, is intended to be
indicative of existing regulatory problems.
A.

Inconsistency in FederalRegulatory Policy

The basic goal of all federal economic regulation of the fuel
industries is the elimination of the evils of oligopoly. There is, however, a
fundamental inconsistency in the methods used to pursue this goal. In
the regulation of some fuel industries, the federal government entirely
rejects oligopoly as a market structure and designs regulations to
encourage competition.3 4 In other fuel industries, however, oligopoly is
accepted as a fait accompli, and regulatory efforts are aimed at
382. PETROLEUM THROUGH 1980, supra note 242, at 74.
383. See notes 463-502 infra and accompanying text.
384. This kind of regulation, which is generally termed "indirect," includes promulgation of
standards and fiscal intervention. Promulgation of standards includes congressional enactments
that rely upon the judiciary for definition. The court-prosecutor system, characteristic of both the
Sherman and Clayton Acts, is generally included within this category. McFarland, Landis' Report:
The Voice of One Crying in the Wilderness, 47 VA. L. REV. 373, 422 (1961). Fiscal intervention
includes government expenditures in procurement activities, management of monetary policy,
control of tax, interest, and exchange rates, and sales of government stockpiles. See generally C.
KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 56.

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 24

minimizing the effects of concentration by imposing detailed rules and
restrictions on marketing procedures. 3 5 This inconsistency may be seen
more clearly by comparing the methods used to regulate the coal
industry with those used to control the natural gas industry. In the
natural gas industry, the Federal Power Commission regulates the
transportation of gas through pipelines 3 sets wellhead and citygate
prices, 3 7 and, in some instances, controls the industry's retail market.,,'
In the coal industry, on the other hand, the Government has traditionally
sought to foster competition. Extensive investigations by the Federal
Trade Commission during and after World War I concluded that the
coal industry was competitive and should retain that posture.3 89 This
seemingly inconsistent approach may be attributable to the lack of
centralized federal control over the fuel industries. 3 The existing
diffusion of power creates a regulatory system that tolerates inconsistent
and conflicting policies, fosters static and unresponsive control, and
remains ill-informed about the very subjects of its authority. Unless this
system is re-examined and perhaps restructured, it cannot promise to
insure the availability of energy resources necessary to meet the nation's
future requirements at a reasonable cost and in a timely manner.
1. Effect of Specific Regulations on the Coal Industry.-The
federal government has fashioned schemes to promote competition in the
coal industry. The industry itself has sought to broaden the geographical
markets in which coal may effectively compete 39' by financing research
designed to iricrease the efficiency of coal slurry pipelines.3 92 Similarly,
the Government has assisted this effort by funding several projects aimed
at increasing the coal industry's product market by developing a method
385. The comprehensive rules and procedures established by independent commissions and
executive agencies are generally termed "direct" regulations. See generally Loevinger, Regulation
and Competition as Alternatives, 11 ANTITRUST BULL. 101, 104-05 (1966); Welch, The
Effectiveness of Commission Regulation of Public Utility Enterprises,49 GEo. L.J. 639 (1961).
386. Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1964).
387. See notes 420-26 infra and accompanying text.
388. See, e.g., Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 359 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1966)
(Commission's refusal, at termination of long-term contract, to certify substitute supplier when the
only alternative gas supply was from another interstate pipeline, held valid, thereby requiring
distributor to continue dealing with original supplier).
389. See, e.g., N. LEONARD, THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 34-35 (W. Adams ed.
1950).
390. "[T]here is no single Federal agency to carry out total energy policy to attain a balanced
national objective of efficient and productive utilization of our total energy resources." Hearings,
supra note 13, at 124 (statement of John N. Nassikas, Chairman, Federal Power Commission).
391. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
392. See N.Y. Times, May 15, 1969, at 81, col. 3 ($1.8 million government contract to
synthesize coal); Wall Street J., July 14, 1969, at 23, col. 6 ($8.1 million government contract to
build a plant to convert coal into pipeline gas).
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to convert coal into other desulphurized fossil fuels. 3 3 Recent legislative
proposals also acknowledge the desirability of a competitive coal
industry. One bill, introduced in the 91st Congress, 9 would require the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to place "a fair proportion of the
purchases and contracts [for coal] made by the TVA with small business
concerns.1 39 - This bill is designed to benefit the small coal companies,
which comprise the most competitive sector of the industry, by
increasing their capacity to compete in contract procurement with the

larger coal-oil combinations. Although this contract procurement
assistance is only regional in scope, it has been suggested that this plan
could be implemented on a national scale through agencies like the
3 7
Department of Defense3 96 and the General Services Administration,
which are authorized to operate similar programs.
Despite this apparent desire to maintain a competitive structure in
the coal industry, certain regulatory programs are clearly
anticompetitive in effect. The Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969 311 is one example. The Act was designed to reduce the frequency of
mining accidents and to eliminate occupational lung disorders. To
achieve these goals, Congress established stringent safety requirements
affecting day to day coal mine operations and provided stiff penalties for
their violation.3 9 Unfortunately, the anticompetitive effects of the

statute were not determined prior to its passage. Small mine operators
immediately recognized that the Act's exacting standards4 " were both
economically and technologically unfeasible in a small coal mine.4",
393. Atlantic-Richfield, Continental Oil, and FMC Corporation are currently operating
facilities, under federal grants, to extract synthetic oil from coal. Mayer, supra note 3, at 75.
394. H.R. 19,694,91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
395. 116 CONG. REC. 9304 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1970) (remarks of Congressman Evins).
Congressman Evins also called upon the FTC to "investigate and report upon the monopolistic
concentration of ownership in these vital and important areas of our economy." Id.
396. Id.; Small Business Act of 1953, § 212, 15 U.S.C. § 637 (1964).
397. 116 CONG. REC. 9304 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1970) (remarks of Congressman Evins);
Commission on Government Procurement Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 251-60 (Supp. V., 1970)
(establishing the Commission on Government Procurement).
398. Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-960 (1971).
399. Fines provided in the Act vary according to the nature of the violation and increase
significantly if the same violation is detected upon a later inspection. Upon the first violation, for
example, a mine operator who allows an "imminently dangerous" situation to proceed unchecked
incurs a $500 fine. The penalty increases to S1500 for a second violation, and to $3000 for a third
violation. Procedures Under the Federal Coal Mine and Safety Act of 1969, 35 Fed. Reg. 7181-82
(1970).
400. The interim mandatory dust standard has been set at 3.0 mg. of coal dust per cubic
meter of air. According to § 202(b)(4), coal companies, which believe that they cannot comply with
this standard, are permitted to request a public hearing before the Interim Compliance Panel. 35
Fed. Reg. 11296 (1970).
401. National Coal Ass'n Bull., Why Is Coal in Very Tight Supply?, at 3.
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Despite Government contention that the Act would have only a slight
effect on the industry, 1830 notices of penalty were issued, and thirteen
small mines were directed to close after only ten days and 234
inspections. 412 Nonetheless, the Government has repeatedly defended the
Act, pointing out that only small mines have been seriously affected and
that total coal production has not declined. Although this analysis is
probably accurate, it ignores the broader impact of the Act on the
market structure of the coal industry. 4 3 More than 20 percent of our
national coal production is controlled by petroleum interests. 4 These
larger companies can afford to pay fines incurred -under the Act since
they can rely on the vast asset reserves of their parent petroleum
corporations. The smaller, independent coal firms, however, do not have
this financial backing and, therefore, are most burdened by the Act.
Congress recently recognized the anticompetitive effects of this Act, and
its solution was to propose an amendment providing a period of grace
during which a company may cure a violation without paying a
penalty.4 5 This amendment will not solve the problem, however, since
many small coal producers cannot afford either the fine or the new
equipment. Since both options require large expenditures by the
offending company, the Act is clearly detrimental to competition in the
coal industry.
The Coal Mine Health and Safety Act is a product of regulatory
tunnel-vision. Although its thrust is directed toward a specific problem
and its provisions deal squarely with this problem, the drafters failed to
calculate its impact upon anything but the specific problem. Neither the
committee that drafted the legislation nor the Department of Interior
undertook the responsibility of protecting competition in the coal
industry. Evidently, they assumed that other authorities-the Justice
Department or the FTC-had this responsibility. Unfortunately, this
402. Franklin, Coal Loss Slight Under New Law, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1970, at 87, col. 5.
403. Although only 3 mines were closed by direct government action during the first week of
enforcement, in Tennessee alone 89 mines voluntarily ceased production in order to avoid
inspections that they believed would be financially disastrous. Franklin, Mine Owners Say Law
Imperils Coal Production, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1970, at 39, col. 3.
404. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
405. S. 3788, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1970). It has been urged that if fines cannot be
significantly reduced the larger companies should at least be denied tax advantages such as the
opportunity for tax-free reorganization, the percentage depletion allowance, and the capital gains
treatment of royalties, they receive under the present system. Indeed, some legislators place blame
for the energy crisis primarily on faulty tax policy. Former Senator Albert Gore has maintained
that tax laws encourage concentration of economic power and has advocated limiting tax-free
exchanges of corporate stock to situations in which the product corporation would have assets of
less than $50 million. 116 Cong. Rec. 13,764-66 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1970).
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syndrome is not uncommon in federal fuel regulation.'1 The failure of
federal agencies to anticipate the potential anticompetitive effects of
much needed regulations is a natural byproduct of decentralized
regulation of the energy industry. As governmental control of the
industry becomes more diffused, the number of failures will increase-a
danger for which there is no "built in" remedy. Although each

regulation may pertain to different industry functions, the adverse effects
on the industry tend to be mutually reinforcing. When combined with

the trend toward interfuel concentration initiated by the oil interests,
these regulations may indeed be too much for the small producers to
bear. Surely, if similar trade restraining tendencies were caused by
private enterprise, the Government's own antitrust laws could validly be

invoked.407
2. Effect of General Regulations on the Coal Industry.Regulatory tunnel-vision is largely the result of an agency's focus on a

specific problem in a specific fuel industry, disregarding the broader
impact on the energy industry as a whole. A similar problem is
frequently encountered on a larger scale when government regulation is

aimed not at particular functions, but at general industry performance.
The ease with which the side effects of dissimilar regulations complement
each other to suppress competition is aptly demonstrated by state and
federal efforts to improve the environment and by federal regulation of

fuels that compete with coal.
(a) New pollution standards.-Although

the current concern over

environmental quality has affected the entire power industry, the impact
upon the coal industry has been especially severe. State and local

regulations applicable to most large cities prohibit the burning of coal
that contains more than a small percentage of sulphur by weight. 4 The
406. The Department of Transportation is currently proposing what appear to be voluminous
minimum safety standards for gas pipelines. The authority for these proposals is granted in the
Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968, § 3(b), 49 U.S.C. § 1673(b) (Supp. V, 1970). Similar to
the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, both the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act and the proposed
regulations are comprehensive in nature and could prove to be a heavy burden on the pipeline
industry. The purpose of the Act is to remove hazards to both life and property in the "design,
installation, inspection, testing, construction, extension, operation, replacement, and maintenance
of pipeline facilities." 49 U.S.C. § 1672(b) (Supp. V, 1970). The Act negatively reinforces
compliance. If steps are not immediately taken to remove hazards, a penalty of $1000 per day, not
to exceed a total of $200,000 for any "related series of violations," is imposed. Id. § 1678.
407. See text accompanying note 156 supra.
408. Those state and local governments in the eastern United States that restrict the sulphur
content of fossil fuels are: Washington, D.C.; Jacksonville, Florida; Chicago, Illinois; Maryland;
Boston, Massachusetts; Cleveland, Ohio; New Jersey; Metropolitan New York; Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania; and Virginia. All except Chicago and Cleveland limit sulphur content to 1% by
weight. These cities respectively restrict sulphur content to 1.8% and 2% by weight. Hearings, supra
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relative scarcity of the required low-sulphur coal makes it costly for the
industry to comply with these strict requirements." 9 The impact of this

environmental concern is felt throughout the coal industry 4l° since no one
has devised an inexpensive desulphurization process. The small
competitive coal firms are most detrimentally affected, however, since
they lack the financial resources necessary to seek out or produce lowsulphur coal.
(b) Promotion of nuclear energy.-Regulation of fuels competing
with coal presents the most patent example of regulatory tunnel-vision.
Lack of foresight in formulating long-range energy objectives is

particularly apparent in the atomic power industry, 41' since competition
with nuclear fuel is virtually impossible where nuclear energy has
acquired a portion of the electric utility market.4 2 Electric utilities
became infatuated with nuclear energy as a power source during the mid1950's. Not only did Government emphasize the ultimate supremacy of
atomic power as an energy source, but large government subsidies for
nuclear research and development indicated that nuclear power would be
less expensive than conventional fossil fuels despite its high initial cost.
These factors persuaded a significant portion of the electric industry to
note 13, at 123 (statement of John Nassikas, Chairman, Federal Power Commission). Moreover, in
furtherance of the purposes of the Clean Air Act and the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, the President stated that it was the policy of the federal government to "provide leadership in
the nationwide effort to protect and enhance the quality of our air and water resources." Exec.
Order No. 11,507, 35 Fed. Reg. 2573 (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (Supp. V, 1970).
409. Pursuant to the Clean Air Act §§ 107(b), (c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857(c)(2)(b), (2)(c) (Supp.
V, 1970), the National Air Pollution Control Administration (NAPCA) has issued the following
reports: (1)Air Quality Criteria for Hydrocarbons (NAPCA Pub. No. AD-64, 1964); and (2)
Control Techniques for Hydrocarbons and Organic Solvent Emmissions from Stationary Sources
(NAPCA Pub. No. AD-68, 1964). Pursuant to the Clean Air Act § 108(c)(l), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857(d)(2)(b) (Supp. V, 1970), these standards are ultimately distributed to state air quality
control boards that must file a letter of intent with the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
indicating that the state will implement and enforce these standards. These reports indict high
sulphur coal as being the largest polluter, in terms of particulate emmissions, at stationary facilities.
410. Indeed, environmental impact is not limited to fossil fuels. "Of the 55 atomic power
plants in the active stage of construction in the United States today, 12 have been stopped or
blocked from producing power by environmental lawsuits." 116 CONG. Rac. 14,507 (daily ed. Aug.
28, 1970) (remarks of Senator Church).
411. Since standards that permit or command increased production of one competing fuel
will naturally depress production by other competitors, the effect upon fossil fuels of large
government spending to promote nuclear development should have been foreseen.
412. Use of nuclear power is preemptive with respect to fossil fuels because nuclear plants are
not generally convertible to burn fossil fuels. Moreover, "there would be little or no incentive for
the conventional equipment manufacturers, the fossil fuel producers, and the transporters of fossil
fuels to make an effort to improve their technology and reduce costs, if they are warned in advance
that whatever their efforts the federal government will guarantee the advantage of their nuclear
competition." Why is Coal in Very Tight Supply, supra note 401 at 2.
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begin constructing nuclear power plants. Despite the serious threat
atomic energy poses to other energy resources, the federal government
still spends only seven percent as much on coal research as it does to
promote and develop atomic energy. 13 While coal companies have
suffered because they lack the independent finances necessary to develop
the technology to desulphurize economically their product, federal
expenditures for nuclear research have fostered the development of
various antipollution devices that enable atomic plants to comply fully
with environmental demands.41 4 Moreover, recent amendments to the
4 5
Atomic Energy Act, which purport to expedite licensing procedures,
promise to make it increasingly difficult for related fossil fuel industries
to remain competitive with atomic fuel. Although nuclear power
accounts for only four percent of the total electricity generated in the
United States today, by 1990 this figure is expected to increase to more
than 50 percent .4 Thus, not only do small fuel producers face stiff
competition from expanding multi-fuel concerns, but they also are

confronted with a total market that is being rapidly constricted by
government promotion of the atomic energy industry.
B.

Regulatory Inertia

Occasionally, an entire regulatory scheme is misdirected. This
problem is easily corrected if the misdirected regulations were designed

to promote competition, since increasingly strict regulatory measures
may be adopted. 17 When comprehensive industry regulation has been
imposed upon a market that would operate more efficiently through

competition, however, it is more difficult to remedy the situation. Strict
industry regulation often perpetuates itself"48 despite the widespread
413. National Coal Ass'n Release (Sept. 11, 1970) (statement of James R. Garvey vice
president, National Coal Association).
414. Note, Legal Control of Thermal Pollution, 2 NATURAL RESOURCES LAW. I (1969);
Note, Cold Facts on Hot Water: Legal Aspects of Thermal Pollution, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 253.
415. These new rules are designed to "expedite the licensed operations of facilities needed for
the generation of electric power without adversely affecting the public health and safety." 35 Fed.
Reg. 16687 (1970) (these rules would amend 10 C.F.R. pts. 2,50 (Supp. 1970)).
416. 116 CONG. REC. 15,404 (daily ed. Aug. 28, 1970) (remarks of Senator Church).
417. Although an incorrect initial choice to promote competition may result in short-run
inefficiency if the economy is one of scale, at least the Government will have the opportunity to
make this choice again and again as it becomes increasingly difficult to sustain competition. For a
discussion of the Government's success in making the initial choice see Lovejoy, Regulation of
Business: The Need for a Public Utility Concept, 3 S. TEx. L.J. 292 (1958); Phillips, Toward an
Improved Regulatory Climate, 70 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 881 (1962); Posner, supra note 135, at 548.
418. At least one writer has observed that "a regulatory scheme is likely to generate interests
that make deregulation extremely difficult." Cramton, The Effectiveness of Economic Regulation:
A Legal View, 54 AN. ECON. REv. 182, 191 (1964). See also G. Hale & R. Hale, Competition or
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belief that as competition increases regulation should decrease.' 9
Moreover, even when commission regulation is correctly imposed,
agencies often respond too slowly to changing economic conditions.
1. Agency Failure To Initiate Change in its Own Structure.-The
Federal Power Commission's regulation of independent natural gas
producers exemplifies this institutional inability or unwillingness to
effect self-change. The Natural Gas Act of 1938 gave the FPC
jurisdiction over the "sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for
resale. ' 4z° In effect, the Commission was empowered to control the price
charged by pipeline companies to local distributors-citygate price-but
could not regulate the price charged by producers to pipeline
companies-wellhead price. 421 Control over wellhead prices was
subsequently added to the FPC's jurisdiction by the Supreme Court in
two steps. First, with Commission backing, the Court extended federal
4 22
regulatory jurisdiction in this area to integrated gas producers.
Secondly, despite FPC protests, the Court, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Wisconsin, 423 directed the Commission to regulate independent
producers. The FPC opposed this second step on the ground that it was
ill equipped to determine rates for the large number of independent
producers. Nevertheless, the Court held that since consumer rates
depend to some extent upon wellhead prices, the Government must
control these prices in order to establish reasonable rates.4 24 The
independent producers, unhappy with rate regulation, lobbied for
change. Their efforts, however, were unavailing. The Harris-Fulbright
bill, 421 for example, which would have negated the Phillips decision, was
42
ultimately vetoed by President Eisenhower.
It has been alleged that the present tight supply of natural gas is
artificial, created by the independent producers as a protest against strict
Control: The Chaos in the Cases. 106 U. PA. L. REV.641, 683 (1958); Miller, A Needed Reform of
the Organizationand Regulation of the Interstate Electric Power Industry, 38 FORDHAM L. REV.
635 (1970); Morton, Creative Regulation,39 LAND ECON. 367, 371-72 (1963).
419. See, e.g., Nelson, The Role of Competition in the Regulated Industries, I I ANTITRUST
BULL. 1 (1966); Phillips, supra note 417; Trebing, What's Wrong with Commission Regulation?, 65
PuB. UTIL. FORT. 660 (1960).
420. 15 U.S.C. § 717(a) (1964).
421. This was accomplished by the Act's specifically exempting producers and gatherers of
natural gas from federal control. Id. § 717(b).
422. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581 (1945). This decision benefited the
consumer since the ultimate price of natural gas was decreased as the price charged to affiliated
pipeline companies by producers was reduced.
423. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
424. Id. at 684.
425. S. 1853, 84th Cong., IstSess. (1955).
426. See 102 CONG. REC. 2793 (1956).
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FPC control. If this view is correct, these producers evidently feel that
the creation of artificial shortages is the most expedient method to force
rate increases from the FPC and to regain control of the market. When
these acute shortages became painfully obvious in the midst of the 1970
brownouts and blackouts, Senator Tower of Texas suggested that "[t]he
most important reason for the decline [in the production of natural gas]
has been 15 years of chaotic regulation by the Federal Power
Commission." 27
The basis of the complaints by the independent producers and by
Senator Tower is best understood by examining the FPC's powers. As a
concomitant to price determination, the Commission is authorized to
alter rates previously established between the producer and the pipeline
company when the total situation renders prices unreasonable. 411
Moreover, when circumstances dictate, the FPC may prescribe the size
of the retail market, and when public necessity so demands, the
Commission may require the producer to perform according to a
contract even after the contract has expired. 429 Thus, "[o]nce the
producer contracts to sell and commits his gas to the pipeline company,
he does not know: first, the price he will receive; second, how long he will
receive any price set by the contract or the Commission; third, how
much gas he must deliver; and fourth, how long he must maintain
deliveries." 4 0 Thus, if gas reserves are larger than claimed, the present
gas shortage may represent an organized protest by independent gas
producers designed to secure some measure of contract sanctity and a
lessening of strict government control. The question, then, is whether this
extensive regulation is necessary. 431
Numerous analyses of the gas market have concluded that
competition among independent producers is feasible. Three major
characteristics of this market have been recognized as likely to sustain
competition in the absence of FPC supervision: (I) the relatively low
concentration within the industry; (2) the possibility that interconnecting
427. 116 CONG. REc. 14,379 (daily ed. Aug. 27, 1970). Senator Tower also noted that
representatives of the gas industry blame the FPC established price ceilings for supply problems
within the industry.
428. Natural Gas Act of 1938, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 717(d)(b) (1964).
429. FPC v. Hunt, 376 U.S. 515 (1964); Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 359
F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1966).
430. 116 CONG. REC. 9023 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1970) (remarks of Congressman Pickle). It was
further noted, however, that return to an unregulated market was extremely unlikely due to political
considerations. See also, Miller, supra note 230.
431. One author has pointed out that the conduct of gas producers indicates that they want to
compete. Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?. II J. LAW & EcON. 55 (1968). He suggests that a
system of competitive bidding could replace all utility regulation.

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 24

pipeline systems could exfand a geographic market so that it would be
virtually impossible for one producer to dominate a geographic area;
43 2
and (3) the easy entry into the independent producer market.
Competition would provide an incentive for increased production and
encourage the exploration and the working of new wells.4 33 The
desirability of terminating federal regulation in the gas industry becomes
even more clear when it is realized that the initial decision to regulate
wellhead prices was not made by an expert board of commissioners
familiar with the industry, but by a court relatively unschooled in
complex public utility problems. Indeed, those closest to the industry
opposed government control from the outset.
Ideally, the commission charged with regulating an industry should
be the first to sense that all is not well, and change should be initiated
before the effects of the problem are noticed by the public. With respect
to gas producer regulation, however, it seems that everyone recognizes
the problem except the FPC. Although some legislators have suggested
that the present regulatory schemes should be modified to give producers
the freedom to enter binding contracts,4 u the FPC has taken no steps
since its initial protest in 1954 to relinquish its control over production
agreements. Even if the Commission disagrees with the propriety of
completely forfeiting its regulatory control, however, the evidence
certainly seems sufficient to justify at least a slight abatement of control

in order to test market performance. The absolute failure of the FPC to
graft market flexibility onto the regulatory mechanism should warn
policy planners that until existing regulatory agencies become capable of
this flexible response, they should not be entrusted with the
administration of the nation's total energy resources. 435
2. Agency Failure To Alter Policies in Response to Changing
432. See, e.g., C. PHILLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 638-39 (1965).
433. In addition, the FPC would be relieved of determining rates of independent producers,
which greatly outnumber producer-pipeline affiliates. The absence of this responsibility might
contribute to the elimination of regulatory delay and perhaps make commission regulation more
responsive to changing economic demands. The outstanding disadvantage of competitive
production is that gas prices on the consumer level might rise. This tendency, however, would be
partially offset to the extent discovery keeps pace with demand. Moreover, prices have consistently
increased under the present regulatory framework, and stand to increase even further given the
current reluctance of producers to operate under strict FPC control.
434. 116 CONG. REC. 9023 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1970) (remarks of Congressman Pickle). Mr.
Pickle pledged to introduce "contract sanctity" legislation shortly after the opening of the NinetySecond Congress.
435. "[I]f regulation ever did become rigid and inflexible-it could then become a straight
jacket, a stagnation process which would not be in the interests of either the public or the regulated
companies." Welch, The Evolution of Utility Regulation,TELEPHONY, June 6, 1964, at 34. See also
Turner, supra note 169, at 1207, 1232.
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Conditions.-Regulatory

inertia also is evidenced by the slow response

of most agencies to obvious problems within their jurisdictions. It was
not until after the coal shortage reached crisis proportions, for example,
that the Interstate Commerce Commission attempted to expedite coal
deliveries to electric plants by doubling its demurrage charge for railroad
hopper cars standing idle at loading zones. 3 6 Although this ICC action
demonstrates that the Commission can respond to defined public
pressures 37 the necessity for this action was at least partially due to the
Commission's failure to recognize at an earlier date the short supply of
hopper cars and its possible effects upon the coal industry. Whether

preventive regulation might have forestalled the coal shortage is now a
moot issue, but the broader problem of whether federal commissions on
the whole are able to detect flaws in their regulatory mechanisms early
enough to avert gross harm still persists. This insensitivity to
incremental change in market conditions is widely regarded as a primary
disadvantage of commission regulation.438
C. Ineffective Regulations
In addition to the problems caused by regulatory policies that
conflict with each other, are wrongly imposed, or are unresponsive to

changing conditions, regulations sometimes simply do not work. In
some instances, provisions which appear viable at the planning stage
prove impractical when applied to an industry. In other instances, the
436. 35 Fed. Reg. 11402 (1970). Service Order No. 1043 stipulated that it would expire of its
own weight unless otherwise modified or changed at 11:59 P.M. on September 30, 1970. On
September 30, 1970, the expiration date was extended to December 31, 1970. 35 Fed. Reg. 15295
(1970). On December I1, 1970, the expiration date was further extended to June 30, 1971. 36 Fed.
Reg. 772 (1971).
437. It is interesting to note that on August 25, 1970, a resolution was submitted in the Senate
calling for the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs to conduct a study concerning the coal
shortage. S. Res. 457, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Of 5 probable causes singled out as worthy of
specific investigatory attention, the first was the inadequate number and availability of railroad
hopper cars to transport coal. The 4 other possible causes were: "(2) IT]he effect of the Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969-including the unavailability of coal mining equipment
required for compliance with the Act--on mine closings and loss of coal production and on the
increased costs of coal; (3) the increasing exportation of coal from the United States to foreign
markets; (4) the existing shortage of manpower needed for operating the nation's coal mines and the
lack of adequate training program for miners; and (5) the growing concentration of ownership of the
nation's sources of coal supplies among a few large operators who own and operate competing
sources of energy.
... 116 CONG. REC. 14,200 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1970).
438. See Phillips, supra note 417, at 882-83. The author considers this malfunction an
inherent defect in the regulatory process and lists 5 resulting adverse effects: (1) it hampers the
progress and efficiency of the regulated industry; (2) it prevents the public from receiving the
benefits for which regulation was imposed; (3) it is "costly" in terms of human energy and in legal
and managerial expenses; (4) it may "postpone or even deny justice"; and (5) it causes further delay.
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inability of planners to obtain information concerning regulated firms
has resulted in imprecise, unworkable regulations. When unworkable
regulations are combined with regulatory inertia, the problem becomes
acute; ineffective regulations are not swiftly replaced or redrafted, but
may linger and be mistakenly relied upon long after their inefficacy is
widely recognized. If government regulation is designed to replace
competition, failure of the system to achieve its goal will result in an
unchecked concentrated industry whose injurious characteristics are not
contained. The expanding consequences of this shortcoming are
particularly apparent in the atomic energy industry. An entire series of
amendments and revisions of the Atomic Energy Act were based on
regulatory safeguards that have since proved unworkable.
1. Inability To Rectify Unworkable Regulations.--The Atomic
Energy Act of 1946 gave the federal government almost complete
control over every facet of nuclear development and the Atomic Energy
Commission, created to carry out this program, was vested with
complete control over all nuclear material and nuclear production
facilities. 43 91 In 1954, the original Act was significantly amended to allow
a greater degree of private control in the nuclear energy field. 440 Although
the Government maintained strict ownership of fissionable material, it
permitted the private sector to construct and operate production and
utilization facilities subject only to AEC licensing requirements. 44' In
1964, the Act was further amended to authorize private ownership of
nuclear materials. 442 Today, therefore, subject to AEC licensing
requirements, the private sector is able to control both the material and
the means to produce atomic energy.
Although the 1954 amendments sanctioned private participation in
nuclear resource development, it also provided safeguards against
possible abuse of the newly acquired privilege by large energy firms.
Section 105(b) of the Act directs the AEC to "report promptly to the
Attorney General any information it may have with respect to any
439. Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, §§ 4(c)(1), 5(a)(2), 60 Stat. 755 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2061(a), 2073 (1964)).
440. Act of Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, §§ 101, 103, 68 Stat. 919, amending 42
U.S.C. § 1804(c) (1952) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2133 (1964)).
441. Complete AEC management of federal responsibilities also was diluted by the 1954 Act.
Direct control of various atomic energy functions was granted to such agencies as the Commissioner
of PMtents, the Federal Radiation Council, the Defense Department, the Department of Justice, and
the Civil Service Commission. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021(h), 2037, 2135, 2165, 2181 (1964).
442. Act of Aug. 26, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-489, § 4, 78 Stat. 602, amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 2073 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2073 (Supp. V, 1970)). This Act repealed 42 U.S.C.
§ 2072, which provided that all special nuclear .materials vested immediately in the Government
upon discovery.
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utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy which appears to
violate or to tend toward the violation of [antitrust laws] . . .or to
restrict free competition in free enterprise. ' 4 3 Section 105(c) further
provides that before any commercial license can be issued under section
103, the AEC must provide the Attorney General with information
concerning whether the proposed license would "tend to create or
maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws. . .. ,,44 The
Justice Department then is given 90 days in which to pass on the
application, and during this time the AEC may not issue the license.445 In
theory, society should benefit from these preventive measures. Not only
would constant vigilance allow the detection of anticompetitive trends at
their inception, but licenses could be denied before a great amount of
money is expended on construction. In practice, however, the fact that
the nation's largest oil companies are fast becoming the principal
holders of uranium is prima facie evidence that these provisions have not
worked. Although seventeen years ago the problem of potential
concentration in the nuclear field was specifically recognized, the
remedies then proposed have not worked, are not working, and most
importantly, are not being restructured so that they might work. Indeed,
the recently proposed liberal licensing requirements, and the possibility
that federally operated enrichment plants will be sold to private
enterprise when government leases expire446 only threaten to increase the
power of multi-fuel firms.
2. Inability To Obtain Precise Information.-The failure of the
A EC antitrust provisions to prevent oligopolistic growth has been
attributed to the inability of the Department of Justice to obtain
licensing information. 47 Without this information, the Justice
Department is virtually unable to accurately predict future
anticompetitive trends. This disclosure of information concerning the
affairs of large corporations is vital to the regulatory process. In order
for a regulatory body to make rational decisions, to avoid bureaucratic
delay, and to carry out congressional mandates, it must have access to
basic information. Without these facts, even the most efficient and
vigorous agencies cannot be expected to solve problems with precision,
and even the most carefully planned regulations can be nothing more
than guesswork.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
(1969).

42 U.S.C. § 2135(b) (1964).
Id. § 2135(c).
Id.
SELECTED MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 417-25.
Donnem, Antitrust Aspects of Facility Licensing, in I CCH ATOM. EN. L. REp.
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Attempts to provide regulatory agencies with the information they
need, however, have not always been successful. The Natural Gas
Information Act, for example, has never been enacted into law despite
repeated proposals. 448 If passed, the Act would require gas producers not
only to report discoveries but also to strictly account for gas reserves. 4"'
This information might well enable the FPC to formulate a clearer
pictu-re of the natural gas industry and perhaps aid it in determining
whether wellhead prices should be regulated. The circuity of administrative information gathering procedures also frustrates efforts to formulate precise regulations. The Office of Management and Budget

(OMB), for example, is charged with the duty of evaluating agency
information requests. In performing this function, the OMB has often
vetoed searthing and necessary agency inquiries and frequently has
converted requests for specific information into questionnaires too
general to inform adequately the agency involved. 50 In order to
determine rate structures, for example, the FPC drafted a form that
required electric utilities to account for "consultative" costs, such as
public relations, accounting, and legal expenses.45' The OMB objected
that this form was too burdensome to the electric industry. The weaker
448. S. 3900, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). This bill was again introduced on June 2, 1970.See
also 116 CoNG. Rac. 8195 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1970) (remarks of Senator Metcalf).
449. Many members of Congress have recently expressed the belief that the shortage of
natural gas is artificial, that it is a ruse perpetrated by the industry to secure higher rates, and that
once the rates are increased, tight supplies will miraculously loosen. One Congressman has pointed
out, for example, that a similar tight fuel supply existed throughout the winter of 1969-70, but that
after the price of heavy fuel oil had increased nearly 50%, the needed oil was found. 116 CONG. REC.
9314 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1970) (remarks of Congressman Evins). Similarly, Congressman Fulton has
stated that "this shortage is artificial, that this increase in demand could have been anticipated
months, even years ago, that it was anticipated but rather than increaseing the supply of fuel it was
deliberately held steady. .. The pap put out for public consumption. . is just a smoke screen
• . . to cover up the real reason behind the fuel shortage." 116 CONG. REC. 9095 (daily ed. Oct. 9,
1970). If this act is passed, these and other Congressmen will not have to speculate.
450. Under the Federal Reports Act of 1942, § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 139a(d) (1964), the Director of
the Bureau of the Budget is "authorized . .. to make a determination as to whether or not the
collection of any information by any Federal agency is necessary for the proper performance of the
functions of such agency . . . ." The Auditing and Accounting Act of 1950, 31 U.S.C. § 66b(b)
(1964), further provides that the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to "reorganize accounting
functions . . [to] eliminate accounting procedures. . . in order to [establish]. . . a unified system
of central accounting and reporting on the most efficient and useful basis."
451. Before agency information requests can be distributed, they must first be approved by
the OMB. Ralph Nader, testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental
Relations, expressed a widely held opinion that "[i]t is quite clear that the Bureau of the Budget, or
the Office of Management and Budget, as it is now called, has control over the Khyber Pass of
information procurement in the Federal Government." 116 CONG. REC. 9209 (daily ed. Oct. 14,
1970) (remarks of Senator Metcalf). See also 116 CONG. REc. 9216 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1970)
(remarks concerning article by Vic Reinerier, Executive Secretary to Senator Metcalf).

1971]

THE ENERGY CRISIS

version that was eventually passed requires the reporting of outside
payments of more than 10,000 dollars for companies that gross over 2.5
million dollars annually. Payments above 5,000 dollars must be reported
for companies that gross over one million dollars annually.4 52 Thus,
while the FPC is allowed to detect large and even some moderate
expenditures, smaller payments go unnoticed. In the aggregate, these
expenditures could become significant and should be available to a
commission charged with protecting the public interest.
D. Proposalsfor Regulatory Reform.
Federal efforts to regulate the fuel industry have led to an unhealthy
proliferation of regulatory authorities. The diffuse nature of federal
regulation makes it difficult to deal with new problems without creating
new regulatory agencies. The creation of each agency, however, merely
compounds the very problem that made its creation necessary. Perhaps
the multitude of agencies is an outgrowth of a typical regulatory
phenomenon: each seeks to undo the side effects of others, yet each
produces side effects that others must undo. Amid the jumble of
conflicting aims, one thing is clear-if federal regulation is to provide
adequate energy resources for the future, these regulations must be
carefully planned with respect to their effects, not only upon individual
fuels, but upon the total energy industry as well.
Most recent attempts at regulatory reform, however, have been
fashioned after the energy industry itself. As fuels have become
increasingly interchangeable, the reforms have sought to establish a
corresponding interchange between the agencies that regulate these fuels.
Generally, attempts to coordinate energy policy have banded together
diverse local, state, and federal agencies into a conglomerate regulatory
structure. The FPC, for example, has instituted a procedure whereby
Commission officials and personnel of appropriate state commissions
are able to work in conjunction with regional reliability
councils-agencies directly responsible for the in-the-field regulation of
utilities on a daily basis-in an effort to coordinate the work of all three
organizations.4 5 3 Similarly, the Office of Emergency Preparedness has
established the Interagency Power and Energy Committee, which is
composed of representatives of seven federal agencies and is designed to
coordinate energy regulation on a policy level.4 54 Although these interim
452.
453.

116 CONG. REc. 9209 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1970) (remarks of Senator Metcalf).
Hearings, supra note 13, at 117 (statement of John N. Nassikas, Chairman Federal

Power Commission).
454.

The Committee consists of representatives from the Atomic Energy Commission,
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measures may be necessary, they promise only limited long-term
advantages. First, there is no mechanism to insure that productive
suggestions from these exchanges of ideas will be implemented. Each
agency is still the ultimate authority within its own realm and can be
expected to oppose any action that would divest its authority. Secondly,
these coordinating committees only consolidate a small portion of the
total number of agencies whose functions affect the fuel industry. Thus,
although interchange and cooperation between government agencies is
desirable, current efforts may be too limited in scope to secure
coordinated control of total energy resources.
As a method of avoiding conflicts of policy, some proposals have
suggested that an explicit affirmative duty be imposed upon existing
agencies to interrelate their functions with those of other agencies. The
proposed Electric Power Environmental Policy Act,455 for example,
purports, under the direction of the FPC,45s to merge total electric
control with environmental objectives. Section 14(a) "requires that all
Federal departments and agencies seek to correlate the administration of
their laws governing . . . electric power resource matters so as to
facilitate an integrated decision by the Federal certifying agency
....
,,457 Although this approach may be more effective than a mere
coordinating committee, adequate electricity and a clean environment
are only two of the numerous national interests that require unitary
control. While the policy behind this Act is desirable, it seems unlikely
that the Act's format could be utilized as a solution to the overall
problem. A comprehensive act of this nature would have to include so
many separate interests that it probably would be impossible to manage.
As one observer has noted, "[A] more direct, time-saving answer might
be found in a statutory reorganization of the interstate electric power
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Department of the Interior, Federal Power
Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission, Office of Emergency Preparedness, and the Office
of Science and Technology. The Office of Science and Technology has recently completed a study of
long-range elctric utility expansion. This investigative committee was comprised of representatives
from the Atomic Energy Commission, Council on Environmental Quality, Department of the
Interior, Federal Power Commission, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Rural
Electrification Administration, and the Tennessee Valley Authority. Among other things, this
group recommended "preconstruction review" by a committee with local, state, and federal
representation of all future utility expansion.
455. S. 4421,91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
456. Although the Act purports to centralize all administrative functions within the FPC, the
Commission is empowered to delegate its responsibilities concerning nuclear plants to the Atomic
Energy Commission.
457. S. 4421, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 41(a) (1970).
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industry, a redrafting of the spheres of regulatory responsibility, and a
4
reallocation of regulatory resources.1 11
A recently proposed bill, which would establish a National
Commission on Fuels and Energy, 49 is perhaps the most promising
attempt to provide a successful system of fuel regulation and,
consequently, it has gained extensive congressional support.," The
purpose of the Commission would be to "make a full and complete
investigation and study of the energy demands and of the fuels and

energy resources

. . .

of the United States.

' 46 '

Based on this study, the

Commission would "recommend those programs and policies which are
most likely to insure, through maximum use of indigenous resources,
that the Nation's rapidly expanding requirements for low-cost energy
will be met, and in a manner consistent with the need to safeguard and
improve the quality of the environment. ' 46 2 The Commission is not
simply a statutory reorganization of energy regulation. It is rather a
proposal that acknowledges the need to approach total energy
requirements-including fossil, synthetic, and nuclear fuels, and the
environmental consequences of their production and use-on a
comprehensive basis. It is hoped the Commission would be able to
isolate the policies that must be adopted by the various regulatory
agencies in order to efficiently manage the nation's energy resources.
Once the objectives and the alternative means of achieving them are
made clear, the Government will have to decide whether a total energy
policy should be administered by a single regulatory agency.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REGULATING THE FUEL MARKET

Before basic fuel services can be effectively supplied to the nation, a
multitude of factors must be coordinated and a myriad of national
priorities must be considered. A successful method of allocation not only
must provide for the extraction, transportation, distribution, and sale of
energy products, but it also must reinforce other national interests, such
as concern over pollution, safety, and diverse national security
objectives. Unquestionably, the present system of generating national
fuel plans and priorities has failed to accomplish these goals. A
consistently adequate fuel supply is still lacking, and most measures
458. Miller, supra note 418, at 663.
459. S. 4092,91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
460. Introduced on July 16, 1970, the bill currently has more than 60 cosponsors. 116 CONG.
REC. 17,833 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1970) (remarks of Senator Randolph).
461. S.4092,91st Cong., 2d Sess., § 2(a) (1970).
462. Id.
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aimed at its achievement frustrate rather than foster related national
goals.
This lack of a discernable national fuel policy lies at the heart of the
energy crisis. The unworkable nature of the present regulatory structure,
which has resulted in conflicting policy objectives and overlapping
jurisdictions, ultimately can be traced to amorphous national fuel goals.
In view of the importance of energy resources, this country should
establish a consolidated fuel agency that would be accountable for a
comprehensive ordering of fuel priorities after considering the competing
interests of both the public and the industry. Only when overall fuel
planning is undertaken can the country accurately predict fuel needs and
develop a commensurate fuel supply. The precise regulatory directives by
which this goal may be implemented are a secondary consideration.
Initially, Government must choose a conceptual foundation upon which
specific policies will be based. Barring complete government ownership,
the remaining choice is between regulated monopoly and free
competition.1 3 These alternatives, however, are not mutually exclusive.
A system of federal regulation could be designed to operate within the
competitive framework." 4
Generally, pervasive commission regulation is not compatible with
competition, and it is beneficial to the economy only when competition
does not or cannot produce advantageous results. 6 5 In these situations,
comprehensive commission regulation can be a substitute for
competition by allocating resources, setting rates, determining profits,
and restraining the effects of monopoly. Commission regulation,
however, often effectively destroys chances for future competition.
Independent commissions frequently usurp the managerial functions of
regulated firms466 and drain an industry's potential for innovation and
463. See generally Lovejoy, Regulation of Business: The Needfor a Public Utility Concept, 3
S. TEx. L.J. 292 (1958); Phillips, supra note 417 at 881. Posner, supra note 135, at 548. But see
Loevinger, supra note 385, at 104.
464. "'Economists who believe that regulation is superior to public ownership, almost
unanimously recommend that a greater reliance be placed on competitive forces." C. PHILLIPS.
supra note 69, at 735.
465. Kaysen and Turner have recognized 3 situations in which competition does not operate
in the public interest: "(a) [s]ituations in which competition, as a practical matter, cannot exist or
survive for long, and in which, therefore, an unregulated market will not produce competitive results. (b) [s]ituations in which active competition exists, but where, because of the imperfections in
the market, competition does not produce one or more competitive results. [and] (c) [s]ituations in
which competition exists, or could exist, and has produced or may be expected to produce
competitive results, but where in light of other policy considerations competitive results are
unsatisfactory in one or more respects." C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 56, at 189-90.
466. C. PHILLIPS, supra note 69, at 737-38. See also Trebing, What's Wrong With
Commission Regulation?, 65 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 738 (1960).
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improvement. Competition, on the other hand, requires the initiative of
dynamic management for stable growth. Independent commissions also
generally bar free entry into the industry," s7 possibly stimulating
concentration,"' but commissioners fail to realize that the efficiency of
competition increases directly with increasing numbers of competitors.
Moreover, since these commissions tend to become "industryminded," 4 9 an independent commission might serve only to concentrate
control of fuel regulation in the hands of the regulated. A purely
competitive structure, however, would be equally undesirable. In the
absence of all governmental restraint, multifuel firms could continue to
accumulate vast power. The temptation to manipulate the market for
purposes far removed from the consumer's needs would be difficult to
resist in these circumstances. Thus while some form of federal direction
of the fuel industry is needed, it is clear that neither traditional
commission regulation nor pure competition can provide the delicate
balance needed to obtain adequate fuel service for the country.
A.

PeripheralMarket Regulation

Peripheral market regulation (PMR) is proposed as a method of
federal market supervision that would seek to insure an adequate
national fuel supply without incorporating the disadvantages inherent in
comprehensive governmental regulation or ungoverned competition.
Since the premise of peripheral market regulation is that competition
can best allocate energy resources, the Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission first should re-establish four separate competing fuel industries through the application of the antitrust laws. This
step, detailed previously, 470 should halt further concentration within the
various fuel markets and should allow petroleum and coal to compete in
these markets. Once the competitive market is assured, a National Fuel
Board should be established and charged with implementing the three
phases of PMR: (1) Minimum Supply Quotas-the guarantee of a fuel
supply adequate to meet the country's fuel needs; (2)
Planning-formulation of a national fuel plan; and (3) Research and
Development-coordination of expenditures to equate present and
future competitive positions of the various fuels through coordinated
technological advancement.
467.

See generally Nelson, The Role of Competition in the Regulated Industries, 11

ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (1966).

468. Schwartz, Crisisin the Commissions, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 23 (S. Krislov &
L. Musolfeds. 1964).
469. Id. at 25.
470. See notes 381-83, supra and accompanying text.
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This form of regulation is termed "peripheral" because the only
market intervention consists of establishing proper supply quotas. So
long as each industry complies with its quota, the National Fuel Board
should allow competition to regulate the market. By limiting the
Board's actions to the initial stages of the marketing process-the
supply of fuel--competitive forces will set prices and allocate resources.
1. Supervision of Supply.-The overriding objective of PMR is to
assure an adequate fuel supply within a competitive framework.
Although competition can provide the necessary resource allocation and
price determination, its performance in producing sufficient fuel has
been inadequate. PMR will affect the market in two ways-through
domestic production quotas and through import-export quotas.
Furthermore, limiting the National Fuel Board's power to these
minimal regulatory devices avoids the dominance of the market
structure that is often the result of government regulation. Rudiments of
these devices are present in today's regulatory structure for crude oil.
The power to set domestic crude oil production quotas is now vested in
state governmental regulatory agencies under various prorationing
statutes.4 11 In addition, the federal government, through the Mandatory
Oil Import Program, has controlled imports of crude oil since 1959.72
State prorationing was designed ostensibly as a fuel conservation
measure to prevent wasteful production of crude oil.4 73 Under the
prorationing system, state agencies allot to each oil well a portion of the
total production quota, which is determined on the basis of short-term
fuel consumption demands.4 74 These agency decisions are enforced
through the Connally Hot Oil Act,4 75 which prohibits interstate
transportation of oil produced in excess of state quotas. Existing
evidence, however, tends to show that the so called conservation purpose
471. See generally Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, decision
amended, 311 U.S. 614 (1940); Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932);
Williams, Conservationof Oil and Gas, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1155, 1159-63 (1952).
472. Presidential Proclamation No. 3279, 24 Fed. Reg. 1781 (1959). See generally Kellam,
Regulation of Oil Imports, 1961 DuKE L.J. 175.
473. The first state prorationing regulations, developed during the Depression, grew out of
the great waste from excess production in Oklahoma City and the east Texas oil fields. Without any
controls, the companies tapping the same pool of oil would try to get the jump on each other. They
would pump oil as fast as possible, many times reducing the natural pressures needed to extract the
oil, to such a point that oil reserves became unrecoverable. Prorationing statutes were initially
passed to prevent this wasteful production. See Williams, Relationship between State and Federal
Government with Respect to Oil and Gas Matters, 19th S.W. LEGAL FDN. OIL & GAS INST. 239,
248 (1968). See also Comment, supra note 121, at 318-19.
474.

See H. WILLIAMS, R. MAXWELL & C. MEYER, OIL AND GAS, CASES AND MATERIALS

631-32 (2d ed. 1964); Comment, supra note 121, at 318.
475. 49 Stat. 30 (1935), as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 715-715(m) (1958).
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of the agencies is a facade designed to prevent surplus oil production that
might lower crude oil prices. 47 Moreover, no prorationing agency has
been able effectively to anticipate and evaluate the effect of production
quotas set by other prorationing authorities.477 Attempts by the Bureau
of Mines to coordinate state prorationing decisions also have proved
largely fruitless; 478 thus it seems unlikely that these agencies themselves
could institute a unified fuel plan.
The crude oil import-export program has much the same effect as
the prorationing regulation. At present, imports of oil are restricted to
an amount that is equivalent to 12.2 percent of domestic demand in the
area east of the Rocky Mountains. 479 This figure, set in 1959, has
remained at a low level despite fuel oil shortages 'throughout the east
coast."" The quota system, designed to encourage domestic production
for reasons of national security,4"" has instead granted domestic
companies subsidies worth approximately 600 million dollars a year by
allowing them to import oil costing two dollars a barrel but worth
4 2
approximately three dollars and ninety cents after it clears customs.
Although the goals of these regulatory schemes may have been laudable
at their incipiency, they have become misdirected through the pressures
exerted by oil interests. State prorationing has been reduced to a system
to prevent any oil firm from producing sufficient fuel to drive down fuel
prices. The import-export scheme complements prorationing by
476. "[Olne of the most important consequences of prorationing has been the stabilization of
the price of petroleum products." H. WILLIAMS, R. MAXWELL, & C. MEYERS, supra note 474, at 81;
see ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. (1955). Comment, supra note 121, at 319;
Comment, Proration of Petroleum Production, 51 YALE L.J. 608 (1942); Bus. WEEK, May 17,
1969, at 104, cols. I & 2.
477. See E. ROSTOW, supra note 203, at 36, 41-42.
478. The Interstate Oil Compact, initially approved by Congress in 1935, functioned as an
agency of coordination, information, and policy guidance for its 29 member states in its early years.
Recently, however, the Commission has acted principally in an advisory capacity, and its services
have been attributable to voluntary adoption of its recommendations by member states rather than
to compulsion. This has allowed the Commission to become an informal discussion group for the
purpose of stabilizing or fixing the price of oil. In turn, this has led to inefficient allocation of
production quotas and an unnecessary burden on the Commission. W. LOVEJOY &P. HOMAN, supra
note 202, at 46-47; H. WILLIAMS, R. MAXWELL, &C. MEYERS, supra note 474, at 80 n. I1; see Kahn,
The Combined Effects of Crude Oil in the United States, 10 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 53, 57-60
(1970). But see Leach, The Interstate Oil Compact: A Study in Success, 10 OKLA. L. REv. 274
(1957).
479. See Lobel, supra note 149, at 10, col. 2; Bus. WEEK, May 17, 1969, at 99, col. 3.
480. See W. LovEjoY & P. HOMAN, supra note 202, at 123-25; Williams, supra note 473, at
258. Certain exemptions to the quota, however, have increased the percentage of oil imported in the
last 2 years. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1970, at 35,41; Wall Street J., Dec. 23, 1970, at 2 (S.W. ed.).
481. See W. LovEJoY & P. HOMAN, supra note 202, at 124; Lobel, supra note 149, at 10, col.
1. See also Kellam, supra note 472, at 175.
482. Lobel, supra note 149, at 10, col. 2; Bus. WEEK, May 17, 1969, at 99, col. 3.
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protecting domestic producers from the influx of lower priced foreign
oil. So long as these conditions are maintained, competition cannot be
4
fostered in the fuel industries. 3
Unlike petroleum production, natural gas distribution is controlled
by comprehensive federal regulation. Under the Natural Gas Act, the
Federal Power Commission has authority to set wellhead prices, specify
terms of sale, and certify transportation facilities.4" 4 Although the
Commission's jurisdiction does not extend to the actual gathering and
production of gas, its present power to set wellhead prices removes any
possibility for competitive self-regulation.4 85 In contrast, the only
existing control of coal production is a cooperative sales agency that is
concerned more with efficient marketing by its members than with
control of competition. 86 Obviously, there is no consistent regulation of
energy production nor any justification for the unequal treatment of the
various fuel industries.
The system of petroleum price maintenance, enforced by
government sanction, and the regulatory dominance of the natural gas
market must be eliminated before PMR can operate effectively. Erasing
this patchwork of anticompetitive regulation, however, requires two
preliminary steps. First, the Federal Power Commission should be
divested of all control over natural gas, and state agencies should be
deprived of their prorationing function. 8 7 Secondly, the power to
regulate the development, production, conservation, and supply of all
fuels must be vested exclusively in the National Fuel Board. With this
power, the National Fuel Board could begin to regulate the supply of
petroleum, natural gas, coal, and nuclear fuel to the national market.
483. "Taken together [state prorationing and import quotas] form a perfect pattern of
monopolistic control over oil production, the distribution thereof among refiners and distributors,
and ultimately the price paid by the public." S. REP. No. 25, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1949); see
Burck, U.S. Oil: A Giant Caught in Its Own Web, FORTUNE, Apr. 1965, at 202.
484. Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 821, as amended 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1958). See generally
Note, FPC Regulation oflndependent Producers of Natural Gas, 75 HARV. L. REv. 549 (1962).
485. See Williams, supra note 473, at 246, 250-53. See generally Miller, Competition in
Regulated Industries: Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines, 47 GEo. L.J. 224, 255 (1958).
486. The National Recovery Administration from 1933 to 1935, and the Bituminous Coal
Acts of 1935 and 1937 laid down minimum price schedules for the industry, but the actual effect of
these schedules on the coal market was slight; they were soon dropped, leaving the Depression-born
Appalachian Coal Agency as the only coordinating mechanism in the coal industry. See I S.
WHITNEY, supra note 187, at 395-410.
487. "The oil and gas so produced is essential to the national security, the national economy,
our whole industrial complex, and the social order. By far the largest part moves in interstate
commerce. Because of this, the development, production, and conservation of oil and gas is
peculiarly and extremely susceptible to federal intervention and control. I do not think that anyone
would question that Federal Government could, within its constitutional authority, take over the
regulation of the production and conservation of oil and gas." Williams, supra note 473, at 245-46.
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Although the Board will adopt measures similar to state prorationing
and import-export quotas for all fuels, these programs would be
implemented with a view toward providing an adequate supply of fuel
and not toward the maintenance of prices or market dominance. Once
this adequate supply of fuel is assured, fuel producers will be compelled
by competitive and economic pressures to allocate the fuel to meet the
nation's fuel needs. A brief sketch of the possible range of Board actions
will illustrate the function of peripheral market regulation.
(a) Petroleum.-The Board's primary tool in regulating the
supply of petroleum will be the establishment of domestic production
quotas and allocation of the quotas among various fuel producers. Since
one characteristic of the fuel crisis has been the persistent lack of
adequate fuel oil supplies, the Board could set domestic quotas to
balance fuel needs against dwindling domestic reserves. If the Board
finds that the nation's energy needs cannot be satisfied with domestic
production, it could permit foreign oil to be imported to correct the
deficiency. This importation of cheaper foreign oil also would help instill
further competition in the oil market. The Board additionally could
discourage overproduction, which dangerously depletes domestic
reserves, by prohibiting interstate transportation of oil produced in
excess of established quotas. Furthermore, should a supplier fail to
comply with the quota, then the unproduced share of the quota could be
permanently reassigned to other producers.
(b) Coal.-Export quotas rather than import quotas would be of
primary importance in supervising the supply of coal. Currently, the
country has vast coal reserves that should last for 800 to 1,000 years at
present rates of consumption. 8 8 Thus the Board would be more
concerned with assuring proper allocation of the coal produced than
with limiting production. Accordingly, domestic production quotas
could be determined on a long-range basis commensurate with the longterm contracts prevalent in the coal industry. To guarantee that
domestic production would be properly allocated, the Board could
prevent exportation of coal to lucrative foreign markets until this
country is provided with a sufficient supply of coal. Limiting exports
also might serve as a deterrent to the present epidemic of contract
breaking by major coal producers.
(c) Natural gas.-Inadequate production of natural gas has
stemmed from two possible factors: (1) A concerted slowdown of
488.

At present, proved recoverable reserves equal 380 billion tons. It is estimated that the
BITUMINOUS COAL FACTS, supra
note 23, at 9.

total recoverable reserves amount to 1,605 billion tons. See 1970
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production to increase natural gas prices; and (2) a severe shortage of
domestic natural gas reserves." 9 The first cause can be eliminated by the
imposition of domestic production quotas. In determining these quotas,
the National Fuel Board would have to consider many of the same
factors that influence oil production quotas, primarily natural gas needs
and gas conservation. The impact of the second factor could be
minimized by allowing the importation of natural gas from foreign
sources."'
2. Collateral Promotion of Competition.-Although inadequate
fuel supply was a major contributor, many other factors combined to
produce recent fuel shortages. In some areas of the country, for example,
coal producers who mined sufficient coal were unable to market the fuel
because of inadequate transportation facilities. 9 Similarly, government
promotion of atomic energy led to cutbacks in coal production;
consequently, when the development of atomic energy proved to be an
expensive, problem plagued task, the public was forced to turn to the
scarce supplies produced by a declining coal industry. 9 If a coordinated
system of fuel planning and government sponsored research and
development had been undertaken, many, if not most, of the causes of
the fuel shortage could have been foreseen and averted. Accurate
forecasts of the transportation facilities needed to move coal might have
enabled the Interstate Commerce Commission to provide economic
incentives to railroad companies to facilitate the movement of coal
hopper cars. Likewise, a more balanced research and development effort
in the competing coal and atomic fuels industries might have improved
coal's status as an efficient competitor.
To alleviate these unnecessary contributors to the fuel shortage, the
National Fuel Board should be empowered to develop a comprehensive
national fuel plan including the coordination of government research
and development. This plan should be implemented with the objective of
maintaining and improving the competitive position of each fuel within
the energy industry.
(a) Planning.-The provision of basic fuel services has been
impeded by numerous conflicting national priorities. Fuel conservation,
new environmental standards, and national security are examples of the
489. Wall Street J., Oct. 5, 1970, at 1, col. 5 (S.W. ed.).
490. At present, for example, Canada is allowed to supply only 3% of the nation's natural gas
consumption. Hearings,supra note 13, at 166 (statement of Hollis M. Dole, Assistant Secretary for
Mineral Resources, Department of the Interior).

491.
492.

FORTUNE, Nov. 1970, at 76-77.
FORBES, Nov. 15, 1968, at 55-58.
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external pressures that affect the supply of fuel. Although each of these
national concerns should be considered and will continue to affect fuel
production, there is no need for their effect to be totally unpredictable.
Further fuel shortages can only be averted when each separate objective
is coordinated by a comprehensive fuel plan. The quota system serves as
an illustration of the Board's future planning function.
The import quota program was designed, not with a view to the
needs of the consumer or to other factors shaping fuel demands, but
solely as a national security measure.493 As a result of this single-policy
focus, less expensive and plentiful fuel has been denied to the American
consumer, who must bid for scarce domestic supplies.494 Yet the import
system has been virtually unassailable, even in the face of a fuel crisis.
Furthermore, by limiting petroleum imports, domestic reserves are being
depleted, creating the danger that reserves will be insufficient if an
emergency should arise that cuts off fuel imports. Likewise, the rapid
depletion of domestic reserves caused by the withholding of foreign oil
guarantees future fuel crises if foreign oil becomes unavailable because
of increased demand overseas.495 These potential dangers could be
eliminated by a comprehensive fuel planning scheme. Instead of
promoting a misdirected national security motive, import quotas would
be utilized primarily to assure an adequate fuel supply. In determining
import quotas, the National Fuel Board could consider all relevant
factors, including fuel needs, interfuel competition, national security,
and fuel conservation.
The conflicting national priorities are only one example of the
collateral factors affecting the fuel supply. There are numerous other
similarly conflicting priorities. These include: (1) The need for a
favorable balance of payments and the shortages caused by exporting
domestic coal; (2) the oil depletion allowance and its encouragement of
domestic oil depletion; and (3) the vast federal subsidies of atomic energy
research and development and the lack of spending in the area of coal
research even though coal reserves exceed reserves of fissionable
material. To harmonize these disparate objectives, the Board would have
to compile all the data concerning the national fuel supply, including
production, imports, exports, transportation, and distribution. Among
the numerous tasks that the Board would then face is the determination
of the effect that current import quota levels have on the depletion of
493. See note 30, supra and accompanying text.
494. Id.
495. See Lobel, supra note 149, at 15-17. See also Bus. WEEK, May 17, 1969, at 99; Nashville
Tennessean, Oct. 8, 1970, at 1, col. 3.
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domestic reserves and, in turn, the effect of domestic depletion on future
fuel demands should foreign fuel supplies become unavailable. The
Board also would be able to analyze the impact of import quotas on
domestic fuel prices and competitive conditions in the fuel industries.
The information gathered by the Board would have the additional
advantage of facilitating fuel planning by the industry and Government.
Since projected fuel needs and programs would be available to the
public, for example, a fuel producer would be able to foresee the fuel
needs for a given area in light of the various pressures affecting the fuel
supply in that region. In addition, other government agencies that
directly affect the supply of fuel would have a ready source of
information concerning the country's fuel needs. The Interstate
Commerce Commission, for example, would be able to predict more
accurately the number of hopper cars necessary to move fuel supplies to
their markets and could avert future transportation shortages. In turn,
the National Fuel Board would have to establish liaison with these
agencies to facilitate interagency coordination.
(b) Research and development.-In addition to the National Fuel
Board's planning function, it is suggested that the concept of peripheral
market regulation include supervising research and development in nonnuclear fuels. Presently, federal research grants that may have direct
impact on the energy market are administered by a myriad of
governmental agencies, usually without regard to the competitive
consequences that a particular grant may produce. If all federal research
and development expenditures were administered by the National Fuel
Board, however, a plan for uniform competitive technological growth
could be implemented. This suggestion has been prompted by recent
reports that five major petroleum companies, including Continental,
Gulf, and Humble, are seeking to develop the synthetic petroleum
process. 496 While research and development in the area of the conversion
of coal to petroleum products is essential, it may be wiser from a policy
viewpoint to allow the coal industry itself to develop the synthesis
process. This arrangement would help assure viable competition in the
future between petroleum and coal derivative products and could be
carried out with a minimum of difficulty. If the policy decision were
made that separate development of synthetic petroleum is desired,
federal research and development money would be allocated exclusively
to the coal industry. This arrangement would certainly not halt an oil
company's expansion into the synthetic petroleum market, but by
496.
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providing needed capital, it would place the coal industry on a
competitive par with other members of the fuel market. For the present,
the technical development of nuclear energy should remain the project of
the Atomic Energy Commission. As nuclear fuel plays an increasingly
dominant role in the nation's fuel market and as technical advances in its
usage make it a lower risk fuel, the regulation of atomic energy should be
shifted to the National Fuel Board in order to insure its proper
integration with fossil fuels as an energy source.
B.

ProceduralImplementation

Before the National Fuel Board can perform its peripheral market
regulatory function, procedures must be adopted so that the objectives
can be accomplished. The problem is to adopt both formal and informal
proceedings in which the Fuel Board can formulate a national policy, set
the requisite quotas, and provide an opportunity for the constitutent
members of the market to have a voice in the rule making process
consistent with procedural due process.
In establishing the National Fuel Board, the congressional enabling
act should define carefully the powers of the Board to prevent
government dominance of the market. The statute should give appellate
courts a standard by which to judge the Board's actions by specifying
that regulation of the periphery of the market is designed to promote
competition. In addition, the enabling act should set forth qualifications
for Board membership that would exclude persons who are subservient
to the regulated industries. This selectivity in the choice of Board
members should prevent interested industries from controlling the Board
and alleviate one of the major problems with present regulatory
schemes.497
For convenience of analysis, the proposed functioning of the Board
is divided into two categories: (I) the policy formulation
phase--development of a unified approach to the regulation of the
supply of fuels to all markets; and (2) the operational phase-the initial
allotment of available quotas among the enterprises in the fuels market
and the reallocation of the quota of a particular enterprise if its
production levels do not comport with the expectations of the Board.
The first function is essentially a legislative one and includes, in
addition to general policy formulation, the month-by-month
determination of the proper amounts of fuel to be produced in a
geographic region and the quantities of fuel to be imported and
497.

Schwartz, supra note 468, at 23, 24-25.
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exported.5 9 These determinations will have to be made largely on the
basis of past experience and results of surveys conducted by the Board
staff. To accomplish this function, the Board will have to rely on
sophisticated economic analysis of the fuel requirements for each section
of the country. After the data is accumulated, the Board should be in a
position to set and publish the monthly quotas. Because of the shortrange nature of these decisions, it is recommended that the time
consuming adversary hearing not be employed as the short-run quotas
are established, but that the fuel industries be encouraged to submit
written briefs setting forth their assessment of regional fuel
requirements.4 99 This procedure seems to satisfy the traditional concept
of procedural due process. As Professor Davis has observed: "The
method of trial is never appropriate except when facts are in dispute.
When the disputed facts are adjudicative, a trial is normally required by
due process. When the only disputed facts are legislative, a trial may or
may not be convenient, but it is probably never required by due
process. ' 50 Since the determination that the Board will be making in
this phase of its functioning is strictly prospective, its policy conclusions
501
will be legislative in nature.
The second kind of determination that the Board will make involves
the reallocation of existing production or import-export permits held by
the individual enterprises that constitute the petroleum, coal, or natural
gas industries. As outlined above, if a firm's production or importation
does not meet the expectations of the Board during an appropriate
period of time, a procedure must be adopted to reassign the unused
portion of the quotas. It is suggested that a formal adversary proceeding
be used since the issues presented will be adjudicative in natures" -was
498. Presently, the Bureau of Mines furnishes detailed data regarding monthly estimates of
the amount of oil that it is anticipated the total market will require from each state. Walden, supra
note 150, at 741,780.
499. "After notice required by this section, the agency shall afford interested persons an
opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views or
arguments with or without opportunity to present the same orally in any manner; and, after
consideration of all relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in any rules adopted a
...
Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5
concise general statement of their basis and purpose.
U.S.C. § 1003(b) (1964). See also Brown, Public Service Commission Procedure-A Problem and
a Suggestion, 87 U. PA. L. REv. 139 (1938).
500. 1 K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.06, at 432 (1958); see Gonzales v.

United States, 348 U.S. 407, 412 n.4 (1955).
501. "Legislative facts do not usually concern the immediate parties but are general facts
which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion." I K.C. DAVIS, supra
note500, § 7.02, at413.
502. "Adjudicative facts are the facts about the parties and their activities, businesses, and
properties. . . adjudicative facts are roughly the kind of facts that go to a jury in a jury case." Id.
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the quota complied with? Was there a reasonable excuse for the
inadequate production? "A party who has a sufficient interest or right at
stake in a determination of governmental action should be entitled to an
opportunity to know and to meet, with the weapons of rebuttal evidence,
cross-examination, and argument, unfavorable evidence of adjudicative
facts, except in the rare circumstance when some other interest, such as
national security, justifies an overriding of the interest in fair
03
hearing.".
Of course, the determinations made by the Board in both phases of
its operation will be subject to review by the appropriate federal courts
of appeals. It is suggested, however, that the administrative orders
should become effective while appeals are pending, and the appellate
courts should be specifically denied jurisdiction to enjoin enforcement of
the orders. If a court found that a Board decision was clearly erroneous,
it could retroactively restore the injured party to its prior position;
meanwhile, the Board could function without being delayed by
numerous appeals.
C. Conclusion
Proposed adoption of peripheral market regulation is merely a
recognition that competition alone will not assure the country of an adequate fuel supply. Although the literature that has grown out of past fuel
crises is replete with allegations that fuel producers have artificially
created fuel shortages in order to preserve high profit margins, the
oligopolistic market structure cannot be isolated as the sole cause of the
present fuel crisis. There is, in fact, substantial evidence that supply
shortages have resulted from a multitude of factors-such as new environmental standards-wholly unrelated to the oligopolistic market
structure. The promotion of competition through peripheral market
regulation is not intended as implied support of those who indict the fuel
producers for the shortage. Instead, it is a recognition that competition,
channeled by minimal regulation, is the best method of solving the fuel
shortage problem. The goal of peripheral regulation is competititon and
not governmental dominance of the market place.
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